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Science is possible only because at any one time there is a body
of conventions or views or ideas that are taken for granted and on
which scientists build. If each individual writer were to go back
and question all the premises that underlie what he is doing, no-
body would ever get anywhere.
Milton Friedman (1975: 17f.)
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Preface
This dissertation focuses on selected issues of the Phillips curve debate. Thus, it is part of “one
of the great public works enterprises of all time” since Phillips’ article “has provided more
employment than any project since the construction of the Erie Canal” (Solow 1979: 36). In-
deed, the accumulated literature on the Phillips curve is enormous (JSTOR’s Data for Research
database lists over 6700 entries related to the term “Phillips curve”), which not only shows that
this topic kept (and still keeps) economists—including myself—busy, but which also reinforces
Paul Samuelson’s view (in Burns and Samuelson 1967: 54) that the Phillips curve “is one of
the most important concepts of our times” (a point of view very recently shared by Snower
2015: 110).
Hence, even though so much has been written on this topic by much more sophisticated
economists than myself, the important role of the Phillips curve in nearly any macroeconomic
model and the ongoing debates, be it about theoretical or policy-related issues, prove that
the Phillips curve is still a worthwhile topic for research. This is not only true for “modern”
approaches, but also with respect to the history of economic thought as recent research by
Forder (2014) on the Phillips curve “myth” shows.
At the beginning of this dissertation it was not my intention to focus in particular on the his-
tory of economic thought regarding the Phillips curve discussion. Rather, the New Keynesian
model and related approaches caught my attention at Vrst. However, since I prefer to have a
founded knowledge about the things I am writing on, I considered it mandatory to have a look
at the original Phillips curve article. What I read in this and in related papers, however, was
not what I had expected. Indeed, most of it seemed to stand in contrast to my basic textbook
knowledge, which proclaimed the naive long-run Phillips curve trade-oU since the late 1950s
and the salvation from this myopic view at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.
Thus, I felt that a detailed analysis of this discussion seemed necessary before any modern
approach could be discussed. Acquiring this knowledge, for diUerent and most of the time
personal reasons, took much longer than expected, so that this dissertation focuses particularly
on the developments in the 1960s and not, as intended at the very beginning of my research,
on recent approaches. In this respect, Friedman’s introductory statement—which by the way
is part of Friedman’s discussion of Phillips’ view about his curve—that “nobody would ever
get anywhere” if indeed everyone “were to go back and question all the premises that underlie
what he is doing” is quite correct. On the other hand, the results of my research show that an
advancement of knowledge is also possible by challenging the “body of conventions or views or
ideas that are taken for granted”. Indeed, a thorough discussion of diUerent lines of thought is
not just of theoretical, but particularly of practical interest since—as Solow (1978: 203) remarked
about the conference at which Lucas and Sargent (1978) presented their devastating criticism
of the Phillips curve—even though “the battles that are fought [...] appear to be fought with
antique pop guns, the bullets are real and they may soon be Vred at you by the Federal Reserve.”
xv
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General Outline
The general structure of this dissertation, of which the main part consists of three already
published articles, is as follows: After some organisational remarks and notes in this Preface,
an introduction to the included journal articles on the Phillips curve will follow in Chapter 1.
The respective articles are reproduced in the Chapters 2, 3, and 4. A discussion of these articles
and of important results of other essays of mine not included in this dissertation will take place
in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
Article Overview
The following three articles and their contents are reproduced in this Ph.D. thesis with kind
permissions from the respective copyright holders, that is, with permission from each journal’s
publisher as well as with permissions from the copyright holders of included third-party mate-
rial (for example, diagrams). For more information regarding these permissions see the Chapter
“Copyright and Permissions”. All three essays were published in peer-reviewed journals:
A.W. Phillips and His Curve: Stabilisation Policies, InWation Expectations and the “Menu
of Choice” This article was published in 2012 in The European Journal of the History of
Economic Thought 19(6), 976–1003. It is reproduced in Chapter 2.
Samuelson and Solow on the Phillips Curve and the “Menu of Choice”: A Retrospective
This paper was published in 2013 in Œconomia 3(3), 359-389. It is reproduced in Chapter 3.
Growth as an Objective of Economic Policy in the Early 1960s: The Role of Aggregate De-
mand This essay was published in 2014 in Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political
Economy 2(67), 175–206. It is reproduced in Chapter 4.
The following papers are not yet published but were also written during my research on the
Phillips curve. Since these papers are not included in this Ph.D. thesis, a short summary will be
provided for each essay. However, because these papers extend and strengthen the arguments
presented in the three already published articles, the results of these yet unpublished essays
will also be part of the discussion in Chapter 5.1
1More information regarding these papers is available upon request. Please write to schwarzer.econ@gmail.com.
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Article Overview
The Cost of InWation vs. the Cost of Unemployment: A Review of the Pioneering Con-
tribution of Grant L. Reuber This essay was presented at the 2012 History of Economics
Society Annual Conference at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada. It will be
cited as Schwarzer (2015a).
This paper analyses the contributions by Reuber (1962, 1964), which focus on contemporary
monetary policy issues in Canada. The 1962 study can be regarded as the Vrst calculation of an
optimal point on the Phillips curve by taking into account the gains of reduced unemployment
and the economic costs of higher inWation. It is shown that Reuber’s proposal to accept some
inWation in order to reduce the rate of unemployment was based on the assumption of pre-
vailing involuntary unemployment. Making use of the Phillips curve trade-oU was endorsed,
even though Reuber was well aware of the theoretical importance of inWation expectations and
of the possibility of endogenous changes regarding the behaviour of economic subjects. How-
ever, empirical evidence seemed to show very convincingly that the trade-oU had remained
stable under diUerent conditions of aggregate demand pressure in the past. Furthermore, due
to endogenous increases in productivity, removing involuntary unemployment did not go hand
in hand with a lower level of real wages, but instead was accompanied by an increase in the
real wage. Therefore, particularly wage earners proVted from making use of the trade-oU by re-
moving involuntary unemployment at the cost of a higher rate of inWation. Hence, even though
Reuber’s essay seems to be an inWationist proposal at Vrst sight and thus Vts very well into the
usual textbook trade-oU story, it is argued in this paper that Reuber’s study was actually quite
sophisticated, that it took into account many elements of later developments such as the role
of inWation expectations or to a certain extent even the Lucas critique, and that the underlying
assumptions (particularly involuntary unemployment) were very diUerent from later trade-oU
models since Friedman’s Presidential Address (Friedman 1968).
The Non-InWationary Rate of Unemployment (NIRU): The Revival of the Long-Run Trade-
OU and of Active Stabilisation Policies in the 1970s This paper was presented at the 2012
PROCOPE-Symposium “Business Cycles and Growth” at the University of Hohenheim and
at the 2013 Séminaire Cournot of the Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA) in
Strasbourg. It will be cited in this thesis as Schwarzer (2015b).
This essay discusses the concept of the “Non-InWationary Rate of Unemployment” (NIRU) of
Modigliani and Papademos (1975, 1976, 1978), which emerged out of the contemporary issue
of stagWation due to oil price shocks and which is to be regarded as a forerunner of the bet-
ter known “Non-Accelerating InWation Rate of Unemployment” (NAIRU). The NIRU concept
criticised the (monetarist) policy implications of Friedman’s “natural rate of unemployment”,
which not only denied a trade-oU between inWation and unemployment in the long run, but
also opposed the idea of Vne-tuning and that of active economic policy. The NIRU framework
in contrast emphasised the important role of active stabilisation policies to minimise the loss
of society in the case of supply side shocks. However, whereas the long-run Phillips curve is
vertical at the “natural rate of unemployment”, the NIRU framework essentially incorporates
a negatively sloped long-run Phillips curve at least for unemployment rates higher than the
NIRU. Thus, two important elements of the discussion in the 1960s, that is, active demand
xvii
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management and a long-run trade-oU between inWation and unemployment, were revived in
the NIRU framework.
Phelps 1967 vs. Phelps 1968: The Phillips-Curve Discussion at its Turning Point This
paper was presented at the 2015 Ph.D. Seminar of the Keynes-Gesellschaft in Graz at the Karl-
Franzens-Universität, at the 2015 Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of
Economic Thought at Roma Tre University, and at the 18th Summer School on History of Eco-
nomic Thought, Economic Philosophy and Economic History at the University of Hohenheim.
It will be cited in this thesis as Schwarzer (2015c).
Two important contributions of Phelps at the end of the 1960s are compared with each
other in this paper. It is shown that Phelps’ 1967 article is very diUerent to the 1968a one
with respect to the causality underlying the Phillips curve and the policymaker’s motive to
make use of the trade-oU: While the 1967 contribution essentially interprets the Phillips curve
as an equilibrium relation in the sense that both workers and Vrms remain on their labour-
supply and labour-demand curves all the time, even though this equilibrium is unstable due
to fully adjusting inWation expectations, the 1968 paper interprets the Phillips curve in the
same way as Phillips (1958b) and Lipsey (1960) did, that is, as a disequilibrium relation, so
that at least one party on the labour market is oU their supply or demand curves. The motive
to exploit the temporary trade-oU in the 1967 paper is based on the assumption of involuntary
unemployment in some sectors of the economy due to separated labour markets and an unequal
distribution of demand among them. This approach thus incorporates elements of the original
Phillips curve discussion, particularly to be found in Schultze (1959) and Lipsey (1960). In the
1968 contribution, unemployment is modelled as search unemployment. Nonetheless, due to
the possibility of downwardly sticky wages, involuntary unemployment can also be prevalent
even though the economy is in macroequilibrium. Because of Phelps’ focus on involuntary
unemployment in both contributions, his account of the Phillips curve trade-oU is much closer
to the “dilemma view” of the early 1960s than to Friedman’s approach. For this reason and
due to Phelps’ preference for active economic policy, it is argued in this paper that Phelps’
contributions to the Phillips curve discussion are, contrary to those of Friedman, not a critique
of the trade-oU, but a reVnement thereof. This is also apparent since Phelps emphasised the
possibility of an endogenous “natural rate of unemployment”, for example, due to hysteresis.
Price Stability vs. Full Employment: Friedman and the “Cruel Dilemma” This essay was
presented at the 2014 Ph.D. Seminar of the Keynes-Gesellschaft in Darmstadt and at the 2014
Summer School on History of Economic Thought, Economic Philosophy and Economic History
at the University of Zaragoza. It will be cited in this dissertation as Schwarzer (2015d).
This essay extends the argument already sketched in the paper on Samuelson and Solow (see
Section 3.4) that Friedman argued within a diUerent framework of the inWationary process. The
paper thus reviews the cost-push demand-pull inWation debate and highlights the role of the
Phillips curve as a quantitative assessment of the inWationary process. The Phillips curve for
most economists seemed to show that the policy goals of full employment and price stabil-
ity are conWicting policy objectives, so that the choice between the two objectives necessarily
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resembled a “cruel dilemma”. Particularly strong unions seemed to be responsible for this con-
Wict by demanding wage increases higher than productivity growth as soon as employment
came anywhere near to the full employment level. In contrast to this dilemma view, especially
Friedman argued that unions cannot be responsible for inWation, since the rate of inWation is
ultimately determined by monetary policy. Therefore, it is argued in the paper, there is no
inherent conWict between price stability and full employment in Friedman’s account of the
Phillips curve. The only mechanism for trading oU inWation for unemployment hence can be
due to surprise inWation. However, his characterisation of the “natural rate of unemployment”
indeed includes cost-push forces such as the aggressiveness of unions, so that Friedman essen-
tially deVned away the beforehand lively debated incompatibility between both policy goals.
Friedman’s arguments thus were met with much scepticism and criticism, since his view was
perceived as falling back into a framework of the inWationary process based on an L-shaped
supply curve. It is then shown that Friedman’s critique of the Phillips curve trade-oU essen-
tially rested on two elements: on assuming a diUerent inWationary process and on emphasising
the role of inWation expectations. However, his Presidential Address and his Nobel Lecture fo-
cus only on the latter, but not on the former. In this sense, it is argued in this essay, Friedman
silently abandoned the dilemma view and thus reinterpreted the negatively sloped Phillips
curve as a relation which will only show up due to surprise inWation. The issue of an unavoid-
able inWationary bias at full employment thus disappeared and the original trade-oU between
inWation and underemployment became to be subsequently understood as a relation to push
the economy beyond full employment by surprise inWation. Thus, the Phillips curve trade-oU
after Friedman’s critique has not much in common with the previous dilemma interpretation
any more.
The following notable working paper is still subject to change, but nevertheless marks an
important milestone on the way to this dissertation:
Optimising Agents and Deliberation Costs: The Case of InWation Expectations This pa-
per was written in joint collaboration with my colleague Niels Geiger and was presented at the
2011 Graz Schumpeter Summer School at the Graz Schumpeter Centre.
It is argued in this essay that modern macroeconomic models building upon Calvo pric-
ing could be improved by taking into account that processing information comes at a cost:
the cost of thinking, or, more abstract, the costs of the whole decision process (deliberation
costs). Hence, instead of imposing an external restriction onto economic agents which cannot
be changed no matter how high the costs of such a restriction (for example, an unchanged
Calvo “lottery” even though there is hyperinWation), it is argued that taking deliberation costs
into account allows for a more realistic restriction in the sense that agents can decide by them-
selves and based on their own optimality considerations when to update or make use of new
information. By focusing on inWation expectations, the approach is in principle close to the
ideas of learning (Evans and Honkapohja 2001), rational inattention (Sims 1998, 2003, 2006;
Reis 2006a, b), sticky information (Mankiw and Reis 2002), or near-rational wage and price set-
ting (Akerlof and Yellen 1985; Akerlof et al. 1996, 2000). For example, in the case of a credible
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inWation target of the central bank, adaptive inWation expectations or even static expectations
(expecting the central bank’s inWation target) can be considered to be optimal on a cost-beneVt
approach.
Supplementary Notes
In order to make the appearance of this dissertation and of the included articles as uniform as
possible without completely changing the original style of each article, the following modiV-
cations have been made:
• Abstracts and acknowledgements have been made uniform in appearance throughout all
articles.
• Headings and captions were adjusted, missing headings (for example, “Introduction” in
Chapter 3) were added.
• The numbering of sections and Vgures now includes the chapter number, however, with
the same subsequent numbering of each section and Vgure as in the original article.
• Information with respect to the permission to reproduce copyright-protected material
has been updated.
• Footnotes have the same numbering as in the original articles. Where necessary, the
footnote counter has been adjusted accordingly (for example, in Chapter 4).
• Some minor typographical errors as well as some minor errors with respect to typesetting
(for example, missing italics in the references) have been corrected.
No other changes have been made to the articles, particularly no changes have been made with
respect to the content of the already published articles included in this thesis.
Because some time has passed since these articles were published and as each article nec-
essarily reWects the scientiVc progress at that point in time, my knowledge and views about
some details have changed (and new results by other researchers have become available). Since
I regard such an evolution of ideas as the natural way of how a Ph.D. thesis develops, these
details will not be debated separately but will be part of the discussion in Chapter 5. However,
serious content-related errors and inaccuracies which came to my mind after the articles had
been published are outlined in the following Section “Errata”.
Errata
The following errors or inaccuracies have been found after the publication of the articles:
• In Chapter 2 on page 39 in Footnote 2 the term “potential output” is used, which is
appropriate given Phillips’ assumption of the target of a stable price level. However,
Phillips did not use this term as the reference value in order to calculate the “error in
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production”. Rather, it is “[t]he diUerence between the actual production and desired
production at any time [which] will be called the error in production” (Phillips 1954: 293).
Since “desired production”, as is discussed in this chapter, can be but need not be that
level of production at which prices are stable, the term “potential output” is too narrow
to describe Phillips’ deVnition of the “error in production”.
• In Chapter 2 on page 50 Samuelson and Solow (1960) are presented as having introduced
the term “Phillips curve”. This is not correct, since it was most likely Routh (1959: 304)
who made use of this term for the Vrst time.
• In Chapter 4 on page 95 it is stated that “the real rate of interest might be lowered if
the nominal rate does not adjust fully to the higher rate of inWation, so that the marginal
eXciency of capital rises and therefore induces further investment”. This statement is not
fully correct, since there is no change of the marginal eXciency of capital as such if the
real rate of interest changes. Rather, the lower real rate of interest at a given marginal
eXciency of capital will induce additional investment as long as investment as such is
interest-rate elastic. Hence, it is a movement on a given investment schedule being neg-
atively dependent on the real rate of interest, but no shift of such a curve. This error
was probably introduced while rearranging some formulations, since in the next sen-
tence expressions such as “optimistic atmosphere” and “general spirit of optimism” are
mentioned, which indeed point at a higher expected rate of return on investment for a
given real rate of interest.
• In Chapter 4 on page 100 the term “aggregate supply curve” is used although actually a re-
lation close to the Phillips curve is discussed. This is due to the fact that Black (1959: 147)
made use of the term “aggregate supply curve or function” since he “is unable to think
of any other name which suggests its actual function adequately” even though Black
(1959: 147) was fully aware that there is an important diUerence between an aggregate
supply curve and the concept which became known as the Phillips curve (on the dif-
ference see Subsection 1.3.2 and Section 2.6). Black (1959: 147) thus correctly noted that
an aggregate supply curve shows “the quantity of the supply of goods which will be
forthcoming at any given price, or alternatively the price which will be needed to induce
producers to supply any given quantity”, while the curve used in his analysis is closer
to a Phillips curve since it “indicates rather the behaviour of prices over time which will
result from any given level of employment.”
• The caption of Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 on page 101 should rather be “The Trade-OU Be-
tween Price Stability, Employment, and Growth” than “The Trade-OU Between InWation,
Employment, and Growth” in order to better represent the diUerent goals of economic
policy.
• In Chapter 4 on page 99 and on page 103 it is stated that the rate of growth in the
neoclassical growth model in the long run solely depends on population growth and
technical progress. This emphasis on the neoclassical model should not imply that this
implication is not to be found within “Keynesian” growth models.
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A Note on the Term “Keynesian”
Throughout this dissertation the term “Keynesian” will catch the reader’s eye and might raise
the question why this term was used even though there might be no clear connection to John
Maynard Keynes himself, or even worse, a possible misinterpretation of Keynes’ contributions.
The reason to use this term is quite straightforward: Many contemporary opinions and con-
cepts discussed in this dissertation, particularly also the non-vertical long-run Phillips curve,
were labelled “Keynesian”—or even ascribed to Keynes himself—by proponents as well as by
opponents of respective ideas (see, for example, Tobin 1967: 103f. and Friedman 1975: 16f., who
both refer to the role of “Keynesian” money illusion for the negative slope of the long-run
Phillips curve).
Since I do recognise that such labelling is problematic, the term thus is usually used within
quotation marks. Indeed, also in the 1960s and 1970s this term was perceived by some econo-
mists as being very questionable. Smithies (1961: 546, n. 8), for example, stated that “I wish I
could save words and simply say the analysis [...] is ‘Keynesian.’ Unfortunately that term has
acquired so many political overtones that its scientiVc usefulness has been seriously impaired.”
Nevertheless, even though the term is and was blurred, it was an essential term at times of the
Phillips curve discussion. Indeed, Lucas and Sargent (1978) used the label “Keynesian”—“a Wag
a lot of people salute” (Lucas in Snowdon and Vane 1999b: 155)—explicitly to address the issues
related to the idea of a stable non-vertical long-run Phillips curve.
Of course, making use of an alternative term to describe and summarise this general line
of thought, for example, “economists of the Neoclassical Synthesis”, might have been better
suited on some occasions, in the same sense as the term “New Neoclassical Synthesis” (Good-
friend and King 1997; Goodfriend 2004) might be preferred to the term “New Keynesian Eco-
nomics” for current mainstream models featuring a “New Keynesian Phillips Curve” (Roberts
1995: 979).2 However, the term “Keynesian” would have still been present in the contemporary
contributions and thus in quotes included in this thesis, so that this disclaimer would have been
necessary anyway. Furthermore, the term “Keynesian” most of the time probably serves better
in order to draw a line between the two rivalling lines of thought which are discussed in this
dissertation, that is, the long-run Phillips curve trade-oU proponents and their “monetarist” op-
ponents, particularly Milton Friedman. Moreover, important economists of this Phillips curve
debate such as Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow are also labelled as “Keynesians” in other
2As is well known, the term “Keynesian” in New Keynesian economics is used since nominal rigidities are as-
sumed, which is close to the preliminary assumption of a Vxed nominal wage in Chapter 2 of Keynes’ General
Theory, even though this assumption is replaced by Wexible wages in Chapter 19. See, for example, Woodford
(2003: 218) for making reference to Keynes’ emphasis on sticky wages. However, as Meccheri (2007: 713U.)
points out, the assumption of Wexible wages and prices would restore full employment at the same “natural
rate of unemployment” in standard New Keynesian models (see critically Trautwein and Zouache 2009), while
Keynes argued that even Wexible wages do not guarantee that the economy will achieve full employment by its
own devices (see Spahn 2009: 182; see also Boianovsky and Trautwein 2003: 428 for reference to the inWuence
of Wicksell’s “cumulative process” on Keynes; see furthermore Patinkin 1948 and Leijonhufvud 1968: 49U.).
Phillips (1958a: 385f.) saw his approach to macro-dynamics within this “Keynesian” tradition of inherently
unstable market economies—indeed, Leijonhufvud (1968: 396f.) noted that “I feel that this was the direction in
which Keynes’ work pointed.”
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more recent contributions on the history of economic thought (see, for example, Young et al.
2004: 114), so that it seems to be a problematic, albeit common, term.
Furthermore and in general, this dissertation does neither aim at disentangling “Keynesian”
concepts from Keynes’ contributions, nor does it aim at a discussion of whether or not pro-
ponents or critics of the long-run Phillips curve trade-oU rightly or wrongly and implicitly or
explicitly also accused Keynes himself of endorsing such a trade-oU view or other doubtful
“Keynesian” concepts. Such an approach is part of the discussion in Rivot (2013: 10U.), which
turned out to be very diXcult, if not problematic (see Colander 2014: 520), due to the fact that
Keynes and critics of the long-run Phillips curve such as Friedman lived and wrote at diUerent
times and thus faced diUerent economic circumstances. Of course, this diXculty in itself is no
reason to dodge the issue, and indeed, where appropriate, some critical remarks are included
in this dissertation and in the research articles. But a deeper investigation of this controver-
sial subject would not have been possible within the narrow word count limit and within the
speciVc research questions of each article. Hence, in order to take full account of such issues,
nothing less than a completely diUerent dissertation would have been appropriate. However,
since I do not claim to be an expert on Keynes, I follow Samuelson (1958: 340) who emphasises
that “[p]art of learning a subject is learning when to reserve judgment.” Hence, I will only point
at some important details with respect to the Phillips curve discussion and particularly what
most likely should not be ascribed to Keynes, but without the claim of being complete or taking
full account of the issue:
Keynes’ view of the inWationary process was lively debated by contemporary economists
(see, for example, Boianovsky 2005) and it hence would not have been possible to fully review
this discussion. Furthermore, many economists already discussed Keynes’ view of the inWation-
ary process (see, for example, Leeson 1999), also in comparison with Friedman’s view (see, for
example, Davidson 1972: 867U.), or with respect to Keynes’ preferences regarding inWation and
unemployment (see, for example, O’Connell 2016). In a nutshell, many contributions empha-
sise that “Keynes was not an inWationist” (Skidelsky 2009: xviii). Harcourt (2000: 305f.) hence
points out that the common Phillips curve trade-oU has nothing to do with Keynes’ work in
general, even though, as already noted, the Phillips curve, Keynesianism, and Keynes are of-
ten regarded to be connected (see, for example, Friedman 1997: 3f.). In the same vein, Solow
(1976: 5) remarked about the Phillips curve that “there is little that is speciVcally Keynesian
about it, either historically or analytically.” According to Harcourt (2000: 305f.), Keynes’ view
of the relationship between wages, inWation, and unemployment was far more complex and
depended on the speciVc economic circumstances.
In the General Theory Keynes (1936: 10) assumed that an increase in output will be accom-
panied by a fall in real wages, since prices rise stronger than money wages due to increasing
marginal costs (see also Spahn 2000: 15, n. 22). This rise in employment at a falling real wage is
in line with Keynes’ (1936: 14f.) argument that workers care not only about the real wage, but
also about their relative wages (see also Tobin 1972b: 3 and Meccheri 2007: 705).3 On the other
hand, Keynes (1939: 44) conceded that a rise in output may also go hand in hand with a rise in
3As Keynes (1939: 40) pointed out, he himself was also accused of “deceiving, so to speak, the working classes
into accepting a lower real wage”. For a discussion of Keynes and the role of money illusion see Trevithick
(1975). See also Section 5.5.
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real wages if, among other reasons, the economy is facing severe excess capacity, so that a rise
in output will not raise marginal costs but rather diminish them at least over a certain range
(see also the diagram in McCombie 1985: 244 and the discussion in Hagemann 1988: 200U.).
Thus, the relation between employment, prices, nominal and real wages is subject to change
depending on the speciVc circumstances in the economy. At least, there is no L-shaped supply
curve assumed in Keynes’ writings (see Rivot 2013: 25), even though such a kinked supply curve
is usually regarded as being part of “Keynesian” analysis (see, for example, Lipsey 1963: 415f.).
Furthermore, it is clear that Keynes did not advocate to make use of inWation in order to
increase the level of employment beyond full employment (see Rivot 2013: 75f.). Spahn (2016)
thus remarked that Friedman’s statement that aiming at an employment rate higher than the
“natural rate” will only lead to inWation is not in contrast to Keynes, since “[t]he ‘discovery’
that money growth beyond the point of full employment will necessarily lead to inWation
without increasing output can already be read in the General Theory (Keynes 1936: 303). There
is hardly any deviation from Friedman’s acceleration principle, although one has to concede
that a systematic treatment of inWation expectation[s] is missing in Keynes (but note that trend
inWation is a post-WWII phenomenon).” Also Hicks (1950: 124) remarked that “[h]as not Keynes
taught us that when an uncontrolled economy reaches a position of full employment, without
the expansionary forces being exhausted, it will break into a boundless inWation of wages and
prices, unless the inWation is counteracted by monetary restriction?” In the same vein, but after
the monetarist counter-revolution, Modigliani (1986: 29) stated that “the non-existence of a
‘long-run trade-oU’ between inWation and unemployment [...] can be seen as a rehabilitation
of Keynes’ notion of a unique upper bound to sustainable employment or, from a diUerent
perspective, of the traditional view that in the longest run the stock of money – or its time
derivative of any order – must be ‘neutral’. This view, which was brieWy lost in the burst of
enthusiasm over the Phillips Curve, is at present broadly accepted by macroeconomists of most
persuasions, at least as implying an upper bound to employment in the Keynesian sense.”
As has been sketched in this section, the term “Keynesian” as well as the concept of the
Phillips curve are not necessarily related to Keynes and his writings. Nevertheless, since this
term was used in the contemporary debate, it will also be used in the following discussion
subject to the disclaimer above.
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1.1 The Phillips Curve and the History of Economic Thought
The history of the Phillips curve reWects nothing less than the history of macroeconomics par-
ticularly since the end of the 1950s: Due to the fact that the Phillips curve debate features
important economic elements such as wages, prices, unemployment, output, unions, business
cycles, expectations, monetary and Vscal policies, and so on, the whole discussion is deeply em-
bedded in any macroeconomic discourse. Because of this vast amount of research comprising
various lines of thought, Rothschild (1971: 245) remarked that “it would require a very spe-
cialised knowledge indeed (and lots of space) to give a full account of all the ramiVcations into
which the debate has run.” In this respect, a complete discussion of the history of the Phillips
curve or connected elements would have required to go far back in time and to extend the
analysis to nearly any economist alive or dead (see Humphrey 1985 on some early forerunners
of the Phillips curve).
Therefore, it was necessary to restrict my own research to some key aspects: The explicit
focus in this thesis will be on the original Phillips curve and on those subsequent contributions
considered to be path-breaking on an international level (such as Friedman’s Presidential Ad-
dress). Hence, the discussion most of the time focuses on the debate in the 1960s in the UK and
in the USA. Thus, as with Keynes, only casual remarks to possible forerunners or to compara-
ble debates outside of the UK and the USA are made in the papers included in this thesis, even
though I am fully aware that similar concepts had been developed and similar issues had been
debated before or at the same time in other countries. For example, Reuber’s 1962 analysis of
the Canadian Phillips curve will play an important role in Section 5.3. A noteworthy debate
regarding the compatibility of full employment and price stability also took place particularly
since the mid-1940s in Sweden and is partly covered in the edited volume by Turvey (1952).1 In
this sense, originality of the literature and concepts reviewed in this thesis is not claimed at all.
However, even though the focus is on the discussion in the UK and in the USA, the amount of
literature which had to be reviewed was not only enormous, but also diverse and oUered many
diUerent interpretations of the Phillips curve.
Since each new interpretation and explanation regarding this relationship either was a re-
Vnement or criticism of previous ideas, knowledge about the development of the underlying
assumptions of each Phillips curve concept is crucial for understanding the diUerent lines of
thought. For example, are markets assumed to be non-clearing in the short run as in the orig-
1See, for example, also the contributions by Eagly (1964) or Jacobsson and Lindbeck (1969), who concluded
that price stability and full employment (unemployment below 2 per cent) are conWicting policy objectives
in Sweden. See furthermore Lindbeck (1968: 18U.) for an overview about the Swedish experience and related
contemporary theoretical discourses.
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inal interpretation by Phillips (1958b) and Lipsey (1960), so that there is a place for active
stabilisation policies, or are all markets assumed to be in equilibrium in general, only to be dis-
turbed by policy shocks as in New Classical models such as the one in Lucas (1975)? ReWecting
on these diUerent assumptions and putting the whole model in its historical as well as theo-
retical context hence is crucial to appreciate the explanation each theory oUers and to avoid
misunderstandings. For example, Meltzer’s (2012: 31) rather recent statement that “Keynesians
introduced a Phillips curve relating departures from full employment to inWation. Their work
in the 1960s implied that policymakers could choose to raise the inWation rate to increase em-
ployment” is Wawed in many respects. As will be shown, especially the idea that “Keynesians”
tried to push the economy beyond full employment by means of creating (unexpected) inWa-
tion must be strongly refuted by the available evidence. If at all, “Keynesians” tried to remove
involuntary unemployment by accepting some modest inWation as the natural outcome of an
economy at full employment. Particularly this inWationary bias at full employment gave rise
to the “cruel dilemma” and thus to a long-run trade-oU between price stability and full em-
ployment. The emphasis of a trade-oU between (unexpected) inWation and overemployment,
as stated by Meltzer above, thus is not a “Keynesian” concept. Rather, as will be shown, it is
the trade-oU concept underlying Friedman’s line of thought which also became incorporated
into the New Classical framework. Hence, even though both lines of thought feature a trade-oU
between two economic variables, one related to the rate of inWation and the other one related
to economic activity, each trade-oU concept is embedded within a speciVc economic frame-
work which also leads to diUerent normative statements. Despite these diUerences, which will
be elaborated more deeply in this thesis to show that there are many interpretations of the
Phillips curve trade-oU, the term “trade-oU” will be used throughout this thesis independently
of the underlying theory or line of thought: The term will be used for describing the possibility
for economic policy to temporarily move on a given Phillips curve (short-run trade-oU) or to
even pin down the economy to a speciVc combination of inWation and unemployment (long-
run trade-oU). Meltzer’s quote, however, strikingly shows how easily this notion of a trade-oU
can be misinterpreted if this concept is discussed out of context.
Particularly Phillips’ original contributions, but also those that followed shortly thereafter,
are prone to being misinterpreted, since they mark the beginning of a new way of analysing
and discussing the inWationary process. Even though the relationship between unemployment
and inWation or, more general, economic activity and its relation to the price level, had been
studied many times before, Phillips’ estimation of a stable relation for nearly 100 years between
unemployment and wage rate changes “was the discovery of order where before there seemed
to be only chaos” (Lipsey 1962: 108). Lipsey’s (1960) shortly following econometric conVrmation
and theoretical underpinning of the curve spurred further research in this direction. However,
by being pioneering contributions, the whole line of argument is often not fully developed,
the focus not always perfectly clear, and the importance of each result not fully understood.
Without doubt, these caveats do not only apply to Phillips and his followers, but also to other
pioneers such as Friedman, who presented an internally inconsistent explanation of the Phillips
curve trade-oU in his Presidential Address in 1967 (see Laidler 2012: 20U.), but which nonethe-
less (and for good reasons)2 was included in the top 20 articles ever published in the American
2Indeed, the “stagWation” (a term created by Iain Macleod in 1965, the spokesman on economic issues for the
2
1.1 The Phillips Curve and the History of Economic Thought
Economic Review (see Arrow et al. 2011: 4f.).
Focusing on a detailed analysis of such pioneering contributions thus can help to disentangle
the often heated debate between diUerent lines of thought. Pioneering work within the history
of economic thought regarding the Phillips curve has especially been conducted by Leeson
(1994a, b, c, 1995a, b, 1996a, b, 1997a, b, c, d, 1998a, b, 1999). But being most of the time a
pioneer himself, some arguments and interpretations might be amended by a more detailed
analysis as is argued in some parts of this thesis (see Section 2.6). Other researchers in the
last years, most notably Forder (2010a, b, 2014), also focused on the history of the Phillips
curve. This recent research provides a balanced account of the trade-oU interpretation of the
Phillips curve. However, whereas Forder often takes a broad perspective, my own research
examined selected contributions to the Phillips curve in more detail and put them into context.
Furthermore, Forder’s and my assessment regarding the trade-oU interpretation of the Phillips
curve diUer with respect to some important details (see Section 3.4 and Chapter 6).
Three main research questions can be found throughout all of my papers, also in those essays
not included in this dissertation:
1. Was the Phillips curve really interpreted as oUering a long-run trade-oU or a “menu of
choice” between inWation and unemployment? If so, was the Phillips curve also perceived
as a stable relationship oUering a trade-oU in the long run based on the idea of permanent
money illusion? Do reasons other than permanent money illusion make a stable trade-oU
plausible?
2. If the Phillips curve was interpreted as a long-run trade-oU between inWation and un-
employment, why did it seem to be necessary to make use of it? If so, which policy
combinations were proposed, why were they proposed and were they truly inWationary?
What underlying factors were regarded as being responsible for the perceived inherent
incompatibility of full employment and price stability?
3. What elements and results of the Phillips curve discussion until the 1970s can be regarded
as being important and noteworthy even today?
As will be shown in the three articles included in this thesis, as well as in the other papers
of mine, providing a clear and straightforward answer to these questions is not as easy as it
seems at Vrst sight. Even though sometimes seemingly unambiguous terms and vocabulary
United Kingdom’s Conservative Party; see Nelson and Nikolov 2004: 293) of the 1970s seemed to conVrm
particularly Friedman’s prediction of an accelerating inWation and the breakdown of the stable Phillips curve
and thus rendered his criticism attractive not only from a pure theoretical, but also from an empirical point
of view (see Lucas 1973b: 382, Lucas 1981: 560, Friedman in Taylor 2001: 124, and Taylor in Solow et al.
2009: 75). Mayer (1999: 117) thus concluded that the “Great InWation” of the 1970s was also caused by the idea
of a long-run trade-oU between inWation and unemployment: “There are several villains, and the biggest one
turns out to be then prevailing views of economists, and not malicious political interference with the central
bank, or cartel-imposed supply shocks. We have met the enemy and he is (or rather was) us.” On the other
hand, oil price shocks and the following productivity slowdown contributed considerably to the bad economic
performance (see Blinder 1982: 275U. and Solow 1992: 162U.), so that Solow (1992: 171) concluded that “[t]he
policies that led to avoidable overheating and excess liquidity in the 1960s were guilty of manslaughter but
not Vrst-degree murder.”
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such as “menu of choice” were used in contemporary contributions, a deeper analysis indeed
shows that particularly these expressions have to be interpreted carefully. This is especially
true with respect to the development of the Phillips curve. Since the Phillips curve today is
already framed by and embedded within the typical distinction between a short-run and long-
run relation, that is, within Friedman’s framework, the meaning of such terms also changed
since they had been used for the Vrst time. By taking the historical circumstances into account
and by putting each contribution into the general theoretical context, it becomes possible to
disentangle the diUerent meanings and interpretations of each term over time and to take full
account of each important detail within the respective contribution.
In order to provide a general overview of the essays included in this thesis and to show how
they are connected with each other, a short summary of the three articles in the next subsection
will highlight the main scopes and results of each paper.
1.2 Three Times the Phillips Curve
The Vrst of the three articles included in this dissertation (Chapter 2) focuses on the role of the
Phillips curve within Phillips’ research programme. Phillips’ research interest and approach to
economic theory clearly were inWuenced by his career as an electrical engineer, the best ex-
ample being the “Phillips Machine” (Phillips 1950). Phillips was sceptical regarding the usually
applied static analysis of economic systems as, on the one hand, movements of prices and the
interest rate cannot be observed in such static models and as, on the other hand, the dynamic
process itself will not ensure that an equilibrium will actually be reached. Phillips thus became
interested in the upcoming concept of automatic stabilisers which were regarded as a viable
alternative to pure discretionary policy. However, knowledge about their implications for the
dynamics in the economy was rare. Phillips thus focused on the analysis of the dynamics of
economic systems in continuous time. Especially the question which automatic stabilisation
policy or which combination thereof may serve best in reducing economic Wuctuations consti-
tuted the core of his research programme—a question which Phillips analysed with methods
which originated in the engineering literature, where optimal stabilisation rules emerged “from
conventional linear-quadratic optimisation problems” (Turnovsky 2011: 68).
The Phillips curve, as is argued in Chapter 2, thus was part of this research programme on
stabilisation policies, since it provided an empirical estimate of the speed of price adjustments
if the economy is in disequilibrium. Since Wexible prices themselves may contribute to the
overall stability—but in certain circumstances also to the instability—of the system, such a guess
about price dynamics provided helpful information about the inherent stability of a market
economy. In the same sense, also price and inWation expectations were discussed by Phillips
as an important stabilising or destabilising force. InWation expectations, however, by being
implemented on the demand side of the economy, were discussed in a diUerent way than by
Friedman (1966a; 1968) and Phelps (1967).
However, as is shown in this article on Phillips, also the trade-oU view is indeed prevalent
in his writings, even though it is argued that the trade-oU has to be interpreted in the histor-
ical context. Particularly cost-push forces (such as strong unions) as a cause of inWation, in
combination with the Vxed exchange rate system of the time, created enormous problems for
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economic policy. In this sense, the Phillips curve also for Phillips served as a trade-oU rela-
tionship and there is no clear indication that it was not regarded as a long-run one. However,
in the contemporary context, economic policies were discussed and implemented in order to
assure full employment and price stability at the same time and there is no notion of mak-
ing use of surprise inWation to steer the economy towards an unsustainable level of over-full
employment—to the contrary: Since a perceived conWict between full employment and price
stability in the UK existed, Phillips proposed to endure a higher unemployment rate in order
to Vght inWation while also emphasising the need to shift the curve to the left by structural
adjustments on the supply side.
This trade-oU interpretation of the Phillips curve and the importance of the historical con-
text are discussed in more detail in the article on Samuelson and Solow (1960) in Chapter 3.
The cost-push demand-pull debate about the causes of inWation without apparent aggregate
excess demand at the end of the 1950s is emphasised as the reason why the Phillips curve as
a quantitative answer to the (in-)compatibility of full employment and price stability was en-
dorsed by Samuelson and Solow. In this respect, “[t]he Phillips curve was one way of making
sense of that episode” (Solow 1976: 4). Furthermore, Samuelson and Solow were very scepti-
cal about the stability of the relation, for example, due to adjusting inWation expectations and
hysteresis. Thus, Phelps’ (1995: 17) statement that “the Keynes–Phillips orthodoxy was sail-
ing on smooth waters, the object of much congratulation, rather like the liner Titanic prior
to its collision with the fateful iceberg” is plainly wrong. Due to the speciVc interpretation
of the Phillips curve in light of the cost-push demand-pull debate, Chapter 3 also shows that
Friedman’s attack on the curve rested on two diUerent arguments. On the one hand, on the
importance of inWation expectations, which, however, was actually well-known and acknowl-
edged by many contemporary economists. On the other hand, on the denial of any long-run
eUect of cost-push forces on the rate of inWation. Thus, in Friedman’s view, a structural conWict
between price stability and full employment does not exist, since “[i]nWation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon” (Friedman 1963: 39 and 1966b: 18). Ongoing inWation
thus cannot be due to cost-push forces, but can only emerge due to demand-pull factors, that
is, an inadequate monetary expansion. The Phillips curve trade-oU therefore is decoupled from
its original interpretation and incorporated into an essentially conWict-free economy. Whereas
inWation in the “Keynesian” view was regarded as an inevitable outcome of a full-employment
economy, surprise inWation is the driving force of the short-run trade-oU between inWation and
unemployment in Friedman’s framework. The paper thus argues that Friedman’s attack on the
trade-oUwas not only based on the emphasis of inWation expectations, but more fundamentally
attacked the whole assumed underlying economic structure, since in his view full employment
and price stability are not conWicting policy objectives as it was perceived by Samuelson and
Solow (1960) and other contemporary economists.
Chapter 4 discusses the importance of this perceived conWict between full employment and
price stability in the broader historical but also economical context. It is shown that there was
a lively debate about the relation of the third major policy objective—a high rate of economic
growth—to the other two policy objectives of full employment and price stability. A high rate
of growth was regarded to be of utmost importance in the USA due to the perceived military
threat of the Soviet Union. Hence, the choice of an optimal combination between all three
objectives was not just regarded as an important but diXcult issue of economic policy, it also
5
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was perceived—as drastic as it may sound—as a matter of survival.3
The paper discusses three diUerent lines of thought. On the one hand, the “Keynesian” ap-
proach which emphasised the importance of high demand pressure to foster investment and
therefore the rate of growth. On the other hand, proponents of the “Paishian” view argued
that some slack in the economy could be beneVcial to keep up economic incentives to improve
productivity and to implement cost-saving ways of production. This view was more prominent
in the UK than in the USA, due to ongoing issues with respect to the balance-of-payments
which limited the possibilities of economic policy to opt for a high demand-pressure econ-
omy. Economists of the third, “sceptical”, view argued that empirical evidence indicated that
the rate of growth was rather independent from the rate of inWation and the overall rate of
capacity utilisation, which was also in line with their theoretical reasoning.
This article thus shows that the conWict between full employment and price stability was
augmented by a third dimension.4 Lipsey (1963: 521) hence remarked that if the rate of growth
actually depends on the level of unemployment “then a much more complex choice confronts
us in deciding our relative preferences between growth, stable prices and employment.” The
paper thus discusses the compatibility of “the holy trinity that has become standard: full em-
ployment, economic growth, and stable prices” (Friedman 1982: 100), which was also analysed
within a Phillips curve framework as is shown at the end of the article.
In sum, all three papers have in common that they demonstrate that the interpretation of
the Phillips curve in the 1960s was very diUerent from subsequent interpretations after Fried-
man and Phelps. The policy objectives of full employment and stable prices were perceived to
stand in conWict with one another due to an inWationary bias of the economy at full employ-
ment, whereas particularly Friedman argued that full employment, that is, the “natural rate of
unemployment”, is compatible with any rate of inWation, deWation, or price stability.
However, since the three articles included in this Ph.D. thesis do not provide a deeper analy-
sis of the writings of probably the most important contributor to the Phillips curve discussion
in the 1960s, Richard Lipsey, a review of his writings is appropriate and necessary for clarifying
important concepts and terms to be used within the papers and the discussion. Furthermore,
in contrast to Phillips, who abstained from the Phillips curve debate nearly completely shortly
after his seminal paper had been published, Lipsey has relentlessly participated in the whole
Phillips curve debate up to today. Thus, an analysis of Lipsey’s contributions provides impor-
tant insights into how the interpretation of the Phillips curve evolved over time. Furthermore,
such an analysis will help to clarify the terms used in this thesis and will shed light on diUerent
Phillips curve concepts.5
3However, some contemporary authors were sceptical that a faster rate of growth than that of the Soviet Union
was a necessary or even suXcient condition to assure the nation’s security. On the one hand, Viner (1963: 24)
remarked that not output as such but the structure of production (consumption versus military goods) might
be more important. On the other hand, Tobin (1964: 6) conceded that a high level of output does not necessarily
also imply military strength since “[n]uclear technology has made this connection looser than ever.”
4Another source of a possible conWict for economic policy was, of course, posed by the Vxed exchange rate
regime of Bretton Woods. This conWict is particularly pronounced in Phillips’ writings (see Section 2.6) and
also in Reuber’s (1962; 1964) analysis of feasible Canadian economic policy choices (Canada as a small open
economy built the basis for the Mundell-Fleming model; see Mundell 1961a, b, 1962, 1963 and Fleming 1962).
5The following discussion in Section 1.3 and some parts in Section 5.4 are based on an essay which was pre-
sented at the 2013 History of Economics Society’s Annual Conference at the University of British Columbia,
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1.3 From an Adjustment Relation to a Trade-OU
Interpretation: The Role of Richard Lipsey
Lipsey’s 1960 article was one major reason why Phillips’ paper, and not other contributions,
such as Dicks-Mireaux and Dow (1959) or Klein and Ball (1959), “caught the profession’s eye”
since “Phillips’s article was extended in a brilliant piece by Richard Lipsey” (Santomero and
Seater 1978: 500). Hence, Lipsey’s (1962: 106) original assertion that he only “played some small
part” in this discussion is a clear understatement: A closer look at the citation count in journals
available on JSTOR indeed reveals that Lipsey’s 1960 contribution was cited considerably more
often than comparable articles such as Dicks-Mireaux and Dow (1959) or even Samuelson and
Solow (1960) (see Figure 1.1). Since the mid-1960s, the cumulated amount of Lipsey’s citations
was at least around 60 per cent of those of Phillips (1958b) and even reached some 80 per cent
in the early 1990s (see Figure 1.2).6
Figure 1.1: Cumulated Citations of Phillips (1958b), Lipsey (1960), Dicks-Mireaux and
Dow (1959), and Samuelson and Solow (1960), 1958–2010, JSTOR.
Own illustration. Source: http://dfr.jstor.org. See Footnote 6 for further details.
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Besides Lipsey’s important role with respect to the theoretical underpinning of the Phillips
curve, Lipsey’s empirical assessment of the curve was a major step towards establishing the
Vancouver. It was discussed at length with Richard Lipsey at the conference and the following days.
6Search pattern for both Vgures: Phillips (1958b): “The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change
of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom” AND Phillips AND 1861 AND 1957 AND 1958. Lipsey (1960):
“The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United King-
dom” AND “A Further Analysis” AND Lipsey. Dicks-Mireaux and Dow (1959): “The Determinants of Wage
InWation” AND “United Kingdom” AND Dicks-Mireaux AND Dow. Samuelson and Solow (1960): “Analyti-
cal Aspects of Anti-InWation Policy” AND Samuelson AND Solow. Search only in references. Unfortunately,
the author had no access to the Social Science Citation Index before 1975 so that JSTOR’s Data for Research
database was used as a second-best solution. JSTOR, however, covers many distinguished journals, for exam-
ple, The American Economic Review, Econometrica, and Economica, so that not all journals but at least the
most important ones are included in this database. This database search was conducted on 17 April 2013. A
similar search in June 2015 generated unreliable results for unknown reasons.
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Figure 1.2: Relative Cumulated Citations of Lipsey (1960) in Per Cent of Phillips’ (1958b)
Cumulated Citations, 1958–2010, JSTOR.
Own illustration. Source: http://dfr.jstor.org. See Footnote 6 for further details.
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Pe
r C
en
t
Phillips curve in the economics profession as Phillips estimated his curve not by standard
methods, but by making various simpliVcations. Hence, before analysing Lipsey’s theoretical
contributions to the Phillips curve discussion, a short review of Lipsey’s empirical assessment of
Phillips’ estimations will be given in Subsection 1.3.1. This review of Phillips’ and Lipsey’s ways
of estimating the curve will provide a more thorough analysis of the empirical Phillips curve
compared to Section 2.3 and 2.4. Furthermore, recent research suggests that also Samuelson and
Solow (1960) made use of Phillips’ technique instead of just drawing a “freehand Vt” (Bodkin
1966: 31) as is supposed in Section 3.3.7
The 1960 paper was written while Lipsey still was in regular contact with Phillips (see Lipsey
2000a: 238). Lipsey (1960: 1, n. 1) also gave credit to Phillips in the acknowledgements section
pointing out that he is “particularly indebted to Professor Phillips for his constant aid and
encouragement” (see also Lipsey 2000a: 236). Hence, an analysis of Lipsey’s 1960 contribution to
the theoretical underpinning of the curve in Subsection 1.3.2 will oUer deeper insights not only
into Lipsey’s interpretation of the curve, but also indirectly into Phillips’ own view about the
curve (which is discussed more deeply in Chapter 2). Furthermore, Friedman’s derivation and
interpretation of the Phillips curve will be reviewed and compared with Phillips’ and Lipsey’s
views.
Subsection 1.3.3 will then focus on the important distinction between the Phillips curve of
a single market in one sector of the economy and the Phillips curve in the aggregate. The
relation between inWation and unemployment on the macro level, as will be shown, crucially
depends on the distribution of demand and therefore of unemployment over all sectors in the
7See on this issue the debate between Hall and Hart (2012, 2015) (who argue that Samuelson and Solow must
have drawn their Phillips curve by hand since standard econometric regressions do not show such a relation)
and Hoover (2015a, b) (who argues that Samuelson and Solow applied Phillips’ estimation technique with
which the Samuelson-Solow curve can be derived).
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economy. This approach of treating the macro Phillips curve as an aggregation phenomenon
has important policy implications as will be more deeply discussed in Chapter 5.
Not only Lipsey’s Vrst contribution to the Phillips curve debate, but also an essay follow-
ing some years later marked a milestone in the discussion, since it was Lipsey himself who
contributed to the reinterpretation of the Phillips curve from being a short-run adjustment
function to becoming a long-run trade-oU relation. While Lipsey (1978: 58U. and 1981b: 547)
emphasised that the curve had been interpreted by Lipsey (1960) as a disequilibrium relation
in line with Phillips’ view, that is, as showing the speed of adjustment if there is excess de-
mand or supply in the economy, Lipsey (1978: 56f. and 1981b: 557, n. 16) also admitted that, at
least for one time, he had used the curve as if it provided a long-run trade-oU between inWa-
tion and unemployment. Hence, Lipsey (2000a: 240, n. 8) noted that “[i]n Lipsey (1964) [Lipsey
(1965)] I drew a stable Phillips Curve and used policymakers’ indiUerence curves to establish
the optimal combination of unemployment and inWation.” This contribution is cited besides
Okun (1965) in the well-known paper by Phelps (1967: 255, n. 1) as oUering such a long-run
trade-oU view. Also subsequent writers after Phelps (1967) cited Lipsey (1965) as a prominent
example of the long-run trade-oU assumption (see, for example, Johnson 1983: 191, n. 4). Laidler
(2010: 122f.) hence pointed out that Lipsey (1965) was one of “the real culprits”. In this sense,
Lipsey (2000a: 237, n. 6) remarked that “[f]or myself, by the time I wrote the Phillips piece I
strongly advocated putting up with signiVcant amounts of inWation as the price of keeping un-
employment low”. This trade-oU view will be discussed in Subsection 1.3.4 and, together with
an investigation of diUerent editions of Lipsey’s textbook (Section 5.4), will play an important
role in the concluding discussion in Chapter 5.
Subsection 1.3.5 will provide a short summary, highlighting the diUerent possible interpre-
tations of the curve which will be discussed in the other chapters of this thesis.
1.3.1 Lipsey’s Econometric Account of the Phillips Curve
Phillips (1958b: 290) estimated8 his curve by an equation of the form
y + a = bxc
or, as a log-linearised function,
log(y + a) = log b+ c log x
with y as the rate of change of wage rates, x as the unemployment rate in per cent, and a,
b, and c as constants. However, logarithms of negative values cannot be calculated, while a
direct estimation of the original function without using logarithms seemed to be technically
unfeasible (see Footnote 9 for further details). As a workaround, Phillips (1958b: 290) calculated
averages of y and x for speciVc intervals of the rate of unemployment for the years 1861–1913
(with the upper bound included in each interval).9 These intervals have equal weights (see
8See on Phillips’ estimation technique Desai (1975: 3U.) and Wulwick (1989: 176U. and 1996: 397U.).
9Phillips (1958b: 290) pointed out that this averaging eliminates the eUect of the change in the rate of unemploy-
ment on wages as rising and falling unemployment rates are included in each interval, “so that each cross
gives an approximation to the rate of change of wages which would be associated with the indicated level
9
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Lipsey 1960: 5, n. 3; see critically Santomero and Seater 1978: 501) and are represented by the
dotted vertical lines in Figure 1.3. The corresponding averages are illustrated as crosses in the
same Vgure. Phillips (1958b: 290) estimated the constants b and c by least squares for these
average values of y and x up to an unemployment rate of 5 per cent. According to Phillips
(1958b: 290), the constant a was adjusted by trial and error so that the curve also Vt the two
remaining averages for unemployment rates higher than 5 per cent as good as possible.10
The Phillips curve thus was found by Phillips (1958b: 290) to be best described by the equa-
tion
y + 0.900 = 9.638x−1.394
or in logarithms by the equation
log (y + 0.900) = 0.984− 1.394 log x
of unemployment if unemployment were held constant at that level.” Amongst other assumptions, methods,
and data used by Phillips, this one was particularly criticised by Routh (1959: 315). Lipsey (1960) defended
Phillips’ results against most of Routh’s criticism particularly regarding the data used. Lipsey (1960: 5), for
example, paid attention to the diUerences between the wage series for the years 1881–1885 provided by Brown
and Hopkins (1950) and by Bowley (1937) to meet the criticism of Routh (1959: 313) that Phillips (1958b: 291)
had arbitrarily chosen the data sources in his discussion of the curve to arrive at the desired relationship
between the two variables. Wulwick (1989: 180U.) furthermore supposed that Phillips had arbitrarily chosen
the intervals to arrive at the hyperbolic curve, so that the form of the curve was in line with his theoretical
reWections (see Section 2.2). In general, Phillips’ technique of estimating and drawing such a hyperbolic curve
was criticised by contemporary economists such as Knowles and Winsten (1959: 114U.), but also in a later and
inWuential contribution by Santomero and Seater (1978: 500f.). Hence, Wulwick (1989: 174) concluded that it
was indeed “a crude curve-Vtting technique” while also noting that this technique had been quite common
at the time. Lipsey (2000a: 239) recalled that Phillips most likely had chosen this kind of technique due to
technical restrictions:
I asked Phillips many times why he had not used more conventional statistical methods for his
original article. He had two answers. Early on, he said that, since the curve had a logarithmic form
and since there are no logs of negative numbers, he was forced to use unconventional methods of
Vrst averaging the data into a few points and then Vtting a curve to those points by eye. [...]
Phillips’ second response, which he used more often after my work was completed, was that he
saw no half-way house between really crude eyeballing of data and what he regarded as a fully
satisfactory econometric treatment, which would take him well beyond the conventional statistical
methods which I had been taught.
Also Gilbert (1976: 53) took the point of view that Phillips’ way of estimating the curve had more to do with
technical limitations at the time than with deeper economical meaning as Desai (1975: 2) supposed. In the
same vein, Wulwick (1996: 403) pointed out that in the 1950s “[n]o computing programs existed that could use
the least-squares criterion to search for the unknown parameters of an equation” which Phillips regarded as
the correct one. Wulwick (1996: 395), however, also remarked that Phillips indeed had access to and also had
previously made use of the computer at the National Physical Laboratory at Teddington. Thus, Wulwick found
it remarkable that Phillips decided to estimate his curve by using an electrically run Marchant mechanical desk
calculator even though he was short on time since he “had to go oU on sabbatical leave to Melbourne” (Phillips
in Blyth 1978: xvi). See also Wulwick (1996: 396, n. 6).
10Gilbert (1976: 56), however, took the point of view that “Phillips in fact Vrst estimated a graphically and then
estimated b and c by least squares” (see also Lipsey 1960: 5, n. 2).
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Figure 1.3: Estimation of the Phillips Curve.
Unemployment and the rate of change of money wage rates, United Kingdom, 1861–1913. Source: Phillips (1958b: 285).
Redrawn and modiVed (grey lines and text). See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Phillips (in Blyth 1978: xvi) noted with respect to Lipsey’s approach to his estimated curve
that he “was appalled at the scientiVc approach, and tried to refute it, Popperwise”. As Lipsey
(1960: 3) aimed at estimating the curve “by standard statistical methods if at all possible”,11 he
had to set up a new equation. Thus, Lipsey (1960: 4) used the following function
W˙ = a+ bU−1 + cU−2
with W˙ as the percentage rate of change of money wage rates, U as the unemployment rate,
and a, b, and c as constants.
This function can be estimated by standard statistical techniques without making use of
Phillips’ workaround. Lipsey (1960: 4) found that by choosing the parameters accordingly, his
equation could in principle be adjusted in such a way that it draws a hyperbola very close
to that of Phillips’ original curve, so that “choosing between the two curves [Phillips’ and
Lipsey’s] does not necessitate choosing between diUerent hypotheses about the nature of the
11Wulwick (1996) tried to replicate the results of Phillips (1958b) and Lipsey (1960): While being able to reproduce
Phillips’ results, Wulwick (1996: 393) noted that “Lipsey’s results are in certain important respects not repro-
ducible.” Whereas the period 1861–1913 is reproducible, the estimates of the period 1914–1957 are not (see
Wulwick 1996: 418). This, as pointed out by Wulwick (1996: 410), also happened to other economists trying
to reproduce Lipsey’s results, even though there had been no published paper beforehand of such failed at-
tempts; but see Leeson (1994c) and Wulwick (1994) for a further discussion. Unfortunately, as Lipsey (1997b: 2)
recalled, the data sheets on which the regressions based got lost during Lipsey’s move from England to Canada
in 1970.
11
1 General Introduction
relation between W˙ and U .”12 Lipsey at this stage of his paper thus accepted the proposed non-
linear shape of the Phillips curve as a working hypothesis (see Lipsey 1960: 4, n. 1). Furthermore,
Lipsey (1960: 5U.) also found some evidence in favour of Phillips’ observation that the rate
of change of unemployment U˙ plays an important role for the determination of wage rate
changes. This will be discussed in Subsection 1.3.3.
In sum, Lipsey conVrmed Phillips’ hypothesis regarding the relation between unemployment
and wage rate changes as he (1960: 11f.) concluded that “[t]here is a signiVcant relation between
the rate of change of money wage rates on the one hand and the level of unemployment and
its rate of change on the other. Over 80 per cent. of the variance in money wage rates over
the period 1862–1913 can be associated with these two variables, U and U˙ .” Lipsey’s approach
thus proved that the curve did not show up merely as an artefact of Phillips’ special estimation
technique so that “Lipsey’s claim to have replicated the Phillips curve by means of a standard
technique convinced many economists to accept the Phillips curve as an empirical entity”
(Wulwick 1996: 410). Thus, “[i]t was Lipsey’s replication that clinched the institutionalization
of the Phillips curve” (Wulwick 1996: 419). Also Lipsey (2000a: 236) himself noted:
I suspect that my more orthodox statistical treatment of the curve did quite a
bit to still some of the many early criticisms, helping the curve to gain acceptance
within the profession.
Most important, Lipsey (1960: 8U.) conducted an empirical investigation of Phillips’ hypothesis
regarding cost of living eUects on wage rates (see Section 2.3). For Phillips (1958b: 283f.), cost
of living adjustments will only have an inWuence on wage rates if the rise of the cost of living—
which is assumed to be exogenously driven by strongly rising import prices—is high enough to
cause a reduction of the real wage. That means that any rise in the cost of living is assumed to
have no eUect on wage rates as long as the cost of living is rising weaker or exactly as strong as
nominal wage rates. Lipsey (1960: 9), however, rejected Phillips’ hypothesis, which in his view
rested on “intuitively implausible” (Lipsey 1960: 8) behavioural assumptions, by the data.
Instead, Lipsey (1960: 9U.) proposed and tested the diUerent hypothesis that the percentage
change in the cost of living index, denoted by the variable P˙ , directly aUects the percentage
rate of change of money wage rates W˙ . The corresponding Phillips curve equation thus became
W˙ = a+ bU−1 + cU−2 + dU˙ + eP˙
For the time span from 1862 to 1913 this coeXcient e of the change of the cost of living is
only around 0.21 (when added to the explanatory variables consisting of the unemployment
rate U and its rate of change U˙ as in the above equation). Thus, Lipsey’s estimation suggested
that there is no one-one relation between wage rate changes and the cost of living.13 This value
changes to 0.37 if the change of the rate of unemployment is dropped (the change in the rate of
12Since Lipsey estimated the curve for diUerent data sets and periods and thus produced many slightly diUerent
results, which in sum conVrmed Phillips’ estimation, no such estimation results will be presented in order to
keep the focus on important details such as the coeXcient of the cost of living in the next paragraphs.
13For Desai (1995: 349), Lipsey thus started the trade-oU debate since the coeXcient of the cost of living was
signiVcantly less than unity. In this respect, Lipsey (2000b: 71, n. 18) noted that “[w]hat I did not do was
to estimate and use the expected inWation rate.” Lipsey (2000b: 71) also recalled: “I found no evidence of a
statistically signiVcant eUect of this sort, and hence abandoned the price level as an explanatory variable, not
12
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unemployment and in the cost of living might be regarded as substitutes due to their possible
high correlation). Even if cost of living eUects are treated as the only explanatory variable of
wage changes there is still no one-one relation between wage changes and price changes since
the coeXcient of P˙ becomes 0.55. This result, however, might be related to the relative stability
of the price level for the time under consideration, so that there was no need for wage setters to
take continually rising prices into account (see also Lipsey 2000a: 236f. and Section 2.3). On the
other hand, Phelps (1967: 256, n. 1) remarked concerning Lipsey’s regression that the current
rate of inWation might be a poor proxy for the expected one and therefore a major cause for
the weak inWuence of the change in the cost of living on wage changes. Lipsey (1960: 12) hence
concluded that “[t]here seems to be some evidence in favour of a simple (but rather weak)
relation between changes in the cost of living and changes in money wage rates.”
However, for the years from 1923 to 1939 and from 1948 to 1957, Lipsey’s (1960: 26) estima-
tion of the coeXcient of the cost of living was 0.69, which led him to the conclusion that there
had been a tendency towards a one-one relation between wage and price changes (see also
Lipsey 1963: 438, n. 4). Lipsey (1960: 29f.) also pointed out that these cost of living eUects might
explain rising wages since 1934 despite high levels of unemployment. Lipsey (1960: 31), how-
ever, warned that “[a] satisfactory theoretical explanation (together with independent tests)
would be needed of the high correlation between W˙ and P˙ . Until more is known about the
causal links between W˙ and P˙ it is very dangerous to argue as if either of these variables were
independent of the other.”14
1.3.2 The Theoretical Underpinning of the Phillips Curve
Lipsey, in the second part of his paper, focused on building a model in order to analyse the
Phillips relationship not only on empirical grounds, but also from a theoretical point of view as
“Phillips had given very little indication of the sort of model of market behaviour which would
produce his postulated relations” (Lipsey 1960: 2). Indeed, as is pointed out in Section 2.3, the
theoretical underpinning by Phillips was not very detailed, even though Phillips had discussed
a comparable relationship on theoretical grounds some years earlier (see Section 2.2).
This part of Lipsey’s paper was strongly inWuenced by George C. Archibald who “was the
analytical alter ego to the LSE group” (De Marchi 1988: 151) and whose “persistent criticisms
because Phillips and I thought it intrinsically uninteresting, but because we could not Vnd evidence of its
aUecting the wage bargain. If we had had it to do again with a more satisfactory expectations hypothesis,
we might have found the evidence we looked for and did not Vnd”. In the same vein Lipsey (2000a: 236)
remarked: “I also tried to give the curve a micro-theoretical explanation but was hampered by not having a
good model of expectations. As a result, I related money wages to the price level by a catch-up rather than
an expectations variable. Since the catch-up variable did not perform well, I dropped it and was left with a
simple, stable Phillips Curve.” Lipsey (1997b: 2) also explicitly pointed at the problem of money illusion: “We
were not unaware of the charge that the model contained money illusion but, lacking any articulated theory
of forward-looking expectations, we sought to catch the eUects of changes in the price level with a catch-up
variable based on past changes in the price level. It did not, however, show much inWuence.”
14Due to this possible interdependence between prices and wages, Bowen and Berry (1963: 170) were critical of
Lipsey’s regressions.
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of measurement without adequate theory” (Lipsey 1960: 12, n. 1) urged Lipsey to also focus on
the theoretical underpinning of the curve.15
Lipsey (1960: 13) started building up his model from the simple dynamics on a single market,
that is, prices will rise in the case of excess demand and will fall if there is excess supply.
This, in essence, is the whole theoretical basis on which also Phillips (1958b: 283) built upon
in his own investigation. The wage-change unemployment dynamics of such a single market,
however, are not necessarily representative for the wage-change unemployment relation in the
aggregate, that is, for the economy as a whole. This issue will be discussed in Subsection 1.3.3.
In order to keep the analysis tractable and to stay in line with Lipsey’s approach, the dynamics
on a single market will be analysed Vrst:
Such a single labour market is depicted in Figure 1.4. In the case of excess demand, that is ij,
wages should rise, but should fall when there is excess supply such as mn. The speed of wage
adjustment is assumed to depend on the overall amount of excess demand and excess supply.
Figure 1.4: Demand and Supply on the Labour Market.
Source: Lipsey (1960: 14). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Lipsey (1960: 13) chose to model the relation between the percentage rate of change of money
wage rates w˙ and relative excess demand d−s
s
(with d for demand and s for supply) as a linear
one (with α indicating the strength of the relation):16
w˙ = α
(
d− s
s
· 100
)
15Even though Lipsey (1960: 12, n. 1) pointed out that Archibald “should in fact be regarded as joint author of part
(1) of this section”, Archibald (1969: 125U.) later attributed the model only to Lipsey. Also Wulwick (1987: 844,
n. 19) noted that “Professor Archibald requested that he [did] not appear as co-author of the model (in a letter
to this author [Wulwick] dated 26 February 1986).”
16Phillips (1958b: 283), however, pointed at the non-linearity of such an adjustment relation due to downwardly
rigid nominal wages. As will be shown, in Lipsey’s model a non-linear Phillips curve in the case of excess
demand is derived, while the relation becomes linear in the case of excess supply.
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This relation is illustrated in Figure 1.5.17 Relative excess demand of 0c, which corresponds to
gh
w′g in Figure 1.4, causes a rise in the wage rate of cd. Higher excess demand such as 0a (
ij
W ′′i
in Figure 1.4) is related to wage rate changes of ab.
It is evident in this part of Lipsey’s analysis that the adjustment mechanism was treated by
Lipsey (1960: 13, my italics) as a relation for describing disequilibrium phenomena as wage
changes are “related to the excess demand, and speciVcally, the greater is the proportionate
disequilibrium, the more rapidly will wages be changing.”
Lipsey’s model thus incorporates some kind of wage or price stickiness, since with full price
and wage Wexibility, that is, an instantaneous adjustment of prices or wages, no disequilibrium
in the sense of excess demand or excess supply can occur. Ackley (1978: 447) therefore critically
remarked about the notion that the speed of adjustment depends on the amount of excess
demand and supply that “[r]eWection will show that this is not demonstrated in Lipsey’s model,
it is merely assumed. The assumed underlying wage-adjustment function already embodies
that idea; but no explanation is given for such a relationship.”
Figure 1.5: The Basic Adjustment Relation Between Excess Demand and Wage Rate
Changes.
Source: Lipsey (1960: 14). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Lipsey (1960: 13) pointed at the advantage of depicting the adjustment relation as in Figure
1.5: The adjustment curve in this Vgure is independent of whether the demand or the supply
curve or even both curves shift. Thus, “it is necessary only that there be an unchanging ad-
justment mechanism in the market, i.e., that a given excess demand should cause a given rate
of change of price whatever the reason for the excess demand”. InWation as the result of excess
demand for labour thus might be explained by a shift of the labour-demand but also of the
17Since Lipsey (1960: 12) made a distinction between the dynamics on one single market and the whole economy,
it is relative excess demand which is under his consideration with respect to the analysis and comparison of
diUerent single markets. Lower-case letters are used for single markets while capital letters refer to the whole
economy. The Vgures, however, despite having capital letters, also apply to a single market. This is because
the Vgures are unaltered reproductions of Lipsey’s originals.
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labour-supply curve, which rendered this adjustment function—and therefore also the thereby
derived Phillips curve—equally attractive for demand-pull and cost-push theories of inWation
(see Laidler 1971: 78, n. 6). This was also noted by Lipsey (1960: 17) as “the observation of the
postulated relation is quite consistent with changes in wages caused by union-induced shifts
in the labour supply curve.”
Unions, however, may change the beforehand symmetrical reaction of wage changes to ex-
cess demand and supply into an asymmetrical one. This is illustrated by the dashed lines in Fig-
ure 1.5. Unions may inWuence the dynamics in the labour market in such a way that wages react
more slowly to excess supply but faster in situations of excess demand (see Lipsey 1960: 17).18
The problem Phillips and Lipsey were facing with respect to estimating the adjustment func-
tion was that data for excess demand or supply of labour is usually not available or observable
at all (see Phillips 1959: 2 and Lipsey 1960: 14, n. 1). Thus, the rate of unemployment was used
as an approximate measure of the excess demand for labour. Lipsey (1960: 13f.) pointed at this
issue:
Now if excess demand for labour were directly observable there would be no
need to go any further. Unfortunately, this is not the case [...] and it is necessary
to relate excess demand to something that is directly observable, in this case the
percentage of the labour force unemployed.
Phillips (1959: 2), however, noted that the unemployment rate might not be a good proxy for
excess demand in the case of low unemployment, since then “there may be considerable excess
demand for labour, and quite large changes in the excess demand for labour will be associated
with only small changes of the percentage unemployed.”19
The assumed relation between excess demand and the rate of unemployment in Lipsey’s
model is depicted in Figure 1.6. At point a, there is zero excess demand. This corresponds
to the equilibrium wage rate 0we in Figure 1.4. As can be seen in Figure 1.6, the absence of
excess demand or supply does not imply that there is zero unemployment, but that there is
some positive amount of unemployment, that is, frictional unemployment: This amount of
frictional unemployment for Lipsey (1960: 14) exists even if the labour market is in equilibrium
as switching between jobs (that is, Vnding a new job) is assumed to take some time.
The negative relation between excess demand and the rate of unemployment comes about
since positive excess demand is assumed to reduce the time necessary to Vnd a job so that
(frictional) unemployment falls.20 The crucial assumption to arrive at a negative relation be-
tween excess demand and unemployment is that the amount of workers searching for a new
18Such a kinked reaction function was used by Lipsey and Parkin (1970: 117U.) in their study on incomes policy—
“[a] piece that [...] became quite inWuential, in spite of its Wawed econometrics” (Lipsey 1997a: xxviii). For
example, a wage policy might aim at Wattening the slope of the reaction function if there is excess demand.
Lipsey (1977), however, strongly opposed wage-price controls as a means to keep inWation under control (see
Lipsey 1981a: 45f. for the historical background, that is, imposed wage-price controls in Canada in 1975).
19Later studies indeed showed that the rate of unemployment is not a perfect measure for excess demand. For
example, hidden unemployment (see Simler and Tella 1968) or hoarded labour should be taken into account
(see Taylor 1970).
20Also Rees (1957: 39f.) pointed at this mechanism of higher demand reducing frictional unemployment as “[v]ery
low levels of unemployment can be reached by creating a vast demand for goods and services, which elimi-
nates all unemployment except frictional and reduces the amount of frictional unemployment by shortening
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job does not endogenously rise in response to the higher excess demand (see Lipsey 1960: 14f.).
Lipsey’s approach was criticised on these grounds by Corry and Laidler (1967: 194f.) as it might
be equally reasonable that higher excess demand may induce more people to search for a new
job.21
Figure 1.6: The Relation Between Unemployment and Excess Demand for Labour.
Source: Lipsey (1960: 14). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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The mechanism underlying Lipsey’s labour-market dynamics hence is a search theoretical
approach, albeit a very basic one.22 Nevertheless, Lipsey was the Vrst to provide a model to
explain the speciVc negative and non-linear shape of the Phillips curve in the case of excess
demand. Corry and Laidler (1967: 193) thus pointed out that “[i]n the literature on the Phillips
curve we have been able to Vnd only one place where any attempt is made to explain this
aspect of the relationship”.
The mathematical derivation can be found in a footnote (Lipsey 1960: 15, n. 1) but is repro-
duced here as the non-linearity of the Phillips curve is based on this non-linear connection
between excess demand and unemployment:
Assume that a constant fraction α of employed persons E become unemployed in each
period, so that the number of those employed becoming unemployed is αE. The number of
the time needed to Vnd jobs.” See also the statement by the Commission on Money and Credit (1961: 27).
Lipsey’s approach was extended by Hansen (1970) in order to take into account further frictions in the labour
market.
21Thus, Corry and Laidler (1967: 189f.) remarked “that the particular form of the Phillips curve, which shows a
continuously negative marginal rate of trade-oU between the rate of change of wages and unemployment, is
not derivable from basic theory without making some rather special and unveriVed assumptions” (see for a
further discussion also Vanderkamp 1968 and Corry and Laidler 1968). However, only such a negative slope of
the curve “would lead to the all important implication of the existence of a trade-oU between the policy goals
of high employment and price stability” (Corry and Laidler 1967: 195).
22However, Batyra and De Vroey (2012) did not cite Lipsey (1960) as a pioneer of search unemployment. On the
other hand, Ackley (1978: 447, n. 19) noted that Lipsey (1960) “to some extent, anticipates the Phelps’ model
[Phelps (1968a)]”. Indeed, Phelps (1968a: 688) himself acknowledged that his search model is based on Lipsey
(1960).
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unemployed people is denoted by V . The number of unemployed getting back into employment
depends, Vrst, on the overall amount of unemployed, and, second, on the amount of free jobs
available (vacancies). This number of free jobs available is deVned by total jobs available (J )—
which is equal to the overall demand for labour—less the number of people already employed,
that is, J − E. Thus, it is assumed that the number of unemployed successfully getting back
into employment (N) can be described by the following equation, while β is a constant:23
N = βV (J − E)
A constant level of unemployment requires that the number of people becoming unemployed
and getting back into employment is equal:
αE = βV (J − E)
As the number of employed E is given by the diUerence between the overall labour force L
less unemployed V , the equation above can be rewritten as:
α (L− V ) = βV (J − L+ V )
Solving this equation for the amount of total jobs available (J ) gives the equation:
J =
αL
βV
− V + L− α
β
Absolute excess demand is given by the number of total jobs available less the labour force,
that is, J − L. Relative excess demand (X) is hence deVned as X = J−L
L
. Thus, J can be
replaced by LX + L. After this substitution and by solving for X the equation above can be
rewritten to show the functional relation between relative excess demand and unemployment:
X =
α
βV
− V
L
− α
βL
DiUerentiating this function shows that this relation is indeed negative and non-linear since
∂X
∂V
= − α
βV 2
− 1
L
< 0
and since
∂2X
∂V 2
=
α
βV
> 0
Thus, the higher the excess demand, the lower the number of unemployed. But as excess
demand increases, the amount of unemployed falls at a decreasing rate.
To arrive at the relation between excess demand and the rate of unemployment u, one V-
nal replacement is necessary. As u = V
L
, the relation between relative excess demand and
unemployment can be rewritten as:
23As Lipsey (1974: 64) pointed out, β must be “suXciently small for the number of persons Vnding work to be
less than the number looking.”
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X =
α
βLu
− u− α
βL
Since u cannot be negative it converges towards its smallest level possible (zero or a small
positive amount) asymptotically if excess demand becomes inVnite. This means that even if
there is high excess demand there will always be some amount of frictional unemployment as
switching between jobs is ongoing.
However, the relation to the right of a in Figure 1.6 is assumed to be linear as any additional
excess supply will just be added as deVcient-demand unemployment to the zero-excess-demand
amount of frictional unemployment.24
Holmes and Smyth (1970: 314) criticised that it is not possible to derive such a deVnite rela-
tion between unemployment and excess demand, as it is not a priori clear if the Vnal quantity
traded lies on the demand or on the supply curve or somewhere in-between so that “a rela-
tion between the rate of change of money wages and the rate of unemployment cannot be
derived from this model and the Lipsey type of theoretical justiVcation for the Phillips curve
phenomena is not valid.”
Lipsey (1974) replied to this criticism and explained his theory in more detail. Most impor-
tant, Lipsey (1974: 64) added the assumption, which, if at all, only implicitly showed up in
Lipsey (1960), “that out of equilibrium the quantity of transactions is determined by the lesser
of qd, qs”, that is, quantity demanded and supplied. With this assumption, a unique relation
between unemployment and wage rate changes can be derived.
The theoretical Phillips curve (see Figure 1.7), then emerges out of a combination of Figure
1.5 (the wage-change/excess-demand relation) and Figure 1.6 (the excess-demand/unemploy-
ment relation). Note that due to the assumed linearity of the wage-change/excess-demand re-
lation and of the excess-demand/unemployment relation for unemployment rates higher than
a, the theoretical Phillips curve in Figure 1.7 thus becomes linear to the right of a as well, even
though the curves in Lipsey’s diagrams (Figure 1.6 and 1.7) are not drawn linear to the right of
a as would follow from his approach.25
24De Vroey (2010: 250U.) criticised Lipsey’s approach for incorporating these two diUerent forms of unemploy-
ment within the same model.
25Lipsey (1960: 15) explicitly remarked that the relation in Figure 1.6 to the right of a is linear. A correct diagram
can be found in Kaliski (1964: 3), who received comments by Lipsey. However, at least the non-linearity to
the right of a in Figure 1.7 can be explained by an aggregation phenomenon if Figure 1.7 is understood as
representing the aggregate macro relation as is more deeply elaborated in Subsection 1.3.3. Thus, Lipsey’s
approach diUers from that of Phillips (1954, 1958b) who assumed a non-linear Phillips curve also in the case of
excess supply. This is explained by an asymmetric wage-change reaction, so that downwardly rigid nominal
wages in the case of high unemployment are the reason for a non-linear relation if there is excess supply
(see Section 2.2 and 2.3). Lipsey (1978: 60, n. 11), however, remarked that not altering the adjustment relation
(Figure 1.5) by including downwardly sticky wages to arrive at a non-linear relation also in the case of excess
supply caused “some unnecessary complications”. It is remarkable that Lipsey did not opt for the rather easy
solution of downwardly rigid wages, particularly since even some critical contemporaries admitted that such
an assumption is not a priori unreasonable (see Corry and Laidler 1967: 192). Leeson (1997a: 96) noted with
respect to this inconsistency of the theoretical relationship with the data that “during its period of policy
inWuence, the theoretical derivation of the Phillips curve contained a dormant but elementary error.” Lipsey
(1981b: 558, n. 17), however, responded to a similar criticism by Cornwall (1981: 167) who stated that “Lipsey’s
analysis of most labour markets is incorrect”:
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Figure 1.7: The Phillips Curve as a Disequilibrium Relation
Source: Lipsey (1960: 14). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Point a is interpreted as an equilibrium rate, that is, there is no excess demand or supply,
since a is the point at which “disequilibrium [...] is completely eliminated” (Lipsey 1960: 16).
Such a disequilibrium can emerge since “[t]here is no Walrasian t[â]tonnement process, so
that transactions can (and do) take place at disequilibrium wage rates” (Lipsey 1974: 63f.). A
movement on the curve from a to b′ and Vnally to c′ thus indicates “that the demand and/or
the supply curves have shifted over the period in such a way as to increase the disequilib-
rium in spite of the increase in wage rates” (Lipsey 1960: 16). Thus, such a sequence of wage-
change/unemployment combinations indicates ongoing disequilibria as wages do not change
fast and strong enough to compensate for shocks to the demand or supply curves. On the
other hand, a sequence of c′ to b′ and Vnally to a indicates that equilibrium is being restored.
One possibility is that the price mechanism works as supposed so that wage changes remove
some excess demand in each period until equilibrium on the labour market is Vnally reached.
Another possibility is that wage changes are fast enough to overcompensate any shift of the de-
mand or the supply curve on the labour market. In sum, any movement away from a indicates
that shifts of the demand and supply curve are more than oUsetting the equilibrating forces
of wage changes. On the other hand, any movement towards a shows that wage changes are
strong and fast enough to overcompensate any disturbing shifts of the demand and the supply
I plead guilty to ignoring in that paper the asymmetry problem in order to concentrate on the
link between the aggregate wage-Phillips curve and micro labour markets. Indeed, by linking the
Phillips curve to competitive but non-instantaneously clearing labour markets I was outside of the
neo-Keynesian tradition, and Cornwall is quite right to take issue with me on this point. Note,
however, that neither Phillips nor myself, nor anyone else whom I know of in the early Phillips-
curve tradition, ever drew an empirical Phillips curve which did not display the asymmetry that
wages could rise fast in the face of excess demand and would fall only slowly in the face of excess
supply. Phillips, for example, calculated the asymptotic rate of decrease in U.K. money wages as
unemployment went to 100 per cent as 1 per cent per annum!
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curve or that shifts of these curves help to restore equilibrium.
From the point of view of a trade-oU interpretation of the curve, it is interesting to note that
Lipsey (1960: 16) remarked that ongoing excess demand (point b′) is only possible if “rightward
shifts in demand and/or leftward shifts in supply were suXcient just to oUset the equilibrating
eUects of changes in w, leaving excess demand constant.” Thus, Lipsey was fully aware that
targeting any other point to the left of a would require ongoing excess demand and hence a
disequilibrium in the economy engineered via deliberate and fast enough shifts of either the
supply or the demand curve in such a way that market forces (the wage reaction) are unable to
restore equilibrium in time.
If at all, such a trade-oU does not emerge due to money illusion, but, as has been shown, is
based on an endogenous adjustment of the speed of labour turnover.26 Hence, it is frictional
unemployment which is modelled as being endogenous to demand pressure. Of course, one
drawback of such an approach emerges if the main reason for voluntary search unemployment
is to Vnd the employer oUering the highest wage (subject to search costs) as then money illusion
once again enters the stage: Slowly adjusting inWation expectations in combination with higher
nominal wage oUers due to excess demand may induce shorter search periods as perceived real
wage oUers are extraordinarily high—until the individual recognises the higher rate of inWa-
tion and adjusts once again (see for an overview Santomero and Seater 1978: 518f.).27 Lipsey
(1960: 14), however, explicitly made no assumption at all about the causes of search unemploy-
ment as “workers change jobs for any reason whatever”, so that the criticism just raised is,
despite being reasonable as such, not applicable to the theoretical explanation brought forward
by Lipsey (1960).
After having described Phillips’ and Lipsey’s disequilibrium approach to the Phillips curve,
it is worth focusing on Friedman’s equilibrium approach to explain movements on the curve.
Unfortunately, Friedman’s own explanation is not straightforward and completely worked out
in his probably most famous contribution to the Phillips curve (Friedman 1968).28 Hence, the
following discussion builds mostly upon Friedman (1975, 1976). Friedman’s (1977b: 456) state-
ment that “[o]nly surprises matter” is the essence for the existence of and movements on a
short-run Phillips curve. This idea is depicted in Figure 1.8. In Friedman’s (1976: 221U.) view, it
is the anticipated real wage and not the nominal wage which is crucial for the amount of labour
demanded and supplied. The equilibrium nominal wage thus must grow at the anticipated rate
of inWation (abstracting from productivity growth). As these anticipations of changes in the
rate of inWation (and hence of expected price levels in the future) adjust only slowly, an (unex-
pected) rise of the nominal wage will be Vrst interpreted by workers as a rise of the real wage.
Thus, such a rise in the nominal wage will cause a movement on the curve at Vrst (from the
initial equilibrium unemployment rate E0 to EF ). This movement is the outcome of the eUect
that the rate of change of nominal wages becomes higher than the anticipated rate of change
of prices—the diUerence between these two is shown on the ordinate.29 However, contrary
26Lipsey, in a correspondence with the author dated 27 July 2011, pointed out that it remains unclear whether or
not Phillips himself accepted this underlying theoretical explanation resting on the speed of labour turnover.
27Such a model based on search unemployment and not fully adjusting inWation expectations, so that a long-run
trade-oU emerges, is developed in Holt (1969: 144U.).
28For a further discussion see De Vroey (2001: 128U.) and Laidler (2012: 20U.).
29The mechanism described by Friedman rests on the assumption that there is a diUerence between expected and
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Figure 1.8: Friedman’s Derivation of the Short-Run Phillips Curve.
Source: Friedman (1975: 20). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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to Lipsey, causality now runs from unanticipated price changes to unemployment (Friedman
1976: 222f.):
Suppose something, say, a monetary expansion, starts nominal aggregate de-
mand growing, which in turn produces a rise in prices and wages at the rate of,
say, 2 percent per year. Workers will initially interpret this as a rise in their real
wage—because they still anticipate constant prices—and so will be willing to oUer
more labor (move up their supply curve), i.e., employment grows and unemploy-
ment falls.
This rise in labour supply is fully absorbed by a rise in labour demand as employers “inter-
pret a rise in the demand for and price of their product as a rise in its relative price and as
implying a fall in the real wage rate they must pay measured in terms of their product” (Fried-
man 1976: 223). Hence, higher nominal wages imply higher real wages for employees as the
general rise in the price level (or in the rate of inWation) is not recognised. On the other hand,
for employers perceived real wages in terms of their product are falling. A rise of the rate of
unemployment to EU comes about vice versa by a decrease in the anticipated real wage. In
both cases, the economy will move back to E0 as soon as expectations about the rate of inWa-
tion adjust. Friedman (1976: 223) hence concluded that “[t]here is thus a short-run ‘trade-oU’
between inWation and unemployment, but no long-run ‘trade-oU.’”
realised rates of inWation, so that workers suUer from money illusion at Vrst sight. However, such a short-run
trade-oU can also come about if wages are Vxed for a longer time period while prices are (more) Wexible. Due
to this asymmetry regarding wage and price Wexibility, such a trade-oU based on surprise inWation can come
about even if workers do not suUer from money illusion (see, for example, Frisch 1977: 1296).
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Due to this misperception of changes in the rate of inWation, Friedman’s supply and demand
curves on the labour market (see Figure 1.9) thus shift implicitly (illustrated as the dashed lines)
for the other party of the wage bargain. A demand expansion (starting from the employment
level E0 and the equilibrium real wage
(
W
P
)
0
) induces workers to move up their labour supply
curve because they interpret the rising nominal wage as a rise in the real wage since workers do
not recognise that the general price level is rising (or rising faster than anticipated) at the same
time. From their perspective, the demand curve of employers has shifted upwards as in their
view employers are willing to pay higher real wages than before at every level of employment.
Workers thus Vnd themselves in Aw. They supply EF units of labour at their perceived real
wage We
P ∗w
(with We being the higher nominal wage oUered by employers and P ∗w as the per-
ceived, that is, too low and thus wrong price level). For employers, on the other hand, it seems
as if the labour supply curve has shifted downwards. Workers seem to be willing to supply the
same amount of labour at a lower perceived real wage of employers. Thus, employers move
down their labour demand curve and settle at point Ae. Hence, they demand the same amount
of labour EF as supplied by workers but at a lower perceived real wage WeP ∗e . This is due to the
fact that employers “count on being able to get a higher price” for their product (P ∗e ), so that
the real wage in terms of their product is falling despite paying higher nominal wages (We)
(see Friedman 1976: 222U.).
Figure 1.9: Labour Market Dynamics in Friedman’s Model.
Source: Friedman (1976: 223). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Hence, the rise in employment comes about since the unexpectedly higher price level (or
higher rate of inWation) is not yet incorporated into the wage bargaining process, so that real
wages as perceived by workers and employers are diUerent. This eUect of an unexpected rise in
the price level (or in the rate of inWation), however, will vanish as soon as expectations adjust.
For Friedman (1968: 8), there is thus only one level of unemployment which is compati-
ble with fulVlled expectations: the “natural rate of unemployment”. Reaching another level of
unemployment will be possible only by accelerating inWation or deWation, so that (adaptive)
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inWation expectations are never fulVlled. Causality thus runs from an unexpected change in
the rate of inWation to a change in the rate of unemployment. From this it follows that the
Phillips curve is reinterpreted as an aggregate supply curve since “Wuctuations in output and
employment in response to price level variations represent the voluntary choices of individ-
uals operating in markets which are continually clearing” (Laidler 1981: 10; see also Lipsey
2010a: 371 and Lipsey 2010b: 377U.).
Since workers and employers in eUect stay on their supply respectively demand curve, Fried-
man’s model actually “features no unemployment” (Batyra and De Vroey 2012: 403; see also
De Vroey 2001: 133), that is, no involuntary unemployment. Hence, there is always a tempo-
rary equilibrium on the labour market—even though it is unstable as it crucially depends on
the misperception of the actually realised price level, since a change in the rate of inWation is
not recognised.
In contrast, Lipsey’s explanation is about disequilibrium on the labour market with unem-
ployment driving wages, so that the Phillips curve is a mechanism “to do the disequilibrium
jobs” (Lipsey 1978: 70). Any change of the wage rate hence is a sign that there is some kind
of disequilibrium on the labour market and at least one party is oU their supply or demand
curve. This distinction between Friedman’s equilibrium and the Phillips-Lipsey disequilibrium
approach will be of importance throughout this thesis. The implications of this diUerent ap-
proach for the trade-oU between unemployment and inWation will be discussed more deeply in
Section 2.6, 3.4, 5.5, and 5.6.
The misinterpretation of the original Phillips curve as an equilibrium relation was already
prevalent shortly after Lipsey’s 1960 paper had been published. Lipsey and Steuer (1961: 19, n.
1) answered to the criticism of Downie (in Robinson et al. 1960: 280f.), who stated that Lipsey’s
model regards “the level of wage rates for any period as an equilibrium rate” as “it can fruitfully
be explained in terms of the intersection of supply and demand schedules” so that it focuses on
“the magnitude one is trying to explain as the product of an equilibrium situation”. This view
is essentially in line with Friedman’s model, but completely contrary to Lipsey’s (and Phillips’)
approach.30 Lipsey and Steuer (1961: 19, n. 1) thus emphasised:
Downie misses the whole point of the theoretical construct in any case. [...] The
whole point of the Phillips-Lipsey model is that it is dynamic, not static. It relates
the rate of change of wages to the diUerence between demand and supply.
An interesting view is provided by Corry and Laidler (1967: 190): They correctly remarked
that causality regarding the Phillips curve runs from unemployment to wage changes. Further-
30Lipsey (2000a: 238) pointed out that his theoretical underpinning was in line with Phillips’ view about the
dynamics in an economic system:
My belief that I was reWecting Phillips’ own interpretation of his curve is based on the following
considerations. First, I was in close contact with Phillips during the year that I was working on my
article. If he had thought my interpretation was at variance with his, I would have known it. Indeed,
when I tried to work with a market-clearing interpretation in which each point on the curve was
generated by the intersection of relevant demand and supply curves, Phillips told me forcibly that
he thought I was on the wrong track because his curve was a disequilibrium phenomenon.
Furthermore, Lipsey (1981b: 547) remarked that his disequilibrium view of the economy “was [...] taught to me
by Bill Phillips when I was a junior staU member at the London School of Economics in the mid-1950s.”
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more, they (1967: 191, my italics) also noted that “[s]ince the dependent variable in the Phillips
relationship is a rate of change, its explanation must involve us in the analysis of disequilib-
rium situations: situations of excess demand or supply.” This is, as has been shown, fully in
line with Lipsey’s and Phillips’ interpretation of the curve. On the other hand, however, Corry
and Laidler (1967: 193) pointed out that rising or falling wages as a reaction to excess supply
and demand as well as stable wages at some positive level of (frictional) unemployment “are
hardly novel propositions, and the Phillips-curve analysis certainly does not derive its appeal
from them.” What in their view is outstanding is that there is a “trade-oU between the rate of
increase of wages and the level of unemployment” for unemployment levels lower than the
frictional level. Thus, in the same year (1967) as Friedman gave his Presidential Address to the
American Economic Association (Friedman 1968), the curve is interpreted as a disequilibrium
phenomenon and as oUering “a trade-oU between unemployment and inWation” (Corry and
Laidler 1967: 197) at the same time—two interpretations which are not necessarily compatible
with one another—at least without further assumptions.
One important element regarding such a trade-oU based on disequilibrium dynamics is the
idea that the slope and position of the Phillips curve in the aggregate depends on the state of
demand within diUerent micro markets. This approach will be very important for explaining
the “Keynesian” notion of the trade-oU between full employment and price stability in Chapter
5 and is thus discussed in the next subsection.
1.3.3 Micro versus Macro Relations
The relationship between the unemployment/wage-change mechanism on a single market and
the average adjustment relation over all markets, that is, the Phillips curve, is discussed in
Lipsey (1960: 17U.).
Even with identical adjustment relations across all micro markets the macro relation, which
shows the aggregated behaviour over all micro markets, will have a diUerent slope and lo-
cation if unemployment is unequally distributed among the individual markets. This is owed
to the fact that Lipsey’s Phillips curve is non-linear for unemployment rates lower than the
equilibrium level. Thus, very low unemployment rates in some markets will cause a more than
proportional rate of wage increases in these markets. On the other hand, high unemployment
in other markets will only cause a proportional decline of wages as here the Phillips curve is
linear. Hence, due to this special shape of the micro curves, an equal amount of unemployment
on the macro level can point to diUerent average rates of wage changes in the aggregate de-
pending on the speciVc distribution of unemployment between the individual labour markets.
This is sketched in Figure 1.10 which illustrates the issue within a two-sector economy:31 The
same rate of unemployment u in the aggregate can be associated with diUerent aggregate rates
of change of wage rates w˙ab and w˙cd depending on the distribution of unemployment between
the two micro markets. Assume that both micro markets have the same micro relation and have
the same weight in the macro relation. However, if unemployment is spread very unequally
across both markets, that is, one sector settles at point a and the other one at point b, then
31For illustrative purposes the micro relation to the right of u is drawn as being non-linear instead of linear.
However, this does not alter the result in general as long as one market faces excess demand and thus falls
into the non-linear part of the original relation proposed by Lipsey.
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the average macro outcome will be at point ab. At this point, aggregate unemployment is at u
while wages rise at w˙ab on average. If the variance of the spread of unemployment over both
markets is lower, as is the case at the points c and d, then the same unemployment rate u can
be in line with a less strong change in wage rates in the aggregate, that is, w˙cd.
Figure 1.10: The Relation Between the Micro and Macro Curve.
Source: Own illustration.
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The whole macro relation therefore will have an upward bias compared to the micro relation
and will have a non-linear shape over all possible rates of unemployment as soon as the un-
employment rate in one particular micro market falls into the non-linear part of the individual
relation (see Lipsey 1960: 19). Furthermore, due to “the upward displacement of the macro-
observations, the observed macro-relation between W˙ and U will always tend to overstate the
upward Wexibility and to understate the downward Wexibility of wage rates to be found in a
typical individual market” (Lipsey 1960: 19). Hence, downwardly rigid wages in the aggregate
relation do not necessarily reWect the extent of the rigidity of wages in each micro market.
The degree of inequality regarding the distribution of unemployment between all markets
thus plays a crucial role for the actual shape and position of the Phillips curve on the aggregate
level. A speciVc Phillips curve hence can only be used to predict wage changes ceteris paribus,
that is, under the assumption that the inequality with respect to the sectoral distribution of
demand stays the same over time (Lipsey 1960: 19):
If one wishes to predict the rate of change of money wage rates (W˙ ), it is neces-
sary to know not only the level of unemployment but also its distribution between
the various markets of the economy.
In this respect, Lipsey (1960: 19) pointed out that economic policy may aim at decreasing the
degree of inequality as this would shift the macro Phillips curve downwards. Most interest-
ingly, also Phillips (1958b: 295) hinted at the hypothesis that the distribution of unemployment
plays a role for the overall rate of inWation as he noted that “[t]he extremely uneven geograph-
ical distribution of unemployment may also have been a factor tending to increase the rapidity
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of wage changes during the upswing of business activity between 1934 and 1937.” Moreover,
Phillips (1962: 12) remarked that a “lack of mobility of labour and industry, resulting in uneven
geographical and occupational distribution of unemployment” might be a reason why wages
rise despite “signiVcant unemployment”.
The change in the distribution of unemployment between diUerent labour markets through-
out a business cycle was brought forward by Lipsey (1960: 21U.) as an alternative explanation
for the loops observed by Phillips: Lipsey (1960: 5U.) investigated Phillips’ tentative idea that
wage changes do not only depend on the level of unemployment, but also on the rate of change
of unemployment which is the main explanation of the observed loops Phillips found surround-
ing the curve. “Loop” in this discussion means that wage rate changes were usually found to be
higher than predicted by the Phillips relationship when unemployment was falling and lower
than predicted when unemployment was rising, which implies an anticlockwise movement
around the Phillips curve during a business cycle. Phillips (1958b: 291, n. 1; 292f.) explained
these anticlockwise loops by an inWuence of the rate of change of unemployment, since em-
ployers would be bidding more strongly for labour when unemployment is falling than when
it is rising (see Phillips 1958b: 283; see also Lipsey 1960: 20f.). The change in the direction of the
loops from being anticlockwise to a clockwise loop from 1953 to 1957 (see Phillips 1958b: 297)
was then explained by Phillips (1958b: 297) by referring to the argument that the unemploy-
ment rate might inWuence wage changes only with a certain time lag (which implies clockwise
loops). This lag, Phillips (1958b: 292f.) argued, could be the result of increased collective bar-
gaining or arbitration and conciliation procedures. Furthermore, Phillips (1958b: 292) also noted
that the inWuence of the rate of change of unemployment had become less important over time
as the loops seemed to narrow. However, Lipsey (1960: 7U.) found no empirical evidence that
the inWuence of the change of the rate of unemployment on wage changes had become less
strong over time.
Due to this evidence against Phillips’ hypothesis and also for theoretical reasons, Lipsey
(1960: 21U.) was in favour of a diUerent explanation for the loops. These loops, according to
his alternative hypothesis, would be the outcome of systematic displacements of the macro
relation due to a changing dispersion of unemployment across the sectors during a business
cycle. Anticlockwise loops (as observed by Phillips for all but one period) in Lipsey’s (1960: 27)
approach emerge if the upswing causes a rise in the unequal distribution of unemployment
while a downswing aUects all sectors equally and at the same time (this hypothesis was tested
by Smyth 1979 and rejected). Hence, a change in the direction of the loops from anticlockwise
to clockwise could be explained by the change from increasing inequality in the upswing and
decreases thereof in the downswing (anticlockwise) to decreasing inequality in the upswing
and increases in inequality in the downswing (clockwise).
Furthermore, following Lipsey (1978: 62, n. 14) a change in the direction of the loops32 might
also be explained by the amplitude of cyclical Wuctuations: If the amplitude of such Wuctu-
ations is high, then the sectoral distribution of unemployment plays an important role for
32Knowles and Winsten (1959: 119), however, brought forth another explanation for the change of the direction
of the loops as they stressed the eUect of cost of living adjustments on wages as a possible source for clockwise
loops—an idea already hinted at in Lipsey (1960: 11) and later also emphasised by Phelps (1972: 47). Indeed, in
modern terms, fully adjusting inWation expectations over a business cycle would cause clockwise shifts of the
short-run Phillips curve around the “natural rate of unemployment”.
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anticlockwise loops, whereas Phillips’ approach to explain clockwise loops (lagged unemploy-
ment) becomes more inWuential if the amplitude of such Wuctuations is low, so that the overall
moderation of cyclical Wuctuations since the Second World War may explain the change in the
direction of the loops from being anticlockwise to clockwise.
The eUects of the distribution of unemployment between separated labour markets were
picked up in Lipsey’s later work, for example, Lipsey and Parkin (1970: 117U.) and, as will be
pointed out in Chapter 5, played an important role for explaining the perceived incompatibility
between full employment and price stability.
Lipsey’s disequilibrium model, however, seems to stand in contrast to his 1965 long-run
trade-oU contribution, which also played an important role in the Phillips curve debate, since
Lipsey’s paper was one of those contributions to which Phelps (1967: 255, n. 1) referred to in
his well-known essay on the necessary distinction between the short-run and long-run Phillips
curve trade-oU (see Section 5.7).
1.3.4 The 1965 Contribution: The Phillips Curve as a Trade-OU Relation
Lipsey (1981b: 557, n. 16) recalled that he “followed the lead of Samuelson and Solow (1960) in
treating the Phillips curve as if it provided a stable long-term menu of choice between inWation
and unemployment.” Furthermore, Lipsey (1997c: 353) admitted that “[t]he [1965] paper reads
in a somewhat dated fashion because of its use of a negatively sloped, long-run Phillips curve.”
Lipsey’s 1965 contribution deals with the contemporary discussion about the sources of un-
employment in the USA, that is, whether unemployment is demand-deVcient or structural.33
The Vrst part of Lipsey’s (1965: 210) paper discusses this issue on theoretical grounds as it
“attempts to deVne various types of unemployment in a way which is operationally meaning-
ful.” Lipsey’s approach is explicitly based on a trade-oU between inWation and unemployment
(Lipsey 1965: 210f.):
Consider the problem of reducing unemployment. Almost everyone would pre-
fer less unemployment to more unemployment ceteris paribus. Problems arise,
however, when the objective of reducing unemployment conWicts with other ob-
jectives such as maintaining a stable level of prices and a satisfactory balance of
payments.
Figure 1.11 shows this policy dilemma as society (preferences represented by the indiUerence
curves I, I ′, I ′′, I ′′′, I ′′′′) has to decide between diUerent combinations of unemployment and
inWation, while combinations closer to the origin of ordinates are preferred. All possible com-
binations which are attainable by using aggregate demand policies lie on the RR curve which
is explicitly based on the Phillips curve (see Lipsey 1965: 212, n. 1).
For given preferences (for example, indiUerence curve I ′) between unemployment and inWa-
tion, the policymaker hence will choose point u with 0r being the “acceptable rate of inWation”
which “is worth incurring in order to reduce unemployment” (Lipsey 1965: 213). The unemploy-
ment rate which will therefore be maintained (and is also attainable) by demand management
33See, for example, also the study by the Commission on Money and Credit (1961: 27f.) and Neil (1964). Lipsey’s
1965 approach also inWuenced a passage in the forth edition of Lipsey’s textbook (Lipsey 1971: 693f.) which
deals with the causes of and cures for structural and deVcient-demand unemployment.
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Figure 1.11: Structural vs. DeVcient-Demand Unemployment.
Source: Lipsey (1965: 211). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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is 0x. Of course, absolute constraints on some variables are also possible (for example, as given
by the horizontal lines r′C ′′ or 0C ′), which indicate that the policymaker is willing to only
accept inWation up to 0r′ and 0 respectively.
It may be possible to shift the RR curve by structural measures to the left (for example, by
reducing inequalities of excess demand between separated labour markets or by reducing the
time necessary for adjustments on the supply side; see Lipsey 1965: 213). RR might also shift
endogenously in the sense that ongoing high demand may foster the reduction of unequally
distributed excess demand for labour across separated labour markets (see Lipsey 1965: 213, n.
3). This argument is very much in line with Lipsey (1960: 19, n. 4).
However, the costs of such structural measures need to be taken into account, so that a
cost-beneVt analysis becomes necessary. Thus, shifting RR to R′R′ and therefore reducing the
unemployment rate from 0x to 0f , will be only beneVcial if the increased additional output
is higher than the costs involved in these structural measures. Of course, not all such supply
side policies will have a positive net gain in strictly monetary terms. For example, shifting
R′R′ to R′′R′′, so that an unemployment rate of 0g becomes attainable, might be possible
by introducing “structural measures which would be desirable on social grounds in spite of
showing a net monetary loss” (Lipsey 1965: 214).
By making use of this model it becomes possible to diUerentiate between diUerent kinds of
unemployment and to arrive at a deVnition of full employment: Consider the case in which cur-
rent unemployment is 0a. Given theRR curve and society’s preferences (I ′) about inWation and
unemployment, unemployment of the amount of ax can be interpreted as “deVcient-demand
unemployment in the sense that this much unemployment could be removed by raising ag-
gregate demand without creating unacceptable conWicts with other goals of policy” (Lipsey
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1965: 214), which points at a long-run Phillips curve trade-oU. On the other hand, regarding
the costs and beneVts of shifting the Phillips curve, xg represents structural unemployment
which can be removed by supply side policies which “pay for themselves” on a monetary base
(shifting RR to R′R′) and/or which are desirable (R′R′ to R′′R′′) because of “nonpecuniary
social beneVts” (Lipsey 1965: 214). Hence, the remaining unemployment of 0g can be consid-
ered to be frictional unemployment as there are no (perceived) monetary or social net beneVts
so that “the persistence of this amount of unemployment is thus consistent with our notion of
full employment and we may deVne 0g as full employment” (Lipsey 1965: 214).
Of course, deVning the amount of unemployment at 0g as the full employment level is
by far less objective than other deVnitions, for example, point s, since at this unemploy-
ment rate prices would be stable, indicating that there is no excess demand or supply on the
labour market. However, Lipsey is fully aware of these “value judgements”34 emphasising that
“point s is objectively determined and independent of the decision takers’ preferences” (Lipsey
1965: 214f.), whereas, on the other hand, u “involves preferences as well as the objective RR
curve” (Lipsey 1965: 215). Equally subjective is point v, which is determined by the objective
R′R′ curve (as costs and gains of shifting RR to R′R′ can be objectively calculated) but is
also determined by the subjective preference function I ′′. Point w is completely subjective as
full employment is now determined by the subjective R′′R′′ curve (as the social desirability
of shifting the curve cannot be expressed objectively in monetary terms) and the preference
function I ′′′.
As a consequence of this approach, no objective, but only a subjective, separation between
deVcient-demand, structural, and frictional unemployment (that is, full employment) is pos-
sible. In eUect, “structural unemployment is that part of frictional unemployment which is
not acceptable either because there would be a net money gain in removing it or because
the social gains of removing it are judged to outweigh the net money cost of so doing” (Lipsey
1965: 215). This indicates that full employment, in an extreme interpretation, might also be zero
unemployment as soon as policymakers decide that all remaining unemployment after an ap-
propriate increase in aggregate demand should be cured by supply side policies. On the other
hand, any amount of structural unemployment can be declared to be in line with frictional
unemployment—and hence full employment—if only the policymaker is convinced that there
are no monetary or non-monetary net gains of removing the remaining non-deVcient-demand
unemployment.
However, not only the deVnition of frictional unemployment and thus full employment be-
comes subject to policymakers’ preferences. Also the deVnition which amount of unemploy-
ment should be cured by demand policies is inWuenced by such subjective judgements as “by
deVcient-demand unemployment we mean unemployment which can be removed by raising
aggregate demand without encountering unacceptable conWicts with other goals of policy”
(Lipsey 1965: 215), that is, in particular, the rate of inWation.
Lipsey’s approach of focusing on both deVcient-demand and structural unemployment hence
had far-reaching policy implications as beforehand full employment was often considered to
be reached as soon as there is no deVcient-demand unemployment (that is, unemployment of
0x in Figure 1.11). For example, the Council of Economic Advisers (1962: 46) deVned full em-
34See also Ackley (1966: 176f.) on the issue of value judgements with respect to economic policy.
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ployment to be reached as soon as a “further expansion of expenditure for goods and services,
and for labor to produce them, would be met by only minor increases in employment and
output, and by major increases in prices and wages.” Exactly this approached is criticised by
Lipsey (1965: 215f.), since this deVnition neglects the possibility of shifting the Phillips curve
by appropriate supply-side policies:
This makes all unemployment deVcient-demand unemployment by deVnition
in the sense that, whatever its causes, full employment can always be restored
solely by increasing aggregate demand. Any structural change which shifts the
RR curve to the right merely raises the level of U at which full employment is
deVned to occur. Clearly, there is nothing to be gained by this deVning away of
the problem, and it is thus necessary to deVne the goal of full employment which
is similar, if not identical, to the one adopted here.
Lipsey thus argued that full employment should not be deVned in a narrow sense by referring
solely to the acceptable rate of inWation (that is, a movement on the Phillips curve until inWation
becomes too high for comfort), but also to the costs and gains of shifting the Phillips curve to
the left by structural policies.
In sum, on the one hand, Lipsey’s contribution provides a deVnition of diUerent kinds of
unemployment. On the other hand, however, it sheds light upon the issue of how the “menu
of choice” interpretation of the Phillips curve opened Pandora’s box as any unemployment
rate could be deVned as deVcient-demand unemployment if only the policymaker is inclined
to accept the accompanying inWation. The relative amount of structural and deVcient-demand
unemployment hence ultimately depends on the preferences of the decision-maker (see Lipsey
1965: 216). This deVnition of diUerent kinds of unemployment thus “is based on cures rather
than on causes” (Lipsey 1965: 216).35
Lipsey’s treatment of the problem of deVning the unemployment rate consistent with full
employment hence was based on a long-run Phillips curve trade-oU in combination with a set
of indiUerence curves. In eUect, the deVnition of full employment became a subjective one.
Tobin (1972b: 2) therefore correctly stated that “[t]his view [the Phillips curve] contained no
concept of full employment. In its place came the tradeoU, along which society supposedly can
choose the least undesirable feasible combination of the evils of unemployment and inWation”,
so that a clear deVnition was replaced by “a zone of more and less full employment” (Tobin
1997: 4). This issue of the diXculty of deVning full employment will play an important role in
Section 5.1.
The overall policy proposal out of Lipsey’s analysis is straightforward: The Vrst step would
be to reduce unemployment by expansionary policies until inWation becomes unacceptable, so
that deVcient-demand unemployment is zero. After that, any remaining unemployment might
be removed by structural measures (see Lipsey 1965: 217). Lipsey (1965: 217) hence concluded:
35However, for Vanderkamp (1966: 221) there is one important advantage of this deVnition as testing this hy-
pothesis becomes straightforward: “Lipsey deVnes structural unemployment with reference to the empirical
trade-oU relationship between unemployment and price changes. Although it would seem possible to devise
an alternative deVnition which relies on information concerning individual labour markets, the deVnition ad-
vanced by Lipsey has the advantage of testability. That is, providing one can agree on the speciVcation of the
trade-oU relation it is possible to say whether or not structural unemployment has increased in a particular
period.”
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Thus in a perfect world, in which policy makers acted rationally, we would be-
have as ifwewere deVcient-demand theorists and increase aggregate demand until
the limit set by acceptable price rises was reached; we would then all behave as
structuralists and consider how the remaining unemployment could be removed.
Lipsey (1965: 217) furthermore seemed to be optimistic that such Vne-tuning is indeed possible
or, at least, that the dangers inherent in active demand management are negligible so that
demand policies should always be tried:
The worst that could happen if we followed this policy is that we might over-
shoot the mark and experience rates of inWation one or two percentage points
above the acceptable level for a short time until demand could be lowered to the
desired level. Of course, there can be no Vnality about value judgments, but I
should regard anyone who opposed this policy because of fear of inWation as hav-
ing either an insuXciently thought-out position or a set of value judgments that
were deVnitely perverse judged by any common standard. The possibility of in-
curring a once-for-all rise in the price level of one or two percentage points [due
to a too high increase of demand which will then be reversed] cannot be regarded
as a high price to pay in order to discover by how much unemployment can be
reduced by using the relatively simple tools of Vscal policy.
Lipsey (1965: 218), however, also emphasised that a deeper analysis of the causes of unem-
ployment is necessary as, for example, it is important to know whether or not the current
unemployment rate is an idiosyncratic problem or the outcome of a long-term trend. Such an
empirical investigation takes centre stage in the remainder of Lipsey’s paper.
Lipsey’s 1965 analysis Vts very well into economic research at that time: In the same year,
Okun (1965) and Musgrave (1965) dealt with similar issues. Particularly Okun (1965: 74) pointed
at the “Phillips Curve dilemma”. Very much in line with Lipsey (1965), Okun (1965: 69) em-
phasised that “[i]t is the risk—or indeed the fact—of inWation, not any absolute limits to the
potency of aggregate demand, that sets the restrictions on our unemployment target.” Even
though Okun (1965) did not draw any diagram to illustrate the Phillips curve trade-oU, the
approach Okun (1965: 70) had in mind is comparable to that of Lipsey (1965):
The choice of an unemployment target therefore is a typical economic trade-oU,
which requires balancing the evil of inWation, on the one hand, with lost pro-
duction and joblessness on the other. Every graduate student knows the formal
solution for such a problem: crank in a preference function and an opportunity
locus, and grind out an optimal solution. The preference function here obviously
involves some weighing of the welfare costs of a little more danger of inWation
versus the beneVts of a little bit more production.
Hence, the Phillips curve is “[t]he opportunity locus relevant to our choice” (Okun 1965: 70).
However, “hard-core unemployability, bottlenecks, and wage-price pressures” have a potential
to “limit our unemployment target” (Okun 1965: 78). Thus, “[i]t is essential that aggregative
policies, manpower policies, and wage-price policies be recognized as complementary tools to
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achieve noninWationary full employment” (Okun 1965: 80). Hence, as in Lipsey (1965), demand-
side policies and supply-side policies go hand in hand and are rather complementary than
substitutable means (see also Musgrave 1965: 93U.).
What stands out is the fact that demand policies are deVnitely regarded as a powerful tool to
remove unemployment at the cost of higher inWation since some kind of a stable Phillips curve
trade-oUwas assumed. Peirce (1965: 98), who summarised the contributions of Okun (1965) and
Musgrave (1965), hence concluded that “they were also unanimous in suggesting that aggregate
demand should be increased further in order to reduce unemployment.” However, as will be
shown in Section 5.3, proposals of such expansionary aggregate demand policies were based
on the underlying assumption of involuntary unemployment.
1.3.5 Summary
Lipsey’s 1960 contribution was a pioneering article in two aspects: It not only provided a further
empirical investigation of the Phillips relationship, but also oUered a model to explain the
speciVc shape of the curve.
Lipsey’s empirical contribution to the Phillips curve was, despite some inaccuracies which
gave rise to later criticism, a very important step towards establishing the Phillips curve in
the economics profession. This empirical assessment furthermore reWected the change in the
methodology at the LSE in the late 1950s. The Phillips curve hence became an “exercise in
positive economics” (Laidler 1997: 101). In this sense Lipsey’s contribution was the Vrst one of
a whole industry of estimating the curve,36 or, as Phelps (1985: 581) put it: “If you didn’t Vnd
the curve you didn’t publish.”
With respect to the theoretical explanation of the Phillips curve the diUerences between
Lipsey’s and Friedman’s approaches are striking: It has been shown that Lipsey’s 1960 model
was very diUerent from that of Friedman (1975, 1976) regarding causality and the general
setup of the economy. Whereas Lipsey followed Phillips in treating the curve as an adjust-
ment mechanism in disequilibrium situations, so that changes in quantities cause changes in
prices, Friedman followed Fisher (1926b)37 regarding causality: unexpected changes in prices
cause a temporary deviation of the quantities supplied and demanded from their “natural” lev-
els. Nonetheless, these deviations are not disequilibria as the market remains cleared and no
party is oU their supply and demand curve. Contrary to Friedman, Lipsey (1960) emphasised
the necessity of analysing diUerent micro markets in order to explain the macro relationship.
Lipsey’s and Friedman’s theoretical explanations of the Phillips curve hence are diUerent
in many important aspects. Whereas Lipsey’s analysis is an attempt to explain the nature of
36See, for example, Goldstein (1972) and Qin (2011) for an overview and Rees and Hamilton (1967) for important
caveats regarding the estimation of the Phillips curve.
37In a series of articles, Fisher (1925, 1926a, b, 1933) argued on empirical and theoretical grounds that a change
in the price level inWuences the level of employment due to contractually Vxed wages. Even though Fisher
(1926b: 1) spoke of “a matter as intensely human as the employment problem”, the policy implication in his
view is not to make use of this trade-oU to lower unemployment by means of inWation, but to stabilise the price
level in order to avoid Wuctuations in employment (see particularly Fisher 1933: 158f.) since Fisher (1926a: 29)
remarked that “I Vrmly believe that we would solve the problem of unemployment for the most part if we
could stabilize the dollar.” On Fisher’s 1926b essay, which was reprinted as Fisher (1973), see Donner and
McCollum (1972) and Section 2.7.
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inWation and its relation to the rate of unemployment, so that the Phillips curve is the outcome
of an economy in ongoing disequilibrium, for Friedman the curve shows up as an artefact
caused by monetary surprises.
However, and without doubt, there is also a sharp contrast between the disequilibrium in-
terpretation in Lipsey (1960) on the one hand, and the trade-oU reading of the Phillips curve
in Lipsey (1965) on the other hand.38 In the former contribution a trade-oU, if at all, is inter-
preted as temporary and would not exist if prices were allowed to adjust instantaneously, so
that excess demand and excess supply would be non-existent. Moreover, the relation between
excess demand and changes in the level of unemployment is explained by the eUect of excess
demand on the speed of labour turnover. Excess demand positively inWuences the speed of
labour turnover and therefore causes a fall of frictional unemployment.
On the other hand, in the 1965 contribution a long-run trade-oU between inWation and un-
employment is not only assumed, but also explicitly presented as a tool for economic policy.
It is exactly this “menu of choice” interpretation of the curve that one would expect after hav-
ing read Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967).39 Indeed, Lipsey’s 1965 contribution built the basis
(together with Okun 1965) for Phelps’ famous 1967 essay. Furthermore, Lipsey also emphasised
the trade-oU view in his textbook (1963: 429, my italics):
The idea that there is a relation between the level of unemployment and the
rate of change of prices opens up the spectre of more or less continuous inWation
to governments committed to a policy of full employment. This suggests that a
government may have to choose between really full employment and a stable price
level.
Such statements indeed give the impression that Friedman’s account of “Keynesian” Phillips
curve analysis was correct without much room for a diUerent view. But as the next essays and
the concluding discussion will show, the trade-oU interpretation was by far more complex and
diverse.
The next chapter will take a closer look at the original Phillips curve and its role within
Phillips’ research programme. It will particularly highlight the role of the Phillips curve as a
relation which shows the speed of adjustment if the economy is in disequilibrium. Furthermore,
the trade-oU interpretation of the curve which can also be found in Phillips’ writings will
be discussed. Chapter 3 will then focus on this trade-oU view by investigating Samuelson’s
and Solow’s “menu of choice” reading of the curve and the cost-push demand-pull debate
about the causes of inWation. It will also shed light on Friedman’s critique regarding this trade-
oU. Moreover, it will be shown that despite the trade-oU view taken in Samuelson and Solow
(1960), the Phillips curve was not interpreted as a stable relationship over time. Particularly the
possibility of adjusting inWation expectations or hysteresis on the labour market as well as the
inWuence of the rate of unemployment on the rate of growth were discussed as shift parameters
of the curve. The last article included in this thesis (Chapter 4) will thus investigate the issue
38Lipsey (1985: 14) remarked with respect to his 1965 contribution that he stayed in the disequilibrium interpre-
tation of the Phillips curve but thought that such “a transitory disequilibrium relation could be perpetuated to
produce a result that persisted into the long term.”
39Forder (2010a: 340 and 2014: 127, n. 9) takes a diUerent point of view by emphasising that Lipsey tried to
disentangle diUerent kinds of unemployment.
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of choosing an optimal point on the Phillips curve with respect to the rate of growth. The
discussion in Chapter 5 will then oUer a synthesis of the diUerent views. It will be shown that
“Keynesians” indeed treated the Phillips curve as a long-run trade-oU. However, the Phillips
curve trade-oU was not understood as an opportunity set for engineering surprise inWation to
push the economy beyond full employment, but as constituting a policy dilemma since full
employment seemed to imply a positive rate of inWation.
35

2 A.W. Phillips and His Curve:
Stabilisation Policies, InWation
Expectations and the ‘Menu of Choice’
Abstract
This paper investigates the interpretation of the Phillips curve by Phillips himself. It will be
shown that Phillips primarily understood his curve as a disequilibrium relation to be used in
his models on stabilisation policies and not necessarily as a long-run ‘menu of choice’ between
inWation and unemployment, even though Phillips did not oppose and sometimes even appears
to have endorsed this interpretation. InWation expectations are discussed by Phillips as well.
Contrary to Friedman, price expectations drive his system from the demand side but not from
the supply side of the economy. Nonetheless, price expectations may induce dynamic instabil-
ity.
Keywords: Phillips curve, menu of choice, trade-oU, inWation expectations, unemployment
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Any time seems to be the right time for reWections
on the Phillips curve.
Robert M. Solow (1976: 3)
2.1 Introduction
Since its discovery by A.W. Phillips in 1958, the interpretation of the Phillips curve has changed
remarkably: in 1960, the ‘menu of choice’ reading of the Phillips curve by Samuelson and Solow
paved the way for its application to economic policy. The well-known critique of this long-run
trade-oU between inWation and unemployment and the introduction of adaptive inWation ex-
pectations by Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968)1 followed soon afterwards. Finally, the incor-
poration of rational expectations (Lucas 1972, 1973 and Sargent 1973) denied a trade-oU even
in the short run. Phillips’ use of the curve in his own research programme, however, had lit-
tle in common with this development: Phillips’ original interpretation of the Phillips curve as
depicting an adjustment relation in his stabilisation models was outlined and emphasised par-
ticularly by Leeson (1997b) and also by one of Phillips’ closest research fellows, Lipsey (1978).
Nonetheless, ambiguous statements by Phillips, especially considering the ‘menu of choice’ in-
terpretation of the curve, are not the focus of attention. This paper thus oUers an extensive
review of Phillips’ contributions with regard to the Phillips curve aiming at clarifying three
core questions: the Vrst issue is whether Phillips interpreted his curve as a stable ‘menu of
choice’ between inWation and unemployment. This question is closely related to the second
one which is aimed at Phillips’ own preferences towards inWation and unemployment. A third
and last issue is whether or not Phillips was aware of the relevance of inWation expectations
for his curve. This paper focuses on Phillips’ contributions in a chronological order to pro-
vide a better survey of the timing of important ideas and theoretical developments. Starting
with Phillips’ theoretical curve, which was published four years before his seminal paper in
which he estimated the Phillips curve, the discussion will move along his later contributions.
Focus will be placed on the Australian Phillips curve and his inaugural lecture given at the
London School of Economics and Political Science in 1961, as both contributions seem to stand
in contrast to his previous interpretations of the curve. Finally, Phillips’ inWuence on the mon-
etarist counter-revolution will be addressed. The conclusion will give the reader one possible
interpretation of Phillips’ somehow contradictory views on the Phillips curve.
2.2 Phillips’ Theoretical Curve
Rather unknown among economists today is Phillips’ (1954) paper ‘Stabilisation Policy in a
Closed Economy’ in which Phillips presents a further development in the theoretical frame-
1See Forder (2010) for possible forerunners.
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work of his Ph.D. dissertation which was Vnished in 1953. Phillips, in this paper, introduces
and discusses a theoretical Phillips curve. The core issue raised in this contribution concerns
the dangers inherent in stabilisation policies: Phillips criticises simple multiplier models as a
basis for recommendations for stabilising aggregate production and employment, since only
comparative statics are being used. Therefore, the adjustment process and variation of prices
and interest rates cannot be dealt with. Baumol (2000: 283) points out that automatic stabilis-
ers were increasingly favoured over discretionary policy at that time, without much research
about the impact of such automatic stabilisers on the dynamics of an economic system – a
question which became one of Phillips’ main research interests (and was also one concern of
Friedman, for example 1948: 254f.). Phillips’ engineering background proved to be of impor-
tance ‘as engineers have long known about these dangers in automatic stabilization devices’
(Baumol 1961: 21, fn. 1). Thus, Phillips (1954: 290) points out that an economic policy aimed
at stabilising the economy may even destabilise the system if the dynamics of the adjustment
process are ignored:
It is quite possible that certain types of policy may give rise to undesired Wuc-
tuations, or even cause a previously stable system to become unstable, although
the Vnal equilibrium position as shown by a static analysis appears to be quite
satisfactory.
Phillips bases his own analysis on a model consisting of an accelerator-multiplier interaction,
where pioneering work had been done by Samuelson (1939) and Hicks (1950) (see Turnovsky
2011: 68), whereas Phillips now applies methods used in dynamic control theory, which were
originally developed in engineering, to analyse and improve the stability of the system (see
Bollard 2011: 5). In the Vrst part of his paper, Phillips discusses diUerent kinds of stabilisa-
tion policies2 under the restrictive assumption that prices and interest rates remain constant.
However, Phillips (1954: 293) is not reluctant to accept other stabilisation goals besides price
stability and full employment as the ‘level of production which it is desired to maintain [...]
may be based on a number of other economic, political or social considerations.’
In the second part of his article, Phillips (1954: 307U.) further discusses his model and diUerent
stabilisation policies now assuming Wexible prices. Therefore, Phillips introduces his theoretical
curve,3 relating the rate of change of factor prices and thus of inWation P˙ to the ‘error in
production’ (P a−P t) in the economy where P a is actual output and P t is the target level (with
2Three diUerent stabilisation policies and a combination thereof are considered and introduced by Phillips (1954:
294U.). All three policies have in common that they react oppositely in sign and proportionally in magnitude to
their respective variable: 1. Proportional stabilisation policy (reaction to the current error): This stabilisation
policy responds directly to the ‘error in production’, that is, if actual output diUers from potential output.
2. Integral stabilisation policy (reaction to the sum of past errors): This stabilisation policy is a function of the
cumulated deviations from the target. 3. Derivative correction (reaction to the rate of change of the error):
The last proposed policy rule reacts to the change of the variable chosen to be stabilised. Phillips’ (1954)
contribution is extended by more realistic time-lag assumptions in Phillips (1957). See also Turnovsky (2000:
297U.) and Turnovsky (2011: 68U.) on Phillips’ stabilisation policies.
3Laidler (2002: 228) and Lipsey (2010b: 380, fn. 3) remark that Phillips himself had been mainly inspired by the
work of Hansen (1951) for deriving his curve.
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θ as a proportionality constant as Phillips assumes linearity for small changes in production,
simulating his model with θ equal to 0, 0.5, 1 and 2):4
P˙ = θ(P a − P t)
Phillips assumes a given quantity and productivity of productive factors so that changes in
the level of prices will be mainly inWuenced by changes in factor prices driven from the demand
and not the supply side. Nevertheless, already in this early stage of his work, Phillips (1954:
307f.) addresses central arguments of the later well-known Phillips curve, as his theoretical
curve is also non-linear – it becomes nearly horizontal in the case of underutilisation and
nearly vertical when facing a very high level of economic activity. This non-linearity of his
curve is based on the assumption that the rigidity of factor prices will be higher in the case
of a low level of production.5 This non-linear approach is in stark contrast to other concepts
used at that time: Vrst of all, Lipsey (2000: 233f.) points out that Phillips found the concept of
the reverse L-shaped Keynesian supply curve (in price level output space) – being horizontal
until full employment is reached – as too restrictive for his analysis of diUerent stabilisation
policies, because such a kinked supply curve will lead to a dichotomised model as ‘any level
of income [until full employment][...] is associated with stable prices, while any amount of
inWation can be associated with full employment income’ (Lipsey 1978: 52). Also, Yamey (2000:
338, fn. 1) remarks that Phillips was in search of a better Vtting supply curve even earlier for
use in his macroeconomic machine (see Phillips 1950), which was later known as the MONIAC
(Monetary National Income Automatic/Analogue Computer),6 a term coined by Abba Lerner
(see Bollard 2011: 5). Phillips also oUers a graphical representation (see Figure 2.1).
Phillips (1954: 307) explains the output level compatible with price stability in the following
way, which Pagan (2000: 132) interprets as an early description of the concept of the ‘natural
rate of unemployment’ (Friedman 1968: 8):
Even with Wexible factor prices, there will be some level of production and em-
ployment which, given the bargaining powers of the diUerent groups in the econ-
omy, will just result in the average level of factor prices remaining constant [...]
This level of equilibrium output and employment will be lower, which indicates that the curve
will shift to the left, ‘the stronger and more aggressive the organisation of the factors of pro-
duction’ (Phillips 1954: 307).
Interestingly, Phillips (1954: 308), now again discussing diUerent stabilisation policies, explic-
itly assumes the goal of price stability (zero inWation), however, without any explanation for
the selection of this goal. Chapple (1998: 73) speculates that the main reason for choosing the
goal of price stability might be that the calculation of the model becomes much easier by set-
ting this value to zero. This argument about easier calculation brought forward by Chapple is
4Equation taken from Lipsey (1978: 49f.).
5For an explanation of this ad hoc assumption see for example Lipsey (1981: 552f.), who argues with reference
to Keynes (1936), that workers care about relative wages. Since a reduction in money wages may not preserve
relative positions, whereas an adjustment of the price level will, this indicates nominal but not real wage
downward stickiness.
6On the MONIAC see the special issue edited by Curzio (2011).
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reinforced when Phillips (1954: 308) assumes linearity of his curve for small deviations around
this zero-inWation output level.
Figure 2.1: Phillips’ Theoretical Curve.
Source: Phillips (1954: 308). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Despite having omitted price expectations in his supply curve, Phillips (1954: 311U.) incorpo-
rates price expectations into his demand curve and even attributes an important role to them
for the stability of the whole system (see also Leeson 1997b: 166). The system may get desta-
bilised by rising price expectations if economic agents anticipate that the price level will not
return to its initial level, which will therefore boost demand and will lead, in a self-fulVlling
way, to rising prices (see also Lipsey 1961: 2f. and Phillips 1962: 9f.).7 However, price expec-
tations in the way Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) incorporated them into their models
operate on the supply side of the economy, equilibrating nominal and real values, safeguarding
that changes of absolute prices do not inWuence economic decisions as long as relative prices
are being reverted to their real values determined in the real sphere of the economic system
(see also Chapple 1998: 74f.). Summing up Phillips’ 1954 paper, it is hard to Vnd any evidence
that Phillips already had the idea of a shifting Phillips curve as a consequence of inWationary
expectations in mind.8 Nonetheless, inWation expectations on the demand side can render the
whole system unstable.
2.3 The Phillips Curve
In Phillips’ most inWuential paper published in 1958, ‘The Relation Between Unemployment
and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957’ – which
he himself described as ‘done in a week end’ (cited from Leeson 1994: 613, who refers to a
7This mechanism of price expectations might be inWuenced by Hicks (1939 [1946]: 204U.), as Hicks makes the
crucial distinction whether or not price changes are expected to be permanent or temporary, whereas expected
permanent changes may induce dynamic instabilities (see Boianovsky 2004: 94f.).
8Also Lipsey (1961: 8, fn.) explicitly states that the two concepts discussed here are completely diUerent: ‘We
might observe in passing another argument for cumulative inWation, that in order to achieve some given
policy goal, say, a maximum of 1.5 per cent unemployment, it is necessary to produce faster and faster rates of
inWation as people come to adjust fully to each new rate. This argument is totally diUerent from the one being
considered in the text; it does not say that constant rates of inWation are impossible, only that their eXcacy in
producing other desired policy objectives diminishes through time.’
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correspondence with Gregory dated 3 December 1992), as a ‘rush job’ (cited from Blyth 1978:
xvi) and as a ‘very crude attempt’ (Phillips 1962: 11)9 – it becomes clear that Phillips (1958:
283) interpreted his curve as a disequilibrium relation: prices are driven by excess demand or
supply, which indicates that not all possible points on this curve would be stable in the long
run (see also Lipsey 2000: 238, highlighting that Phillips strongly insisted on this disequilibrium
interpretation):
When the demand for a commodity or service is high relatively to the supply of
it we expect the price to rise, the rate of rise being greater the greater the excess de-
mand. Conversely when the demand is low relatively to the supply we expect the
price to fall, the rate of fall being greater the greater the deVciency of demand. It
seems plausible that this principle should operate as one of the factors determining
the rate of change of money wage rates, which are the price of labour services.
The curve (see Figure 2.2), therefore, relates unemployment (data mostly from Beveridge 1944:
310U.), as a proxy for excess demand for labour (see also Phillips 1959b: 2 and Lipsey 1960: 13U.),
to wage changes (in large part based on data from Brown and Hopkins 1950; see Leeson 1997b:
162f. for an extensive list of data sources used). Corry (2002: 167) points out that the switch
from the gap between full capacity output and actual output, as a proxy for excess demand, to
the unemployment rate was mainly induced by more readily available data on unemployment
rates than on output gaps.
Figure 2.2: The Phillips Curve.
Unemployment and the rate of change of money wage rates, United Kingdom, 1861–1913.
Source: Phillips (1958: 285). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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As Phillips (1958: 299) regards his own curve as a disequilibrium relation, he only emphasises
two points on his curve (with respect to productivity increases and external price shocks) – on
9Sleeman (2011: 234) therefore speculates that not Phillips himself, but rather James Meade, who was, together
with James Durbin, supervisor of Phillips’ Ph.D. thesis, submitted the paper to Economica.
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the one hand, an unemployment rate leading to stable prices (about 2.5%) and on the other
hand, a higher unemployment rate leading to stable wages (about 5.5%).
Nevertheless, at least one statement concerning economic policy can be found with respect
to the location and shape of the estimated curve. Phillips (1958: 295) notes that the high average
unemployment rate of nearly 11% between 1925 and 1929, which turned out to be necessary
to restore the pre-war gold parity by forcing down the price level, ‘could have been predicted
fairly accura[t]ely from a study of the pre-war data, if anyone had felt inclined to carry out the
necessary analysis.’
However, concerning the long-run stability of the relation between unemployment and
wage-rate changes, Phillips does not take inWation expectations fully into account. Rather, he
only discusses cost of living adjustments as playing a crucial role in the wage-negotiation pro-
cess if price increases – as a consequence of a severe rise in import prices – are large enough to
threaten the real wage. This means that only if inWation, due to exogenous shocks, exceeds the
rise in nominal wages, will cost of living adjustments have an impetus on nominal wages. As
long as inWation remains lower or equal to the rise in nominal wages, ‘the introduction of cost
of living adjustments in wage rates will have no eUect, for employers will merely be giving
under the name of cost of living adjustments part of the wage increases which they would in
any case have given as a result of their competitive bidding for labour’ (Phillips 1958: 284).10 It
should be noted, however, that for the time span Phillips estimated his curve (between 1861 and
1913 in the United Kingdom), inWation was not a permanent phenomenon, so that not laying
primary emphasis on this element, which became important later, can be most likely explained
(but not justiVed from a theoretical point of view) by the fact that taking care of inWationary
developments was just not necessary (see also Forder 2010: 495f.).
In Figure 2.3, the period from 1861 to 1913, which was used by Phillips to estimate the Phillips
curve, is shown dashed. As can be easily seen, inWationary and deWationary periods are both
prevalent. However, the curve estimated for this period also Vts the two other periods under
Phillips’ consideration rather well (1913–1948 and 1948–1957), even though inWationary times
became more dominant than deWationary ones. Phillips (1958: 297), however, needed to lag
unemployment by seven months to get a good Vt for the last period (see also Leeson 1997b:
164).
Phillips’ assumptions (downward rigid nominal wages and cost of living adjustments as a
means to retain a certain real wage), however, do not imply that Phillips thought of completely
rigid nominal or real wages. Nominal wages are relatively more rigid downward compared to
upward Wexibility. Hence, the (theoretical as well as empirical) Phillips curve becomes Watter
but not completely horizontal the higher the slack in the economy. Due to rather sticky down-
ward wages in the case of underutilisation, an adjustment in the labour market via unemploy-
ment might take years and can therefore induce high economic losses. Phillips has shown this
above in the transition to the pre-war gold parity.
Be that as it may, Phillips (1958: 299) is well aware that his investigation of the relation
between unemployment and the rate of change of money wages and its interpretation needs to
10This assumption was under critical discussion shortly afterwards by Lipsey (1960: 8U.) who rejects Phillips’
concept on the grounds of empirical evidence and favours instead the hypothesis that changes of the cost of
living directly aUect wage changes, which, however, also ‘did not perform well’ (Lipsey 2000: 236).
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Figure 2.3: InWation in the United Kingdom, 1850–2010.
Retail price index (RPI), growth rate in per cent. Own illustration. Data source: Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to
Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present, MeasuringWorth, April 2011.
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be examined more deeply as he ends the paper with the warning that ‘[t]hese conclusions are
of course tentative.’
Unfortunately, Phillips never responded to early critiques emphasising, for example, the cost
of living eUect on wage determination (Knowles and Winsten 1959), or critiques questioning
the data and methods used to estimate the curve (Routh 1959). This can be related to the
fact that Phillips regarded his curve not as his primary research interest and most important
work (see Bollard 2011: 7). Yamey (2000: 337), editor of Economica at that time, remarks that
Phillips also refused to comment on other papers published in Economica relating to the Phillips
curve. Phillips (1968a [2000]: 224) also had the opinion that ‘the Vrst priority for an academic
economist should be to get on with the [...] job of trying to Vnd out more about how the
economy works and that he should resist the temptation to divert his limited time and energy
from this task to general debate on policy issues’, which might explain why he never engaged
heavily in later policy discussions.
Phillips, however, actually commented on another important contribution to the early Phil-
lips curve discussion by Dicks-Mireaux and Dow. They present their own investigation of the
determinants of wage changes. The most interesting result brought forward is that cost of liv-
ing eUects do not enter wage negotiations fully (the weight of past inWation being around 0.5;
see Dicks-Mireaux and Dow 1959: 166). Phillips (1959a: 176f.), in his comment, emphasises once
again the importance of achieving price stability and ‘a high level of economic activity and em-
ployment’. Regretfully, Phillips does not discuss the newly introduced variable capturing cost
of living eUects as Phillips focuses on other econometric details. Phillips, however, compares
his own results of his 1958 article with those found by Dicks-Mireaux and Dow (1959) and Vnds
them to be quite similar with the exception that his curve is a non-linear one. Noteworthy is
the fact that Phillips once again interprets his curve and the results of Dicks-Mireaux and Dow
only in the range around price stability.
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2.4 The Australian Phillips Curve
Phillips’ point of view about diUerent economic goals becomes much clearer in Phillips (1959b),
in which he is estimating the Australian Phillips curve. Phillips (1959b: 1) starts his paper –
which was presented at the University of Adelaide (see Leeson 1998: 88) but never formally
published, as Phillips seemed to be unsatisVed with the estimations due to data problems (see
Harcourt 2000: 304, Pitchford 2000: 263 and Sleeman 2011: 228) – with the following statement:
One of the main economic problems in Western countries today is whether it is
possible to prevent continually rising prices of consumer goods while maintaining
high levels of economic activity.
As labour is quantitatively the most important production factor – and the rate of wage changes
therefore the most inWuential factor for the change in prices – Phillips (1959b: 1) stresses the
need for a relation like the Phillips curve for guiding economic policy:
The problem therefore reduces to whether it is possible to prevent the money
price of labour services, that is average money earnings per man-hour, from rising
at more than about 2 per cent. per year [assumed productivity increase], while
maintaining high levels of economic activity and employment.
Wage changes in Phillips’ analysis are driven by export and import prices, cost of living adjust-
ments (see below) and by the demand for labour. As the ‘demand for labour [...] can be con-
trolled, and is continually being controlled, by Australian monetary and Vscal policy’, Phillips
(1959b: 3), therefore, points out that ‘one of the main purposes of this analysis is to consider
what level of demand for labour the monetary and Vscal authorities should seek to maintain in
their attempt to reconcile the two policy objectives of high levels of activity and stable prices.’
Phillips now also includes cost of living adjustments explicitly in his estimation equations.
Pitchford (2000: 264U.) tries to interpret this approach as a partial forerunner of Friedman
(1968), since now the relation may also be interpreted as relating real wage changes to the level
of unemployment. Phillips’ (1959b: 3) argument, in a nutshell, runs as follows: the change of
nominal wages depends on the excess demand for labour, approximated by the unemployment
rate, and is additionally a function of the change of the cost of living, while the cost of living
in turn depends on the change of wage rates. Because of this interdependency between wages
and prices, Phillips concludes that price changes can be eliminated in an estimated equation,
as both wage and price changes are a function of the unemployment rate. Thus, the change in
nominal wages already includes past cost of living adjustments (in Australia it was common in
the 1950s to decide on such adjustments centralised by an arbitration court) for any rate of un-
employment. As Phillips, however, does not take the idea of expected real wages into account
(and wage negotiators thus remain completely backward-looking), Pitchford (2000: 266) sees
Phillips as being ‘part of the way there’.11 Nevertheless, Phillips (1959b: 4) seems to interpret
11Friedman, in a letter to Sleeman dated 22 October 1982 (cited from Sleeman 1983: 152, fn. 47), recalls ‘having
a long conversation with Bill Phillips about this question [the mis-speciVcation of the Phillips curve]’ and
‘I remember pointing out to Bill that his argument should have been stated in terms of real wages and not
nominal wages. My recollection also is that he was persuaded that that was the case though I do not know
that he ever stated so in print.’
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his curve (see Figure 2.4) as a stable long-run relationship (see also Pitchford 2000: 266; see
critically Leeson 1997a: 55) as he is thinking in terms of years and even discusses an inWation
rate of 10% in this context:
[...] since we are interested here in long-run policy objectives, not in the short-
run prediction of wage changes, we can assume that the Wuctuations in export
and import prices average out over a long period of years and can therefore be
ignored in considering the level of demand for labour at which policy should be
aimed. The relations [...] between the rate of change of wage rates and the level
of unemployment [...] indicate that, on average over a period of years, wage rates
would rise [at the present level of unemployment of about 2.25 per cent of civilian
employees] at a little over 2 per cent[.] per year [...] The speed of inWation would
increase if the demand for labour were held at a higher level, thus at 1 per cent.
unemployment wage rates would rise on average at about 4 per cent. per year
which would give about 3 per cent. per year rise in consumers’ prices. If demand
were held at a level suXcient to reduce unemployment much below this level, the
speed of inWation would be very greatly increased. Thus with unemployment at
about 1
2
per cent. we could expect wage and price changes of the order of 10 per
cent. per year.
Figure 2.4: The Australian Phillips Curve, 1947–1958.
I: wage changes explained by the unemployment rate with a time lag of three quarters of a year;
II: wage changes explained by the unemployment rate with distributed time lags.
Source: Phillips (1959b: 11). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Thus, at an unemployment rate of 2.25%, wage rates will rise in line with an assumed pro-
ductivity growth of 2%. However, as hourly earnings, which are a better indicator of actual
wages paid, will rise by 3.5%, yielding a rate of inWation of 1.5%, Phillips (1959b: 4) concludes
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that ‘the two main objectives of monetary and Vscal policy, namely full employment and sta-
ble prices, cannot be completely and simultaneously obtained without a change in the present
attitudes to and methods of wage determination.’12 Phillips (1959b: 5) thus suggests supply-side
policies to improve the location of the Australian Phillips curve, like ‘measures [...] to increase
the mobility and adaptability of labour’ or ‘technical training and retraining’ to come closer
to the goal of price stability and full employment. Also the ‘practice of negotiating general
wage changes covering workers in widely diUerent groups of industries, occupations and ar-
eas’ might be responsible for ‘increasing the level of unemployment which is compatible with
stable prices’ as ‘areas which are developing rapidly’ are ‘likely to be dominant in determining
general increases in wage rates’ (Phillips 1959b: 5). As already discussed, the unemployment
rate (or the level of production) which will lead to stable prices is not assumed to be Vxed but
depends on conditions of the supply side, like the aggressiveness of bargaining (see Phillips
1954: 307) or, in the case of Australia, general, instead of local or sectoral, wage agreements.
Phillips (1959b: 4), furthermore, heavily opposes wage policies by trade unions (which were
quite strong in Australia in the 1950s; see Pitchford 2000: 263), which aim at higher increases in
wages than productivity growth, as this would only cause inWation and hurt the ones receiving
Vxed money incomes. Due to such ‘organised attempts to force up money wages and prices’, the
government would then have ‘no alternative but to operate the economy with a higher level of
unemployment than would otherwise be possible, to the general detriment of the country and
the people, and especially to the weaker and poorer members of the community’ (Phillips 1968a
[2000]: 227; see also Phillips 1959b: 5). Moreover, technical progress might be dampened when
the ‘share of proVts in the national product’ (Phillips 1959b: 5) could be reduced successfully by
an aggressive wage policy. Phillips ends this statement with an expression no economist can re-
sist to agree on: Phillips (1959b: 5) rightly regards ‘[t]echnical innovation and capital expansion’
as the main source of the steady increase in productivity and therefore as the ‘only possible
source of continuing increases in real wages’ (see also Phillips 1962: 12f.). Phillips (1968a [2000]:
229) also opposes expansive demand policies if the economy is already at full employment, as
this will dampen growth due to ‘general shortages and ineXcient operation’. Therefore, despite
Phillips’ interpretation of the Australian Phillips curve as a stable relationship (and probably
as a tool for demand policies), Phillips is well aware of the problems if wages are rising out
of line with productivity, thereby causing inWation, as such a wage development will not be
sustainable in the long run due to its adverse eUects on income distribution and productivity
growth.
12Despite Phillips’ regular emphasis on these two goals, Phillips never gives a founded deVnition of full employ-
ment (see in particular Phillips 1968a [2000]: 225). Also the Vrst edition of Lipsey’s textbook (1963), which was
written while Lipsey was still in regular contact with Phillips, does not discuss critically the concept of full
employment, so that one may conclude that deVning what full employment really meant was not a major
concern at the LSE at that time (correspondence with Lipsey dated 30 September 2011). A Vrst approach of
a clear-cut deVnition with respect to the Phillips curve might be found in Lipsey (1965: 214) and in Lipsey’s
second edition of his textbook (1966: 830U.).
47
2 A.W. Phillips and His Curve
2.5 Phillips’ Inaugural Lecture ‘Employment, InWation and
Growth’
In his inaugural lecture, given at the London School of Economics and Political Science on
28 November 1961 (Phillips 1962), Phillips (1962: 1) states his position on actual economic de-
velopments, showing a clear preference for a stability-oriented policy and condemning high
inWation rates, emphasising that the average rate of inWation of 3.7% per year between 1948
and 1960 in Britain is ‘undesirable’.
Phillips (1962: 2) also makes reference to his estimated Phillips curve and possible upcoming
problems for economic policy. First of all, Phillips stresses the need for established statistical
relationships for conducting sound economic policy as there is still a ‘lack of adequate quan-
titative knowledge and understanding of how the economic system works.’ A relation like the
Phillips curve will also make clear conWicting policy goals, which cannot be solved without
altering the driving forces in the background, so that ‘some modiVcation of institutions or
behaviour’ can be necessary to ‘alter the relation so as to permit some more desirable combi-
nations of consistent aims.’
Phillips’ own reluctance against economic policy based on too simple models, which had
already shown up in previous contributions like in Phillips (1954), once again is being put
forward by Phillips (1962: 2) warning about the inherent pitfalls of such policies:
If we do not have this knowledge the policy adjustments will almost certainly be
inappropriate in magnitude or timing or both and may well cause, as I believe they
have often caused in the past, unnecessary and harmful Wuctuations in economic
activity.
Such severe Wuctuations, inherent in the economy, may especially arise if the coeXcient that
relates price or wage changes to excess demand or to the rate of unemployment is high (see
also Phillips 1954: 313). For example, the system of Phillips’ (1961) model, which investigates
the short- and long-run equilibrium conditions in a growing economy, may be unstable at
some constellations, especially if the parameter on the price-output relation becomes large
(indicating high price adjustments to small changes in quantities), which might be the case at
very low levels of unemployment (Phillips 1961: 365 discusses diUerent reasonable values of
this coeXcient referring to his estimated non-linear curve of 1958). Therefore, Phillips (1961:
367U.) introduces a derivative stabilisation policy, which improves the dynamic stability of the
system. In this line of thought, Phillips’ well-known statistical relationship can be interpreted
as an early attempt of Phillips to gain insights into the macroeconomic system to be later
incorporated into his models for stability analysis, rather than the idea of an exploitable trade-
oU (see also Laidler 1997: 90 and Lipsey 2000: 239).
Interestingly, Phillips (1962: 7f.) assesses an important role for monetary policy (see also
Phillips 1954: 315), though he is aware of the dangers of time lags threatening the stability of
the economic system by causing ‘cyclical Wuctuations’. Therefore, monetary policy for Phillips
(1962: 8f.) is not the right choice for stabilising short-run economic Wuctuations and should be
focused on the long run (see also Bergstrom 2000: 192). Phillips (1962: 9f.) preferred the adjust-
ment of direct taxes as a Vrst choice since the adjustment of indirect taxes like a purchase tax
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may destabilise demand due to the eUect on price expectations as already discussed in Section
2.2. Government spending, on the other hand, may create Wuctuations itself as it is too slow
in its impact on aggregate demand. Furthermore, it may also ‘produce undesirable dislocation
of spending programmes’ (Phillips 1968a [2000]: 225). Another reason why Phillips (1962: 9)
gives no role to monetary policy as a short run stabiliser is that monetary policy in the United
Kingdom in the 1960s was dominated by external constraints and therefore not feasible for
internal needs. Phillips (1962: 14U.) thus advocates a more Wexible exchange-rate system, al-
lowing a change of the parity in the order of 1% per year (see also Phillips 1968a [2000]: 228f.).
Most interestingly, Phillips and Friedman (see for example Friedman 1960: 87f.) have much in
common regarding the role of time lags in the monetary transmission process and the hereby
inherent destabilising dangers of activist monetary policy. However, for Friedman markets are
inherently stable (see Laidler 2012: 14U.) and will only be shaken by false economic policy (so
that a Vxed growth rate for the money supply is favoured), but for Phillips stabilisation policies
based on the best models available are necessary to cope with potentially unstable markets,
as the economic system may lack an adequate adjustment mechanism since prices and wages
probably will not adjust immediately – especially in the case of unemployment and under-
utilisation. Moreover, Phillips (1954: 308U.) emphasises that even perfectly Wexible prices may
destabilise the system as the price signals may induce, as already discussed, dynamic instability
themselves. Thus, for Phillips, economic policy is necessary to cope with potentially unstable
economic systems (see also Laidler 2002: 227). Therefore, it is most important to analyse the
adjustment process in the economy itself to assure dynamic stability, as pointed out by Phillips
(1962: 3f., my italics) himself:
It is frequently stated, and has indeed been stated with some emphasis by such
eminent economists as Walras, Marshall and Wicksell, that such a system [a per-
fectly competitive market] is necessarily stable, i.e., that it always tends to an
equilibrium in which the price is such that the rates of production and consump-
tion are equal. The argument is usually very simple. [...] In brief; the existence of
any discrepancy between production and consumption causes a movement in price
which tends to correct the discrepancy. Therefore, the argument runs, the system
is stable. This argument is, of course, fallacious except on the assumption that the
complete response of the rates of production and consumption to any change in
price occurs instantaneously. If there are any time lags in any of the responses the
system will usually Wuctuate. Whether the Wuctuations will die away or whether
they will increase in amplitude and tend to some regular and sustained limit cy-
cle depends on the precise forms of the time lags, on the slopes of the supply and
demand curves and on the speed at which the price changes when there is a given
excess demand.
Phillips (1962: 11) once again turns the discussion to his 1958 contribution, now being more
critical about his own work regarding the omission of cost of living eUects on wages as long
as prices do not rise faster than nominal wages. He indeed does admit that the direct inclusion
of cost of living adjustments by other authors, especially regarding the post-war period, is
‘probably nearer the truth than the assumption I used’. However, as Phillips argues that changes
in the cost of living are most likely the result of earlier wage changes and are therefore already
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included in the data and thus in the estimated Phillips curve, an argument as has been shown
already brought forward in Phillips (1959b: 3), he (1962: 11) still sees his and other similarly
derived curves as ‘valid relations for prediction purposes’ to ‘form some judgement of the
likely eUects of alternative types of economic policy’ (Phillips 1962: 3). This assumption might
be reasonable in the case of an erratically changing price level, exhibiting inWation as well
as deWation – an inWation environment, as has been shown, which prevailed during the period
that Phillips used for estimating his curve. Johnson (1963: 57) therefore warned that the Phillips
curve should not be expected ‘to hold its shape if an attempt were made by economic policy
to pin the economy down to a point on it.’ Nonetheless, Phillips (1962: 11) still seems to regard
his curve as showing a long-run trade-oU between unemployment and inWation, even though
Phillips’ considerations are almost at any time more related to the costs of a disinWation process
than to the gains of inWating the economy:
If it is true that such a relation holds we are faced with a diXcult choice. Then
we can only reduce inWation, for any given rate of increase of productivity, at the
cost of higher unemployment.
Phillips did not realise that although a disinWation process can be costly in the short run if
inWation expectations are adaptive, it will end up, given that the coeXcient on inWationary
expectations is unity and abstracting from hysteresis, with the same unemployment rate again
but at a lower rate of inWation.
Turning onto Phillips’ preferences towards inWation and unemployment, it becomes clear
that Phillips is far from advocating inWationary policy. To the contrary, even though the curve
from his point of view predicts long-run costs in terms of unemployment, Phillips (1962: 11f.)
is proposing a higher average unemployment rate to Vght inWation.
Phillips (1962: 14f.) furthermore makes reference to the seminal article of Samuelson and
Solow (1960), who coined the name ‘Phillips curve’ and introduced the idea of a ‘menu of choice
between diUerent degrees of unemployment and price stability’ (Samuelson and Solow 1960:
192, caption in Figure 2). It is Phillips himself who calls the results of Samuelson and Solow
‘tentative’ – a curtailment he also made clear about his own conclusions. Phillips, as a reaction
to Samuelson and Solow, also presents his own estimates for the United States. For Phillips
(1962: 14), however, in the United States ‘7 to 8 per cent. unemployment would be needed to
maintain a stable price level, and that at 4 per cent. unemployment the price level would rise at
about 4 per cent. per annum’, which is in stark contrast to the results of Samuelson and Solow
(1960: 191f.). With respect to their curve, the unemployment rate needed for price stability
would be around 5.5% and the price level may rise by 2.25% at 4% unemployment. Phillips
(1962: 15) thus concludes that ‘if unemployment is reduced, as seems to be hoped, to 4 or 5
per cent., the United States may well have a rather faster rate of inWation than Britain would
have with 2 per cent. unemployment.’ Phillips thus clearly did not disagree with Samuelson
and Solow and their idea of a ‘menu of choice’ (see also Bergstrom 2000: 193).
However, it should be noted that the main focus of Samuelson and Solow (1960) is not
on having found an exploitable trade-oU but on other issues, like the prevalent distinction
of the time between cost-push and demand-pull theories of inWation (see Solow 2002: 71f.).
Also Samuelson and Solow (1960: 193) see their approach as dealing with the short run and are
sceptical about the long-run stability of the curve:
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It would be wrong, though, to think that our [...] menu that relates obtainable
price and unemployment behavior will maintain its same shape in the longer run.
What we do in a policy way during the next few years might cause it to shift in a
deVnite way.
So Phillips probably did not oppose the ‘menu of choice’ interpretation of the Phillips curve by
Samuelson and Solow as they oUered many qualiVcations regarding the stability of the ‘menu
of choice’ in the long run. Furthermore, for Phillips (1962: 14), the main issue behind his com-
ment on Samuelson’s and Solow’s analysis is not focused on the possibility of freely reducing
unemployment by accepting inWation, but on the question of whether it will be possible to
achieve a ‘balance of internal objectives [employment, inWation and growth] which would be
consistent with the maintenance of Vxed exchange rates.’ Thus, once again, Phillips interpreted
the curve as a tool for economic policy, which needs, however, to aim at feasible long-run con-
stellations in the economy. The rate of unemployment consistent with price stability and the
most likely rate of inWation at any given rate of unemployment, both estimates provided by
the Phillips curve, were most important for economic policy in times of a Vxed exchange rate
system like Bretton Woods. Thus, supply side policies can be necessary to lessen the tension
between incompatible goals as suggested by Phillips (1962: 15) for the United States.
2.6 Phillips and the Monetarist Counter-Revolution
Unfortunately, there are no statements from Phillips regarding the groundbreaking contribu-
tions of Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) as Phillips increasingly lost interest in economics
and turned his energy onto Chinese studies. The state of his health decreased further and a
massive stroke in 1969 forced his retirement (see Blyth 1978: xvi, Leeson 1994: 612f. and Leeson
2007: 218). Alban William Housego Phillips, who was born on 18 November 1914 and died on 4
March 1975, thus was never able to answer to the Lucas critique (1976), even though contempo-
rary colleagues like Holt (2000: 314) assume that Phillips would have challenged the underlying
assumptions and the derived results of the rational expectations revolution.
However, the interpretation of the underlying causality of the Phillips curve changed dras-
tically in the wake of the counter-revolution:13 whereas for Phillips changes in the rate of un-
employment induced changes in wages and prices, for economists like Friedman (1968, 1977),
unperceived changes in inWation are the driving force of quantity changes (a line of thought
starting with Fisher in 1926). Both ways of reading the Phillips curve are possible, but, on
the one hand, change its interpretation, and, on the other hand, require diUerent underlying
assumptions. The disequilibrium interpretation used by Phillips is based on an environment
without perfect price Wexibility so that markets facing shocks in aggregate demand stay in dis-
equilibrium for a longer time span, so that quantities instead of prices react. Lipsey (1960: 16)
explicitly states that his theoretically derived Phillips curve ‘shows the speed at which prices
adjust to a disequilibrium and we shall call it an adjustment function.’ From this, it follows
that interpreting the Phillips curve as always depicting an ‘intersection of demand and supply
curves is contrary to the whole spirit of Phillips’ dynamics where transactions occur out of
13See also Laidler (1990: 52U.) and Lipsey and Scarth (2011: xxvU.).
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equilibrium because [the] price does not adjust instantaneously’ (Lipsey 1974: 69).14 The in-
clusion of an expected real wage (and the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated
changes) transforms the disequilibrium relation into an equilibrium relation (a short-run ag-
gregate supply curve) as quantities adjust voluntarily (in a now assumed perfectly Wexible and
competitive market) as a reaction to price signals. Of course, movements on the curve are in-
duced by imperfect information but are nonetheless adjustments towards a new equilibrium
which only afterwards turns out to be unsustainable, as economic agents recognise that the
expected real wage has not been realised. Lucas and Rapping (1969) were the Vrst ones to fully
implement and make use of this diUerent interpretation of the Phillips curve. Being aware of
the new implications of their approach, they mention that ‘[o]thers have attempted to motivate
the Phillips curve by appealing to an “out-of-equilibrium” adjustment function. This was the
original motivation suggested by Phillips (1958) and later Lipsey (1960)’ (Lucas and Rapping
1969: 722, fn. 2). Thus, the critique of Friedman (1968: 8) accusing Phillips of the ‘failure to
distinguish between nominal wages and real wages’, which brings about the ‘basic defect’ in
Phillips’ analysis, should be regarded with caution as the underlying framework and causality
changed completely at the same time.
Leeson (1997a: 58U.), however, Vnds some evidence that Phillips was an important contribu-
tor to the development of adaptive expectations as Friedman (in a correspondence with Leeson
dated 25 August 1993) remembers ‘discussing with Phillips [in 1952] the question of how to
approximate expectations about future inWation and his writing on the back of an envelope the
basic equation underlying adaptive expectations’ (cited from Leeson 1997b: 166). Leeson refers
for support of his hypothesis to Phillip Cagan, who (in a correspondence with Leeson dated 11
March 1997) conVrms that ‘Phillips had suggested trying a relationship in which the change
in expected price change was proportional to the diUerence between actual and expected price
change. [. . .] This relationship was later called “adaptive expectations” by others’ (cited from
Leeson 1997a: 59). Cagan (2000: 22) therefore states that ‘Phillips deserves credit for what later
came to be called “adaptive expectations”.’
Leeson (1994: 612), furthermore, takes the point of view that Phillips already developed the
idea of the Lucas critique. Court (2000: 465) also points out that an unpublished paper of Phillips
(1972 [2000]) shows some similarity to the equations used in Lucas (1976). Phillips, however,
contrary to Lucas, seems not to have emphasised ‘that the basic problem with optimal control
is that economic agents are intelligent maximisers’ (Laidler 2001: F527) even though Phillips
seems to have recognised that the structure of the model changes after a political intervention.
Court (2000: 463f.) bases this argument also on Phillips (1968b [2000]) and on Phillips (1964
[2000]), which is unfortunately only available as a preliminary draft. Court (2000: 465), how-
ever, points out that the Vnal assessment on the similarity between Lucas and Phillips ‘may
best be left to the judgement of the reader’ – a proposal which shall be highly endorsed at this
place.
14See Downie in Robinson et al. (1960: 280f.) for such a misinterpretation. For an immediate reaction see Lipsey
and Steuer (1961: 149, fn. 1).
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2.7 Conclusion
The discussion of Phillips’ work revealed some interesting results, as policies based on the
Phillips curve in the 1960s, and by extension Phillips himself, are usually associated with in-
Wationary outcomes by exhausting the (assumed) stable trade-oU. Despite the fact that Phillips
regards his curve as a stable relationship, there is no evidence whatsoever that Phillips favours
a high inWation rate or trading oU more inWation for less unemployment. On the contrary,
Phillips’ reWections are almost entirely concerned with the costs of disinWation and how to
improve the location of the curve to achieve price stability and a high level of employment
at the same time. However, inWation expectations clearly do not enter as a location parame-
ter into his curve. This might be related to the possible interpretation of the Phillips curve by
Phillips himself, that wage rate changes already include cost of living adjustments as both are
interdependent and therefore both a function of the unemployment rate, which nevertheless
neglects possible shifts of the curve as a consequence of changing inWation expectations which
result from ongoing positive rates of price changes. As has been shown, however, at the time
Phillips estimated his curve, inWation was not a permanent phenomenon so that including in-
Wation expectations as a shift parameter of the curve probably was not regarded as necessary.
One might therefore join Friedman (1968: 8) bringing forth that ‘[i]mplicitly, Phillips wrote his
article for a world in which everyone anticipated that nominal prices would be stable’. Even
though Phillips indubitably interprets his curve as being stable in low as well as in high demand
environments (see in particular Phillips 1959b: 4 and Phillips 1962: 11f.), he never proposed to
exploit this trade-oU to reduce unemployment as he was fully aware of the dangers of an in-
Wationary policy since self-fulVlling inWation expectations on the demand side in the economy
can induce positive feedback and thus dynamic instability. There is, however, no complete
transfer by Phillips (1958) of this concept of inWation expectations to the supply side in the
labour market: only a severe and exogenous rise in import prices, that is high enough to cause
a reduction in real wages, would have an inWuence on wage behaviour. Workers even then stay
completely backward-looking and the relationship between wage changes and unemployment
remains stable, as these exogenous shocks only cause higher wage changes than predicted by
the relationship, but not a shift of the curve itself. Phillips’ (1959b) approach, which explicitly
considers cost of living adjustments, but remains nevertheless completely backward-looking,
was most likely inWuenced by the equally backward-looking wage-determination process in
Australia (see Pitchford 2000: 267). It must be emphasised, however, that the issue of ongoing
frustrated expectations of real wages due to accelerating inWation – in order to keep unemploy-
ment below a natural rate – is probably just not in Phillips’ mind as such policies are not in
line with Phillips’ stabilisation goals.
Taking into account Phillips’ diUerent interpretations of the curve, it might be that the curve
had a two-fold function for Phillips: a tool for economic policy as well as a dynamic adjustment
function for stability analysis – two purposes a reaction function like the Phillips curve needs
to serve in economic models as explained in an early paper (Phillips 1956: 100) discussing inter
alia ‘the need for quantitative knowledge of economic reactions’ (my italics):
It is clear that some quantitative knowledge about the responses in the system is
necessary both for rational discussion of the relative merits of alternative policies
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and for the satisfactory implementation of whatever policy is adopted.
There is another reason, less obvious but no less important, for wishing to obtain
quantitative knowledge about the diUerent responses. It can be shown that any
interdependent dynamic system may have an inherent tendency to Wuctuate when
subjected to disturbances. Whether it will Wuctuate, and the severity with which
it will do so, will depend on the quantitative values of all the relationships in the
system, including the policy relationships.
Policies from Phillips’ point of view, however, should not be mixed up with policies trying to
eternally peg the unemployment rate at a certain (overemployment) level. Policies in the sense
of Phillips (1956: 100) are diUerent adjustment mechanisms if some economic variables are out
of equilibrium due to shocks – in Phillips’ (1956: 99) example: higher investment leading to
excess demand and inWation – so that the government has, in order to attain certain ‘equilib-
rium objectives’ (Phillips 1956: 100) – in Phillips’ (1956: 99) example: a Vxed exchange rate – to
decide on ‘[t]he extent to which it will be necessary to depress economic activity and employ-
ment during the correction process’ which ‘will depend on the magnitudes and speeds of these
responses’ (for example given by the later Phillips curve).
Therefore, the ‘relative merits of alternative policies’ Phillips is talking about are without
doubt trade-oUs but in the sense that the government may choose between diUerent adjust-
ment paths for interdependent economic variables – at least by Vtting Patinkin’s (1977: 125)
‘regression line’. One practical example considered by Phillips was the attempt to force down
the price level to restore the pre-war gold parity which required a high rate of unemployment
over many years. The economy thus may move along a stable Phillips curve by policy actions
(creating temporary disequilibria), but only with respect to Phillips’ partly implicit and partly
explicit assumption that the government’s Vnal goal is to stabilise the economy around its equi-
librium level, that is, for Phillips, full employment and price stability. If both goals cannot be
achieved simultaneously, Phillips always proposes supply side policies to improve the location
of the curve. So Phillips possibly would have held the same view about the practical implica-
tions of the no-long-run trade-oU postulate as Solow (1976: 13) stating that ‘[f]or any span of
years meaningful for the formulation and execution of economic policy, it may still be right
and necessary to imagine the economy as trading oU real output for price stability.’
Nonetheless, a clear distinction has to be made between the Phillips curve in its original form
being used to close macroeconomic models by serving as an adjustment relation if the economy
is in disequilibrium as a consequence of imperfect markets, and its later implementation as an
aggregate supply curve – a reinterpretation which relies on the misperception of the rate of
inWation in otherwise perfect markets. Making use of the Phillips curve in its original version,
like Phillips did, to simulate the likely eUects of stabilising policies, therefore, was far from the
later interpretation of exhausting a trade-oU but concerned with stabilising an overall unstable
economy in which wrong policies will do more harm than good. Thus, the Phillips curve per
se cannot be regarded as an ‘econometric failure on a grand scale’ (Lucas and Sargent 1979: 6).
As an adjustment relation in Phillips’ models, it opened up the analysis of dynamic instability
problems which may be even worsened by wrong economic policy. Therefore, it never really
was thought to be ‘billed as a long-run equilibrium proposition’ but as ‘a part of a tool kit
[...] for analyzing economic events and guiding economic policy in the short run’ (Tobin 1968:
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51). Unfortunately, the shift to the trade-oU view validated the early prophecy by Lipsey (1960:
31, fn. 1) that ‘[a] premature application to policy can [...] easily discredit a hypothesis that is
potentially very fruitful.’
Whereas Phillips brought the formula of adaptive expectations into economic thought, it
would be too excessive to speak of a ‘Phillips-Friedman-Phelps critique’ (Leeson 1997b: 166)
as Phillips neither did modify his curve by adding inWation expectations nor did he make the
policy conclusions as clear as Friedman and Phelps did. Probably, Phillips also was a forerunner
of the core statements of the Lucas critique. However, the striking implications (Patinkin’s 1977:
124 ‘moment of truth’) for economic policy were especially outlined by Lucas. These results,
of course, in no way disparage Phillips’ strong inWuence on economic theory. One just must be
careful interpreting past contributions with the knowledge of today, as the temptation is high
to attribute successful ideas to some possible forerunners. So as Keynes’ General Theory had
many alleged predecessors (see Patinkin 1982 for a detailed discussion), the Phillips curve had
too – especially as its success became clear: for example, a contribution written by Fisher in
1926 was posthumously reprinted in 1973 with the additional title ‘I Discovered the Phillips
Curve’, even though Fisher actually describes an aggregate supply and not a Phillips curve (see
also Lipsey 2010a: 371 and Lipsey 2010b: 384).
The misunderstandings in the Phillips curve discussion reinforce that bothering about ‘the
wrong opinions of dead men’ (Pigou cited from Blaug 2001: 154) can be fruitful, especially if it
turns out that those opinions were not so wrong at all.
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3 Samuelson and Solow on the Phillips
Curve and the “Menu of Choice”: A
Retrospective
Abstract
This paper focuses on the seminal contribution to the Phillips curve discussion by Samuel-
son and Solow in 1960, which is usually considered as the Vrst trade-oU interpretation of the
Phillips curve. It will be shown that Samuelson and Solow indeed oUer a trade-oU view but
are very sceptical about the long-run stability of the curve. Nonetheless, a “menu of choice” in-
terpretation cannot be completely denied, even though their trade-oU interpretation is heavily
inWuenced by the contemporary discussion on cost-push versus demand-pull inWation. Hence,
their approach to the trade-oU between inWation and unemployment with emphasis on cost-
push inWation is very diUerent to that of Friedman, who only accepts demand-pull forces as
a source of inWation. Therefore, contrary to Samuelson and Solow, full employment and price
stability in Friedman’s framework are not conWicting policy objectives, so that a trade-oU be-
tween inWation and unemployment only emerges due to inWationary surprises.
Keywords: Phillips curve, menu of choice, trade-oU, inWation expectations, cost-push inWa-
tion, demand-pull inWation
Une rétrospective sur Samuelson et Solow à propos de la courbe de
Phillips et du “menu of choice”
Cet article fait le point sur la contribution séminale au débat sur la courbe de Phillips rédigée
par Samuelson et Solow en 1960. Cette dernière est habituellement considérée comme la pre-
mière interprétation de la courbe de Phillips en termes d’arbitrage. L’article montre que si
Samuelson et Solow expriment en eUet ce point de vue, ils sont très sceptiques sur la stabilité à
long terme de la courbe. Néanmoins, une interprétation sous la forme d’un “menu of choice” ne
peut pas être complètement écartée, même si leur interprétation en termes d’arbitrage est forte-
ment inWuencée par la discussion contemporaine entre l’inWation “cost-push” vs “demand-pull”.
Leur approche sur l’arbitrage entre inWation et chômage avec un accent sur l’inWation “cost-
push” est donc très diUérente de celle de Friedman, qui n’accepte que les forces “demand-pull”
comme source de l’inWation. Ainsi, contrairement à l’analyse de Samuelson et Solow, le plein
emploi et la stabilité des prix ne sont pas des objectifs de politiques contradictoires dans le
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cadre d’analyse de Friedman. Pour lui, un arbitrage entre inWation et chômage n’apparaît que
lors d’inWation surprise.
Mots-clés: courbe de Phillips, menu of choice, arbitrage, anticipations d’inWation, inWation
cost-push, inWation demand-pull
JEL: B22, E24, E31
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Introduction
In one of his last contributions, presented at a conference in August 2006, Milton Friedman
spoke on the topic “Trade-oUs in Monetary Policy”. In his view (2010, 114), Samuelson and
Solow (1960) are still the starting point of interpreting the Phillips curve as oUering a trade-oU
between inWation and unemployment:
Phillips himself did not present the curve as a policy tool, but less than two
years later Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow published a celebrated article in the
American Economic Review (1960) in which they did. Given the long period for
which the Phillips curve appeared to hold in Britain, Samuelson and Solow con-
cluded that it could be treated as a long-run structural equation which provided
the missing equation that the then conventional Keynesian system needed. They
treated it as a menu from which the monetary authorities could choose. By tol-
erating higher inWation they could experience lower average unemployment and
vice versa.
Hence, their idea of a “menu of choice between diUerent degrees of unemployment and price
stability” (Samuelson and Solow, 1960, 192, caption in Figure 2) is still regarded as the begin-
ning of applying the Phillips curve to economic policy. This possible trade-oU hence tempted
politicians to “stay in the saddle by riding the Phillips curve” as it was believed that “there was
no longer a unique Full Employment but rather a whole family of possible equilibrium rates,
each associated with a diUerent rate of inWation” (Modigliani, 1977a, 3). The subsequent de-
velopment is well known. Phelps’ (1967; 1968) and Friedman’s (1968) incorporation of inWation
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expectations marked the beginning of the end of trading oU inWation for unemployment as the
model economy now would, in eUect, always return to its natural rate of unemployment in the
long run.1
Finally, however, the upcoming concept of rational expectations (Lucas, 1972; 1973 and Sar-
gent, 1973) inclined economists to completely refrain from “Keynesian” Phillips curve analysis
and the idea of a “menu of choice” ended up in the drawer, and—at least asserted by some
economists—“the undermining of any notion of a trade oU between inWation and unemploy-
ment delivered the coup de grâce to oXcial Keynesianism” (Desai, 1995, 346).2
Samuelson’s and Solow’s contribution as the possible starting point of the trade-oU discus-
sion was in the focus of attention of many scholars: The evolution of this trade-oU idea and its
relation to Samuelson and Solow (1960) is tracked in Humphrey (1985b), Laidler (1997), Leeson
(1997) and Forder (2010a).
Humphrey (1985b, 5U.) takes the point of view that the trade-oU interpretation in the 1960s
was widespread but makes no reference to Samuelson and Solow as the inventor of the trade-
oU (but Humphrey, 1985a, 24 does). However, the trade-oU interpretation of the Phillips curve
takes centre stage in his contribution.
Laidler (1997, 91f.) remarks that already the RadcliUe Report (Committee on the Working
of the Monetary System, 1959) hinted at systematic policy trade-oUs between diUerent goals
of economic policy, in particular unemployment and inWation. Also in the US, the Report of
the Commission on Money and Credit (1961) not only pointed, but was particularly aimed at
“studying not only the positive nature of those tradeoUs, but also the welfare considerations
that might enable the goals to be weighed against one another” (Laidler, 1997, 93). Hence, in
particular from the perspective of economic policy, the stage had been set for making use of
the Phillips curve as a “menu of choice”. Laidler (1997, 93) therefore interprets Samuelson and
Solow (1960) as oUering such a trade-oU view, even though he admits that they were quite
cautious regarding the stability of the Phillips curve.
The political background at the end of the 1950s is covered in Leeson (1997)—a view not
shared by Solow (in Snowdon and Vane, 1999, 284): Leeson supposes that in the wake of the
1However, one important diUerence between Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) should not be neglected:
Whereas Friedman’s contribution criticised the approach of Vne tuning, Phelps focused on modelling eco-
nomic policy as a dynamic optimisation problem. Economic policy in this approach hence still relied on active
management of the economy instead of a constant money growth rule (see Laidler, 2010, 124 and Laidler
2012, 18, n. 19). Phelps (1972) extended this approach which also relied more and more on the formalisation
of the decision problem the policy-maker was facing. Johnson (1968, 986) critically discusses this increasing
formalisation (for example by using preference functions) as “formalization, while popular, is unfortunately
rather empty of economic content, since it simply postulates that society is able to weigh more unemployment
against more inWation in some unspeciVed manner to arrive at a preferred position.”
2The Phillips curve is often regarded as a Keynesian concept (Johnson, 1970, 110: “the only signiVcant contri-
bution to emerge from post-Keynesian theorizing”), however, without being related to the core arguments
of Keynes, as it solely provided an explanation for the speed of adjustment if the economy is in disequilib-
rium (see Lipsey, 1978, 53U.). Nevertheless, the misinterpretation of the Phillips curve, like the idea of a stable
trade-oU which should be utilised to push the economy even beyond full employment, not only discredited
the Phillips curve in its original interpretation but also the core ideas of Keynes (see e.g. Hahn, 1982, 74f.,
Meltzer, 1983, 51 and Harcourt, 2000, 305U.; see Davidson, 1972 for a thorough analysis of Keynes’ framework
and Lipsey, 2000, 58U. for an investigation of the relation of the IS-LM model and the Phillips curve to the
Keynesian core).
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presidential election campaign Samuelson and Solow (1960) might be interpreted as provid-
ing an overdue analysis of the inWationary consequences of the high employment target of
the Kennedy administration so that “Samuelson and Solow believed that they had uncovered
evidence that suggested that tolerable and stable rates of inWation were associated with high
employment; the system also looked reversible—aggregate demand could be manipulated to
move the economy down the Phillips curve, if necessary” (Leeson, 1997,145).
Finally, Forder (2010a), provides an extensive literature reviewwhich focuses on how Samuel-
son and Solow (1960) were interpreted by later writers. In sum, he Vnds that many authors cited
Samuelson and Solow (1960) as an example of the instability of the curve (Bronfenbrenner and
Holzman, 1963, 620; Kaliski, 1964, 6, n. 11; ShonVeld, 1967, 436f.) or as depicting a relationship
between inWation and unemployment (Gray, 1968, 58, n. 1; Smyth, 1971, 426, n. 1) instead of the
original wage-change-unemployment relation by Phillips (1958). According to Forder (2010a),
the possible trade-oU interpretation of Samuelson and Solow (1960), however, barely shows up
in the literature. Hence, Forder (2010a, 19) concludes that the contribution by Samuelson and
Solow was not as important in the 1960s as one might think at Vrst sight. Thus, the role Samuel-
son and Solow actually played might be attributed to them with hindsight to Vll a gap in the
trade-oU story which seems to be heavily inWuenced by Friedman’s Nobel Lecture (Friedman,
1977b) in 1976 (see Forder, 2010b).
Forder (2010a, 19), after an own analysis of Samuelson and Solow (1960), furthermore sums
up that “Samuelson and Solow’s was an early attempt to bring together what one might call
the accumulated lessons of the experience of the period and to determine the prospects of ac-
tually achieving full employment and price stability.” Forder (2010a, 1) thus emphasises that
the long-run trade-oU interpretation or a pledge for an inWationary policy cannot be found in
Samuelson and Solow (1960). Even though Forder’s view is partly shared in this paper, it will
be argued that there remains a strong ambiguity in Samuelson and Solow (1960). Furthermore,
an often neglected aspect of the previous discussion will be emphasised, namely the direc-
tion of causation underlying the Phillips curve, which changed in the wake of the monetarist
counter-revolution. Moreover, it will be argued that Friedman’s attack against the trade-oU
interpretation rested on a completely diUerent view of the economy and of the inWationary
process. Therefore, Samuelson’s and Solow’s trade-oU interpretation must be judged in the
light of the cost-push demand-pull debate, which Friedman did not take into account in his
presidential address.
The remainder of this paper is organised in Vve parts. First of all, in Section 3.1, a short
overview about the historical and theoretical background is necessary to provide the basis for
the subsequent discussion. In particular, the cost-push demand-pull debate in the second half
of the 1950s will be reviewed. Section 3.2 then focuses on Samuelson’s and Solow’s own assess-
ment of this lively discussion in the 1950s. In Section 3.3, the paper will focus on Samuelson’s
and Solow’s presentation of the Phillips curve as an alternative tool for analysing the inWation-
ary process. This section will also discuss immediate conference comments to their 1960 paper.
Section 3.4 will compare Friedman’s and Samuelson’s and Solow’s trade-oU framework. It will
be shown that their trade-oU view was shaped by the economic issues of the 1950s and hence
was very diUerent from Friedman’s trade-oU explanation. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.1 Historical and Theoretical Background
By the midst of the 1950s the economics profession was confronted with the pressing issue of
why the economy was facing rising prices despite ongoing slack in the economy (see Figure
3.1)—an ongoing inWation which was usually called “creeping inWation”.3 Thus, at least at Vrst
sight, it seemed that a new kind of inWation entered the stage which did not emerge solely
because of “too much money chasing too few goods”. In general, it was feared, as pointed out
for example by Lewis (1959, 311), that this “creeping inWation” might accelerate without bounds
(see for example Lipsey, 1961 who focuses on this discussion and argues on empirical grounds
that inWation can indeed be stable and will not necessarily become explosive). In search of a
remedy for this new kind of inWation, the underlying causes of inWation attracted attention of
the economics profession. Hence, a lively debate evolved which led to numerous approaches on
how to describe best the inWationary period since the mid-1950s.4 Bowen (1960,199) summarises
this discussion pointing at the many diUerent linguistic distinctions which emerged to identify
the speciVc character of each cause of inWation:
A distinguishing characteristic of much recent thinking and writing in the gen-
eral area of price behavior has been the rapid proliferation of inWation “types.” It
is no longer fashionable to speak simply of “inWation”; instead, one must specify
whether he means “cost inWation,” “demand inWation,” “excess-demand inWation,”
“wage inWation,” “money inWation,” “structural inWation,” “log-rolling inWation,”
“buyers’ inWation,” “sellers’ inWation,” “mark-up inWation,” “administered-price in-
Wation,” and so on.
Figure 3.1: InWation and Unemployment in the US, 1945–1960.
Own illustration. Source: Unemployment data: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 135), Series D 85–86, “Unemployment: 1890 to 1970”; notes:
persons 16 years old an over; prior to 1947 14 years old and over; new population data in 1953, 1960, 1962. InWation: Consumer Price Index;
data from Samuel H. Williamson, “Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to present”, MeasuringWorth,
April 2013; for data details see Lawrence H. OXcer, “What Was the Consumer Price Index Then? A Data Study”, available at
www.measuringworth.com.
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3For example, Holzman (1959, 324) titled his review on diUerent contemporary contributions dealing with this
inWationary period (amongst others the report of the Joint Economic Committee, 1958) “creeping inWation”.
4An extensive literature review on this episode can be found in Bronfenbrenner and Holzman (1963).
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Bowen (1960, 199) also singles out “the most popular single dichotomy”, that is, “the dis-
tinction between ‘cost inWation’ and ‘demand inWation.’” Such a distinction seemed useful
“to decide what (if any) public policy measures should be adopted to curb mild inWationary
pressures which occur side-by-side with non-frictional unemployment” (Bowen, 1960, 204).
Whereas demand inWation (for example due to rising investment demand) can be cured in a
straightforward way by restrictive monetary and Vscal policies, Vghting cost-push inWation
(for example aggressive wage claims by trade unions) by the means of restrictive demand poli-
cies involves accepting higher rates of unemployment. Thus, as pointed out by Newman (1958,
243), “[t]he price level-employment dilemma was brought into the arena of public discussion
following the start of the so-called ‘creeping inWation’ of 1956–1957.” Wage and price controls
hence were often favoured by cost-push adherents (see the discussion in Bronfenbrenner and
Holzman, 1963, 595). In particular, the inWationary period between 1955 to 1958 became to be
regarded as “exhibit A” (Bronfenbrenner and Holzman, 1963, 629) by cost-push theorists (for
example, Machlup, 1960, 132 considers this period to belong to cost-push inWation whereas
1945–1948 and 1950–1952 are regarded as demand-pull periods). However, while the diUerent
proposed concepts to describe the causes of this new inWation seemed to be sharply separated
at Vrst sight, from a more founded analytical perspective the distinction between cost-push and
demand-pull inWation turned out to be quite diXcult.
For example, Selden (1959, 10) proposes that a shift of the supply curve in a certain mar-
ket may be called cost inWation, while demand inWation could be identiVed as a shift of the
demand curve. Selden also tries to empirically separate both inWationary types. However, in
his view (1959, 19), a rising velocity of money along with overly expansive monetary policy
(see also Johnson, 1959, 1034) were more responsible for inWation than cost-push factors in this
period. On the other hand, however, it was also brought forward that in particular the velocity
of money (Fleming, 1961, 515) and also the supply of money (Machlup, 1960, 127) may rise
endogenously due to the dynamics of cost-push inWation.
With regard to the problem of separating these two diUerent approaches, Bowen (1960, 201U.)
provides a well-founded analysis emphasising the diXculties of such an attempt. Problems
arise in particular due to non-linear and interdependent supply and demand curves (see also
Poole, 1960). For example, the ability of trade unions to succeed in enforcing their wage claims
(cost-push) may depend on the state of demand for the products of this industry (demand-
pull). How far these wage claims will be translated into cost-push inWation, however, will
depend on other factors on the supply side as well. Furthermore, cost-push inWation in one
particular industry due to rising wages may at the same time show up as demand-pull inWation
in another industry where the higher income of workers is being spent. Bowen (1960, 204) thus
concludes that “[a]ttempts to use the ‘cost inWation’ versus ‘demand inWation’ distinction as a
way of classifying inWations must be abandoned.” At the same time, this implies, however, that,
without the knowledge about the exact causes of inWation, policy prescriptions are prone to be
inadequate.
This overall sceptical view on the distinction between cost-push and demand-pull inWation
and on the diXcult task of Vnding a remedy for inWation was also the main research question
of the contribution by Samuelson and Solow (1960) as will be shown in the next section.
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3.2 Samuelson and Solow on Cost-Push and Demand-Pull
In line with other contemporary authors, for Samuelson and Solow (1960,177) inWation in the
period 1946–1948 seems to be best explained by demand-pull inWation, while the period 1955–
58, however, remains a “puzzling phenomenon”. Their own research objective is twofold: On
the one hand, “to emphasize the types of evidence which can help decide between the con-
Wicting theories” and, on the other hand, to discuss “some policy implications that arise from
the diUerent analytical hypotheses.”5 Thus, after a short summary of contemporary demand-
pull and cost-push approaches, for example Lerner (1958) and Schultze (1959), Samuelson and
Solow (1960, 182) stress the “problem of identiVcation” on how to decide empirically which
kind of inWation the economy is facing (my italics):
If I believe in cost-push, what should I expect to Vnd in the facts that I would
not expect to Vnd were I a believer in demand-pull?
For example, the data may show that money wages rose faster than productivity which might
be interpreted as cost-push inWation. However, as also demand-pull inWation can make wages
rise faster than productivity—and so the clause starting with “not” in the quote above is not
fulVlled—the criterion “wages rising faster than productivity” is not appropriate to decide be-
tween these two types of inWation.
Samuelson and Solow (1960, 183) then go on and emphasise another diXculty on how to
separate both inWationary types. In particular, the timing of wage and price increases is not
an appropriate criterion either for identifying cost-push or demand-pull inWation as it is not
possible to determine a “normal initial standard from which to measure”. Therefore, a wage-
push might be interpreted as autonomous but might also be just the result of earlier excess
demand for labour if the timespan under consideration is extended accordingly. Furthermore,
Samuelson and Solow (1960, 184) emphasise that an analysis based on shifts of demand and
supply curves is equally prone to the problem of interdependencies as wages are cost and
income at the same time. Thus, inWation may be self-sustaining due to spillovers and feedback
to and from other sectors of the economy, or in the words of Samuelson and Solow (1960, 184)
“it may be that one of the important causes of inWation is—inWation.”
Samuelson and Solow (1960, 185) thus conclude that other tools might serve better for
analysing the problem they are facing: On the one hand “the behavior of real demand under
inWationary conditions” and, on the other hand, “the behavior of money wages with respect to
the level of employment”—this last relation being, of course, the Phillips curve. However, they
are pessimistic about the stability of both relations. In particular, rising prices over some time
may spur further inWation by altering the economic system (Samuelson and Solow, 1960, 185):
[T]here seems to us to be some doubt that ordinary reversible behavior equa-
tions can be found, and this very diXculty points up an important question we
5Solow (in Solow et al., 2009, 73) points out that the 1960 paper was devoted to the debate between cost-push
and demand-pull inWation (see also Solow, 1976, 4, Solow in Snowdon and Vane, 1999, 284 and Solow, 2002,
71f.). Solow also commented on other articles covering this cost-push demand-pull controversy, for example
Holzman (1960).
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have mentioned earlier: that a period of high demand and rising prices molds at-
titudes, expectations, even institutions in such a way as to bias the future in favor
of further inWation.
Hence, with regard to the (in-)stability of the behaviour of real demand, the experience of an
endogenous rise of the velocity of money from 1955 to 1957 leads them to the conclusion “that
the whole distinction between cost-push and demand-pull begins to evaporate” (Samuelson
and Solow, 1960, 186)—an issue, as has been shown in Section 3.1, which was also brought
forward by other authors in the 1950s.
In sum, until now, the arguments and evidence presented by Samuelson and Solow (1960) Vt
pretty well into the climate at the end of the 1950s and no statement as such is innovative or
original in its own way. This assessment, however, changes as soon as we take a closer look at
their treatment of the Phillips curve in the next section of this paper.
3.3 The Role of the Phillips Curve
Samuelson and Solow (1960, 186f.) start their investigation of the Phillips relationship with
a short review of Phillips (1958). They note that “[h]is Vndings are remarkable” as the curve
estimated for the period 1861–1913 also Vtted other periods (1913–1948 and 1948–1957) well.
Furthermore, Samuelson and Solow (1960, 1867) focus on Phillips’ results about the level of un-
employment needed to assure stable wages (5 per cent of unemployment) or stable prices (2–3
per cent).6 For the US, they only mention the studies by Schultze (1959) and Garbarino (1950)7,
which are either “too casual” or “hardly a full-scale analysis”. Thus, Samuelson and Solow
(1960, 187U.) present their own empirical analysis, at Vrst on the relation between money wage
changes (in manufacturing) and unemployment, which will be later on transformed into a rela-
tion between inWation and unemployment. They suggest that 8 to 10 per cent of unemployment
might be necessary to assure stable money wages. However, and this is the more interesting
argument, Samuelson and Solow (1960, 187) point out that such a relation might be unstable
on theoretical grounds. In particular, money wage stickiness8 might be endogenous:
But would it take 8 to 10 per cent unemployment forever to stabilize the money
wage? Is not this kind of relationship also one which depends heavily on remem-
bered experience? We suspect that this is another way in which a past character-
ized by rising prices, high employment, and mild, short recessions is likely to breed
an inWationary bias—by making the money wage more rigid downward, maybe
even perversely inclined to rise during recessions on the grounds that things will
soon be diUerent.
6The original values in Phillips (1958, 299) are 5.5 and 2.5 per cent respectively.
7As there are no exact references in the whole contribution of Samuelson and Solow (1960), Garbarino (1950)
is the author’s best guess based on available contributions in JSTOR by Garbarino in the year speciVed by
Samuelson and Solow (1960, 187).
8Solow (1975, 59) argues on these grounds that the absence of severe depressions (due to stabilising economic
policy) in the last decades might have contributed to the inWationary bias modern economies are facing.
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Thus, their overall sceptical view about a too simple-minded description of the inWationary
process is pronounced once more. However, also based on the empirical evidence available, they
suggest other causes for an unstable relation over time. For example, in the period 1933–1941
money wages did not fall despite high and ongoing unemployment. One explanation brought
forward by Samuelson and Solow (1960, 189) is that “one could argue that by 1933 much of the
unemployment had become structural, insulated from the functioning labor market, so that in
eUect the vertical axis ought to be moved over to the right.”9 Compared to Phillips’ rather stable
relation, Samuelson and Solow (1960,189) thus remark that there is “the strong suggestion that
the relation, such as it is, has shifted upward slightly but noticeably in the forties and Vfties.”10
In the Vrst two decades of the 19th century, the unemployment rate needed to stabilise money
wage rates was—according to their estimates—4 to 5 per cent (stable prices 3 per cent, assuming
an increase in productivity of 2 to 3 per cent). However, for the period since 1946 to the late
1950s around 8 per cent of unemployment seemed to be necessary to achieve stable wages (5
to 6 per cent with respect to price stability).
As concerns economic policy, Samuelson and Solow (1960, 187) try to answer their own
question of “[w]hat policy decisions might conceivably lead to a decrease in the critical un-
employment rate at which wages begin to rise or to rise too fast?” One possible approach is
to reduce imperfections on the labour market especially with respect to the mobility of labour
(between regions but also between sectors) which seems to be higher in the UK than in the US
(see Samuelson and Solow, 1960, 190). The mobility of labour, however, depends “heavily on the
pull of job opportunities elsewhere” and hence is inWuenced by the overall state of aggregate
demand.11 Samuelson and Solow (1960, 190) thus emphasise “that a deliberate low-pressure
policy to stabilize the price level may have a certain self-defeating aspect.”
Be that as it may, with regard to the cost-push demand-pull debate, Samuelson and Solow
(1960, 191) see themselves as taking an intermediate position—and this is where Vnally the
Phillips curve comes into play since the curve shows that neither pure demand-pull nor pure
cost-push inWation is at work in the economy.12 The Phillips curve thus is regarded as an alter-
9Today, this issue of long-term unemployed who lose their disciplining eUect on the wage claims of those still
employed is one cause of “hysteresis” (Blanchard and Summers, 1986). In particular Ball (1999, 231) emphasised
this mechanism.
10Laidler (2010, 123, n. 2) hence remarks: “The US data presented by Samuelson and Solow (1960) are much
less convincing in their support for the relationship’s existence. That these authors’ conjectures about the
existence of a trade-oU were taken so seriously on the basis of such Wimsy empirical analysis is a minor
mystery in the history of postwar empirical economics”. Unfortunately, Samuelson and Solow do not provide
much information about data sources used and the timespan under consideration. Keeping this in mind it
seems as if the scatter plot, from which conclusions about a shifting Phillips curve were drawn, contains data
from the beginning of the 19th century to 1958. King (2008, 318, n. 5) supposes that the earliest data is from
1890. See Hall and Hart (2010, 5f.) for data sources most likely used.
11Also Samuelson (in Burns and Samuelson, 1967, 124f., 139f.) points at such beneVcial eUects of a “long, steady
expansion” for the location of the Phillips curve as structural unemployment might be reduced successfully in
this way.
12Solow (in Solow et al., 2009, 73) points out that they “thought that a more useful distinction was between
movements along the Phillips curve and shifts of the Phillips curve” as inWation caused by excess demand
could be explained by movements along the curve, whereas cost-push inWuences on inWation would shift the
relation between inWation and unemployment (see Solow 2002, 73). This, however, as Samuelson and Solow
(1960, 189) remark, would only be a correct interpretation of the Phillips curve if “the relation we have been
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native tool to analyse the inWationary process and to draw policy conclusions. The US Phillips
curve (see Figure 3.2) hence is interpreted as showing “the diUerent levels of unemployment
that would be ‘needed’ for each degree of price level change” (Samuelson and Solow, 1960,
192).13
Figure 3.2: The Menu of Choice.
Source: Samuelson and Solow (1960, 192). Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
The original caption reads:
“Modified Phillips Curve for U.S.
This shows the menu of choice between diUerent degrees of unemployment and price stability,
as roughly estimated from last twenty-Vve years of American data.”
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discussing represents a reversible supply curve for labor along which an aggregate demand curve slides. If
that were so, then movements along the curve might be dubbed standard demand-pull, and shifts of the curve
might represent the institutional changes on which cost-push theories rest.” As “[t]here are two parties to a
wage bargain” Samuelson and Solow (1960,190) remain sceptical about the “identiVcation of the relationship
as merely a supply-of-labor phenomenon.”
13Solow (2002, 73) recalls that Samuelson and he himself explicitly chose not to Vt a multiple regression: “It is a
remarkable fact that we made no attempt to Vt a multiple regression. I was teaching econometrics regularly
at the time, so we knew how; but we both thought that running regressions after so much eyeballing of
the data would be inappropriate. Neither of us would have thought the simple bivariate relation to be an
adequate representation.” Thus, their paper was “no great show of econometrics” (Solow, 1976, 4). The curve
hence seemed to mainly serve illustrative purposes as Solow (1979, 39) points out: “Then, using no more than a
couple of rules of thumb and educated guessing, we converted those post-war observations into a hypothetical
relation between the rate of price inWation and the unemployment rate.” Peston (1971, 130, n. 15), however,
notes that sketching such a smooth line was “foolhardiness” and that “this was one of the Vrst articles to take
the two dangerous steps of drawing the Phillips curve as a smooth relationship without a scatter of points
around it, and to replace the change in wages with the change of prices on the vertical axis.”
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Samuelson and Solow (1960, 192) emphasise two points on their curve, whereas they call
these results “guesses”:
• Point A: To assure price stability, an unemployment rate of 5 to 6 per cent seems to be
necessary, which indicates that at this rate of unemployment wages do not increase by
more than the growth rate of productivity which Samuelson and Solow consider to be
2.5 per cent per year: “That much unemployment would appear to be the cost of price
stability in the years immediately ahead.”14
• Point B: To achieve an unemployment rate of 3 per cent (a “nonperfectionist’s goal”),
inWation of up to 5 per cent per year has to be accepted: “That much price rise would seem
to be the necessary cost of high employment and production in the years immediately
ahead.”
However, Bronfenbrenner and Holzman (1963, 627) remark that structural and frictional un-
employment at that time for the US was usually estimated to be 3 per cent of the labour force.
This means that the 3 per cent goal, which is not in line with price stability, is not necessarily
an over-employment target but rather compatible with the notion of full employment.15 On
the other hand, it becomes clear that Samuelson and Solow (1960, 193) do not regard an un-
employment rate of 5 to 6 per cent needed for price stability as the full employment level as
they “expect that the tug of war of politics will end us up in the next few years somewhere in
between these selected points. We shall probably have some price rise and some excess unem-
ployment” (my italics).
That the relation may shift due to economic policy is in focus of attention once again.
Samuelson and Solow (1960,193) emphasise:
Aside from the usual warning that these are simply our best guesses we must
give another caution. All of our discussion has been phrased in short-run terms,
dealing with what might happen in the next few years. It would be wrong, though,
to think that our [...] menu that relates obtainable price and unemployment behav-
ior will maintain its same shape in the longer run. What we do in a policy way
during the next few years might cause it to shift in a deVnite way.
14See Klein and Bodkin (1964, 393f.) for comparable estimates. Phillips (1962, 14f.) discusses Samuelson’s and
Solow’s results. His own estimates for the US, however, “made lead me to think that the situation in the
United States is less favourable than this. I estimate that 7 to 8 per cent. unemployment would be needed to
maintain a stable price level, and that at 4 per cent. unemployment the price level would rise at about 4 per
cent. per annum.”
15See Gordon (1965, 45U.) for a contemporary discussion about the level of unemployment considered to be full
employment in the US.
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Most noteworthy is their focus on the consequences of a low-pressure economy. In particular,
Samuelson and Solow (1960, 193) hint at the possibility of adjusting inWation expectations16 as
a beneVcial by-product17 of this low-pressure economy:
Nevertheless, it might be that the low-pressure demand would so act upon wage
and other expectations as to shift the curve downward in the longer run—so that
over a decade, the economy might enjoy higher employment with price stability
than our present-day estimate would indicate.
On the other hand, the problem of hysteresis on the labour market may cause an inWation-
ary bias in such a low-pressure economy as pointed out once more by Samuelson and Solow
(1960,193):
But also the opposite is conceivable. A low-pressure economy might build up
within itself over the years larger and larger amounts of structural unemployment
(the reverse of what happened from 1941 to 1953 as a result of strong war and
postwar demands). The result would be an upward shift of our menu of choice,
with more and more unemployment being needed just to keep prices stable.
Samuelson and Solow (1960, 193) also focus on whether or not a low-pressure economy might
be able to compensate the loss of output (compared to a high pressure economy) in the long
run: On the one hand, a low-pressure economy “could succeed in improving the eXciency of
our productive factors” and thus may even forge ahead. However, also a falling behind of the
low-pressure economy is conceivable (Samuelson and Solow, 1960,193):
On the other hand, if such an economy produced class warfare and social con-
Wict and depressed the level of research and technical progress, the loss in growth
would be compounded in the long run.
16Solow, in a letter to Sleeman in 1982 (cited from Sleeman, 1983, 152, n. 47, Solow’s brackets), states: “I think a
reading of our (i.e. Samuelson and Solow’s) AEA paper (which started oU by worrying about cost-push vs.
demand-pull) will suggest that we already realized that both past and expected future price movements could
have an inWuence on wage behavior.” Solow (2002, 73) thus remarks that “we were obviously wondering about
something like an expectations-augmented Phillips curve”, even though “we did not see it as being as central
as it became later” (Solow in Snowdon and Vane, 1999, 285). In the same vein, Solow (in Solow et al., 2009,
76) points out: “We said explicitly that it is unlikely that one could successfully exploit the Phillips curve in
the long run. We even mentioned the possibility that it was inWationary expectations that would shift the
curve adversely if one tried. But I think we had something more general in mind: that the mere experience,
however you process it, whether through expectations or the development of norms or behavior, would have
that eUect. So when I read Milton’s address, that part didn’t come as much of a surprise, though Milton dwelt
on that point much more than we had thought to do so.” Solow (2002, 74), however, emphasises that these
qualiVcations should not be misread as a forerunner of the vertical long-run Phillips curve as “[n]either of us
ever had much conVdence in the accelerationist model when it was Vnally formulated”.
17Also Samuelson (in Burns and Samuelson, 1967, 163) points at the positive eUects of a (temporary) low-pressure
economy for the Phillips relationship: “I think it might be argued that the optimal policy in a mixed economy
like ours might be intermittent periods of letting a certain amount of slack develop, then getting the beneVt of
this slack in breaking inWationary expectations, and then going on strong.” In the same vein, Solow (1962,14)
remarks that a period of high unemployment and stable prices might be beneVcial for reducing unemployment
without strong wage pressure compared to “a time when the expectation of inWation is fresh and strong”.
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In sum, the focus of Samuelson and Solow (1960) on the Phillips curve must be interpreted as
an alternative way of analysing the inWationary process in the 1950s compared to the, in their
view, not fruitful discussion about cost-push versus demand-pull inWation. Their assessment
of diUerent combinations between inWation and unemployment is well balanced: On the one
hand, they are well aware of the dangers of an ongoing “creeping inWation” and especially point
out the problem that an economy subject to such permanent price increases may bread an in-
Wationary bias. On the other hand, they are sceptical about Vghting inWation by engineering a
low-pressure economy: Even though there are some advantages (as for example the beneVcial
eUect on inWation expectations), Samuelson and Solow (1960, 193) also stress the possibility of
structural unemployment or below average technical progress. Taking into account this discus-
sion of endogenous possible shifts, it becomes clear that they did not treat the Phillips curve as
a stable relationship.
Also immediate comments at the conference18 questioned the long-run stability of the curve
even though all commentators seem to have understood Samuelson and Solow as oUering
such a “menu of choice”. In particular Chandler (1960, 213f.) doubts the usefulness of Samuel-
son’s and Solow’s “quantitative ‘guesstimates’” for practical policy and emphasises the issue
of endogenous changes in the behaviour of interest groups as soon as economic policy tries to
maintain a certain level of employment. Moreover, a policy focused on creating short periods
of high growth may also create high rates of price increases and therefore inevitably restrictive
policy which could lead to severe social losses as “[t]he resulting disappointment of widely held
highly inWationary expectations could be quite damaging to employment, output, and growth”
(Chandler, 1960, 215).
On the other hand, Laidler (2003, 22, n. 9) points out that another commentator, Lerner
(1960), “gently chides them for not recommending the purchase of less unemployment with
more inWation.” Without doubt Lerner (1960, 217) discusses such a trade-oU:
One can apply the economic principle of equalizing marginal cost and marginal
beneVt, indulging in creeping inWation as long as the value of the additional output
is greater than the damage from the additional inWation involved.
Nonetheless, Lerner (1960, 217) is fully aware of the accelerationist hypothesis as he points out
that “[a]s adjustment is made to the inWation it has to run faster and faster to keep output in
the same place.” InWation for Lerner (1960, 217) is not an obstacle for proposing expansionary
policies as the distributive eUects of inWation are considered to be the lesser of the two evils as
“a 3 per cent cut in output is much worse than a 3 per cent inWation which can never do more
than redistribute a fraction of 3 per cent of the output. A small part of the diUerence in output
would be suXcient to correct the injustices since much of the redistribution will cancel out or
will be in desirable directions.”
The last commentator, Pechman (1960, 218), while being very sceptical about the results
derived by Samuelson and Solow, also interprets the contribution of Samuelson and Solow as
discussing “the ‘terms of trade’ between unemployment and price stability. By this I mean the
18The conference was the seventy-second annual meeting of the American Economic Association, held in Wash-
ington, D.C., from December 28 to 30, in 1959. The topic of the Samuelson-Solow session was: “Problem of
Achieving and Maintaining a Stable Price Level” (see American Economic Association, 1960, ix).
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cost in terms of a higher rate of unemployment of achieving price stability or, alternatively,
the cost in terms of higher prices of reducing unemployment to a tolerable level.” The trade-
oU notion thus was certainly there at the conference and also taken up by commentators.
Even though Samuelson and Solow can be interpreted as oUering a “menu of choice” between
inWation and unemployment, it will be argued in the next section that their trade-oU view is
very diUerent from that of Friedman.
3.4 Friedman vs. Samuelson and Solow on the “Menu of
Choice”
To fully understand the divergent interpretations of the Phillips curve trade-oU by Friedman
and Samuelson and Solow, it is necessary to discuss two major diUerences between both lines
of thought: On the one hand, it must be discussed if and how the underlying causality changed
with Friedman’s critique as the direction of causation is crucial for the interpretation of the
trade-oU itself. On the other hand, it seems necessary to judge Samuelson’s and Solow’s possi-
ble trade-oU interpretation in the light of the late 1950s and the cost-push demand-pull debate.
As concerns the underlying causality, it seems that Samuelson and Solow (1960) did not
change the direction of causation of the Phillips curve: Like Phillips (1958, 283) himself, Samuel-
son and Solow (1960, 189) state that “[w]age rates do tend to rise when the labor market is
tight, and the tighter the faster.” Thus, changes in the rate of unemployment are regarded as
the driving force of the relationship, which indicates that causality runs from unemployment
to inWation and not from (unanticipated) inWation to unemployment.19
This diUerent theoretical understanding of causality to explain movements on the Phillips
curve is most important as the interpretation of the Phillips curve by Samuelson and Solow
points to its role as an adjustment relation for an economy in disequilibrium, which was par-
ticularly brought forward by Lipsey (1960, 1974), and not to an aggregate supply curve of labour
based on the misperception of relative prices or on the confusion of nominal and real wages as
in Friedman (1975, 41U.).20
Friedman (1968), however, was ambiguous about the underlying causation—or at least there
is a certain tension in his argument: On the one hand, unemployment is, as in the original
Phillips curve, treated as a proxy for excess supply or demand on the labour market so that
the Phillips curve remains a disequilibrium relation as “transactions occur out of equilibrium
because price does not adjust instantaneously” (Lipsey, 1974, 69). On the other hand, reducing
unemployment below the natural rate is only possible due to misperceptions of the “true” real
19This view is bolstered by Solow, in a letter to Sleeman in 1982 (cited from Sleeman, 1983, 130, n. 4, omission
by Sleeman himself), in which he explicitly refers to the disequilibrium interpretation of the Phillips curve:
“From the very beginning I regarded the Phillips curve as analogous to any price adjustment equation driven
by excess supply or demand” and “I have always thought of . . . the Phillips curve as a model of disequilibrium
states with causality running from RHS to LHS.”
20This was also emphasised by Solow (in Solow et al., 2009, 77): “What Milton did without ringing any bells
to warn you, was simply to take it that the causality ran the other way, that it’s the deviation of the rate
of inWation from the expected rate of inWation that pushes the unemployment rate away from the ‘natural’
rate. Phillips is about disequilibrium in the labor market. There is no question about that [...]. After Milton’s
address, everybody treated this as an equilibrium matter, looking in the reverse direction.”
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wage on the side of workers since inWation expectations adjust only slowly. Thus, given their
perceived price vector the reaction of the labour force is as if workers are moving on their
supply curve (and Vrms respectively moving on their demand curve)—the Phillips curve thus
becomes an equilibrium relation embedded into a framework of full price Wexibility. Friedman
(1975, 41U.) Vnally chose sides and opted for the direction of causation from prices to quan-
tities and therefore for the equilibrium interpretation (see Laidler, 1990, 55 and Laidler, 2012,
20U.; see also De Vroey, 2001). But even before Friedman’s full commitment to the Fisher-type
causality (see Fisher, 1926) regarding the Phillips curve, Lucas and Rapping (1969) reinterpreted
the Phillips curve as an aggregate labour supply curve.
Thus, if there was any trade-oU idea involved in the paper by Samuelson and Solow then it
did not rest on the grounds of cheating workers and producers alike by creating unexpected
inWation. The most important weakness of this contribution thus may be the fact that there is
no fully developed underlying theoretical framework21 for explaining movements on the curve
and thus for how it may be possible to pin the economy down to a point on it.
Moreover, it seems that their view of the trade-oU is much more diUerent than the “modern”
version and becomes only visible in light of the previous discussion of cost-push and demand-
pull inWation. Of course, their overall ambiguity makes other interpretations feasible as well,
but contrasting Friedman’s and Samuelson’s and Solow’s view from another perspective might
prove helpful.
The “menu of choice” in Samuelson’s and Solow’s view only exists as inWation is a mixture
of cost-push and demand-pull forces. Thus, the economy may either enjoy price stability and
unemployment or full employment and rising prices. These rising prices at full employment,
however, are not the result of general excess demand (which cannot be full employment by
deVnition) but are caused by many diUerent market imperfections, most notably the unequal
distribution of demand over diUerent sectors (those with excess demand pushing inWation, but
those facing excess supply not reducing their prices accordingly) and labour markets involving
trade unions and other bargaining elements so that “price inWation does not wait for full em-
ployment” (Burns in Mitchell, 1951, xxi; see also Solow, 1978, 203 with reference to the 1960s).
Samuelson’s and Solow’s emphasis on the Phillips curve concept hence can be interpreted in
the sense that it provided “[a] more eclectic model of imperfect competition in the factor and
commodity markets” in order “to explain the fact of price and wage rises before full employ-
ment and full capacity have been reached” (Samuelson and Solow, 1960, 180).
This “cruel dilemma” (Tobin, 1967, 101) for the policymaker thus only exists as price stabil-
ity and full employment are not possible at the same time. In Friedman’s presidential address,
however, neither cost-push forces nor other market imperfections mentioned above play a role
for the rate of price increases. Additional evidence can be found in Friedman (1966a), in which
he Vrst introduced the concept of the “‘natural’ level of unemployment” (Friedman, 1966a,
60). In his discussion of the feasibility of guideposts, Friedman (1966a, 57) denies that there
21Also Solow (1976, 4f.) admits: “It did not occur to me then that the Phillips curve (or perhaps Phillips surface
would be better, to signal that more than the unemployment rate governs the rate of wage increase) needed
any subtle theoretical justiVcation. It seemed reasonable in a commonsense way that the change in the money
wage, like the change in any other price, should respond to the demand-supply balance in the labor market.”
This very basic explanation is the same as in Phillips (1958, 283). A Vrst model to derive the curve is provided
in Lipsey (1960, 12U.).
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is any issue of “premature inWation” due to cost-push forces. This result is based on Fried-
man’s argument that “[i]nsofar as market power has anything to do with possible inWation,
what is important is not the level of market power, but whether market power is growing or
not.” Hence, cost-push inWation, if at all, is only a temporary issue.22 InWation in Friedman’s
sense, but in the terminology of the late 1950s, is pure demand-pull inWation since “[i]nWation
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” (Friedman, 1966b, 18). In such an inWa-
tionary environment, however, a long-run trade-oU clearly is not only non-existent, it is also
completely unnecessary since full employment and price stability then are not incompatible
policy objectives. The negative slope of the (short-run) Phillips curve in Friedman’s framework
hence only exists as unexpected inWation alters the supply of and demand for labour. The “cruel
dilemma” in such a framework boils down to a deliberate choice of the best rate of inWation,
be it price stability or not. Thus, in such an economy “[t]he problem of macroeconomic policy
is the transparent one of dosage” (Samuelson in Burns and Samuelson, 1967, 55).
In contrast, in Samuelson and Solow (1960), the negative slope of the short-run or long-run
(as this distinction is not applicable here) Phillips curve exists due to inWationary pressures
even before full employment is achieved so that “the days of happy and simple Keynesianism”
(Samuelson in Burns and Samuelson, 1967, 46) are over.23
The “menu of choice” in Samuelson’s and Solow’s analysis hence is not opening up an
opportunity set to maximise social gain, but to the contrary shows the social loss as both
objectives are not compatible at the same time. In eUect, the policymaker and society as a
whole would be better oU if such a “menu of choice” never existed. Samuelson’s and Solow’s
(1960, 192) “nonperfectionist’s goal of high enough output to give us no more than 3 per cent
unemployment”—a level which was, as already noted, in line with contemporary estimates
of frictional unemployment and hence full employment—is simply not attainable without ac-
cepting some inWation. Friedman thus did not only change the direction of causation, but also
altered the underlying causes of inWation by denying the issue of permanent cost-push inWa-
tion, which in the original trade-oU interpretation prevented the economy from reaching and
keeping full employment without any rise in the price level. This becomes clear by looking at
Friedman’s (1966a, 60) critique about the assumptions of why guideposts are necessary (and
why there exists a trade-oU between inWation and unemployment in the sense of Samuelson
and Solow):
Hence, the alleged case for the guidelines seems to me to rest on two basic falla-
cies: Vrst, that market power is a source of rising prices, and second—on the belief
that somehow or other you can fool the people all the time—that by increasing the
rate of monetary expansion, you can thereby induce people to maintain a perma-
nently lower level of unemployment.
However, in Friedman’s presidential address the Vrst “fallacy” is not mentioned at all, whereas
the second “fallacy” took centre stage. Thus, Friedman, by only accepting the concept of de-
mand inWation, removed any qualiVed reason to discuss a trade-oU as in such an economic
22This view was criticised by Ackley (1966, 71), who points at the connection between the state of demand and
the possibility for making use of market power. See also Solow (1966a, 44) and in particular Solow (1968, 4f.)
regarding the issue of ongoing wage push.
23See also Samuelson in Burns and Samuelson (1967, 53U.) and Tobin (1967, 101f.).
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setup there is no need to choose between inWation and unemployment. Furthermore, the sec-
ond “fallacy” was never there as such. It rather emerged artiVcially due to Friedman’s implicit
change of causality. In a Samuelson-Solow economy, monetary expansion may remove unem-
ployment. InWation, however, is an unwelcome by-product of this process, but it is not the cause
of this lower unemployment rate. This becomes very clear by Solow’s (1966a, 64) immediate
reaction to Friedman’s (1966a, 60) critique:
I don’t think I’m guilty of the fallacy of which Milton charges me—of believ-
ing that inWation generates employment. I’m not arguing that. I’m arguing that
demand pressure, whether it is generated by monetary or other means, generates
both inWation and employment. And that is what creates the dilemma [...].
As a Vnal assessment of Friedman’s critique, it is worth discussing the results by Forder (2010a,
19), stating that Samuelson and Solow Vlled “a gap in a story” and that “Friedman’s Nobel Lec-
ture is no more than mythologizing” (Forder, 2010b, 344). Some of the results of this paper are
in line with Forder’s statement: First, the discussion has shown that Samuelson and Solow are
very cautious about the stability of the curve and that there is no inWationary position taken
in their contribution.24 Second, Friedman not only reinterpreted the underlying causality but
also the inWationary process itself. The latter point seems to be even more important as it is in
particular this combination between cost-push and demand-pull inWation which gives rise to
the speciVc trade-oU interpretation in Samuelson and Solow (1960). Both trade-oU views hence
are completely diUerent in both the underlying assumptions and the consequences of mak-
ing use of the trade-oU. In Friedman’s view, the trade-oU allows the economy to temporarily
deviate from full employment by inWationary surprises but breaks down as soon as inWation
expectations adjust. In Samuelson’s and Solow’s framework, there is indeed the possibility of
a trade-oU even in the long-run (besides their qualiVcations on the possible instability of the
curve) but only in the sense that the policymaker has to accept the higher rate of inWation at
full employment—a rate of inWation which arises mainly due to market imperfections.25
However, the way Samuelson and Solow present their argument indeed causes the impres-
sion of a trade-oU between inWation and unemployment in the sense of Friedman. At least
their Phillips curve diagram is described in such a way as if the policymaker has the explicit
choice between the two discussed combinations—and there is no clear statement to the reader
that the choice stops here. Hence, in principle, any point on the curve is feasible, even though
Samuelson and Solow warn that inWation expectations may adjust or that there might be hys-
teresis. Solow (2002, 74) therefore also acknowledges that “the prosecution has a case too. It is
that the qualiVcations are just qualiVcations, and the reader is left with the impression that the
recorded Phillips curve really does provide [. . .] ‘a menu of choice’.”
Furthermore, Solow (2002, 73) admits that “we were interested in the possibility that the
Phillips curve might represent an exploitable trade-oU between unemployment and inWation”,
while also noting that “we were very skeptical about the durability of any such trade-oU”.
24Solow furthermore became an opponent to Johnson’s expansionary policies in the second half of the 1960s (see
Solow, 1966b describing his change of mind and Solow, 1992, 163f. as a retrospective).
25Market imperfections are also a determinant of Friedman’s (1968, 8) “natural rate of unemployment”. However,
contrary to Samuelson and Solow, market imperfections for Friedman deVne the level of wages but play no
role for the dynamics of wages in general.
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Moreover, it also seems to be the case that both Samuelson and Solow had some kind of conV-
dence in this interpretation, too, as Solow (1979, 38) remarks:
I remember that Paul Samuelson asked me when we were looking at those di-
agrams for the Vrst time, “Does that look like a reversible relation to you?” What
he meant was, “Do you really think the economy can move back and forth along a
curve like that?” And I answered, “Yeah, I’m inclined to believe it,” and Paul said,
“Me too.”
As has been shown, one favourable way of reading Samuelson’s and Solow’s “menu of choice”
interpretation is based on taking into account the cost-push and demand-pull inWation dis-
cussion which heavily alters the trade-oU interpretation since this view points at the conWict
between inWation and full employment. Nevertheless, the authors unfortunately missed to take
a clear position and to present a solid theoretical model of their “menu of choice”, so that dif-
ferent interpretations are indeed possible. This issue also showed up at the conference as all
commentators more or less interpreted their contribution as oUering in a favourable way the
possibility of trading oU inWation for unemployment.
3.5 Conclusion
As this discussion has shown, it should be stressed that there is indeed a strong ambiguity in
the work of Samuelson and Solow (1960), for on the one hand the idea of getting less unemploy-
ment by accepting more inWation (and vice versa) is sketched. On the other hand, it has been
argued that the trade-oU interpretation in light of the cost-push versus demand-pull debate in
the 1950s probably needs to be reformulated: The trade-oU concept in their view shows the
rate of inWation that has to be accepted for increasing employment up to its full-employment
level. This unavoidable rise in prices is not the cause but the outcome of full employment due
to various imperfections in the economy. The main issue hence is that “of an inWationary bias
of the economy at full employment” (Ackley, 1966, 78). The Phillips curve thus provided an
alternative view on the inWationary process and therefore “served to dispose of the rather ster-
ile ‘cost push’-‘demand pull’ controversy” (Modigliani, 1977a, 3).26 Hence, the Phillips curve
“can be used to portray a modiVed cost-push model” (Samuelson, 1961, 383) in the sense that
the slope of the curve is an in-between case of pure demand-pull inWation (vertical curve at
full employment) and pure cost-push inWation (horizontal curve until full employment, that is,
no demand-inWation until full employment).27 Therefore, the choice between unemployment
and inWation resembles a dilemma28 as Samuelson (1961, 383) explains to his students in his
textbook:
There is, so to speak, a choice for society between reasonably high employ-
ment with maximal growth and a price creep, or reasonably stable prices with
26Phillips (1958, 298f.) makes use of his curve to separate cost-push and demand-pull inWation, too.
27See also Samuelson (1970, 808U.).
28As pointed out by Bronfenbrenner and Holzman (1963, 626, n. 57) it was Reder (1948) who Vrst used the term
“dilemma” (in Reder, 1948, 47 “policy dilemma”) to describe the problem of achieving full employment and
price stability at the same time.
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considerable unemployment; and it is a diXcult social dilemma to decide what
compromises to make.
Even though the paper of Samuelson and Solow is very cautious when it comes to the stability
of the curve and particularly considers inWation expectations and hysteresis, the overall cli-
mate at that time seems to have been less worried about these qualiVcations as Solow (1995,
199) concedes that “[t]he eclectic American Keynesians of the 1960s were not suXciently alert
to the force of inWationary expectations. They expected more from the Phillips curve than it
could deliver in practice.” Probably some contemporaries thus acted in the spirit of “hydraulic
Keynesianism” (Coddington, 1976, 1265). However, also Solow (1995, 199) admits that their pre-
sentation of the policy possibilities was too optimistic. On the other hand, as has been shown,
immediate reactions at the conference to the contribution questioned the possibility of a long-
run trade-oU without accelerating inWation (see also Leeson, 1998).
However, the causality of the curve was still regarded by Samuelson and Solow as running
from quantities to prices. InWation thus was considered to be the outcome of lower unemploy-
ment and of adjustment processes in the economy (a view explained in Tobin, 1972, 9U.) and
not the cause and starting point like in Friedman’s presidential address in 1967 and even more
pronounced in his later work (see Friedman, 1975, 1976, 1977b).
Also Solow (1995, 199) admits that the famous Phillips curve article which despite all quali-
Vcations still seems to oUer this trade-oU possibility “is one of the things I would do diUerently
now”—probably as its ambiguity not only opened up the trade-oU interpretation of the Phillips
curve in general, but as it also prepared the stage for Friedman, who remembers that “the basic
idea grew out of the discussions about guidelines and, in particular, out of the Samuelson and
Solow paper on the Phillips curve” (Friedman in Taylor, 2001, 124).29 Likely, it was precisely this
ambiguity of the contribution by Samuelson and Solow which made it tempting for Friedman
to do “what we all do when we try to diUerentiate our products; namely, to set up straw men
(Friedman, 1977a, 13).30
However, as has been argued in this paper, the theoretical core assumptions of Friedman’s
and Samuelson’s and Solow’s approaches are very diUerent. For Samuelson and Solow a trade-
oU only exists as it is not possible with the given structure of the economy (in particular with
respect to cost-push forces) to achieve full employment and price stability at the same time,
which is contrary to Friedman’s reading of the trade-oU interpretation based on pure demand-
pull inWation. Accordingly, full employment and price stability in Friedman’s concept do not
exclude each other and the (short-run) negatively sloped Phillips curve is nothing more than
an artiVcial outcome of policy surprises.
A modern interpretation of Samuelson’s and Solow’s reading of the Phillips curve would
be very close to the reasons given by today’s central banks on the choice of a positive in-
Wation target. These reasons in favour of a positive inWation target include, amongst others,
29Friedman (1968, 9) also exemplarily chooses an unemployment target of 3 per cent for his critique, which, as
has been shown, is one of the targets—the one not in line with price stability but with full employment—
discussed by Samuelson and Solow: “Let us assume that the monetary authority tries to peg the ‘market’ rate
of unemployment at a level below the ‘natural’ rate. For deVniteness, suppose that it takes 3 per cent as the
target rate and that the ‘natural’ rate is higher than 3 per cent.” The natural rate is assumed to be 4 per cent in
Friedman (1966a, 60).
30This quote, of course, is not directed at his own work, but at a discussion of Modigliani (1977b).
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wage rigidities, business cycle Wuctuations, or also a Wexible environment for economic growth
(see Horváth and Matěju, 2011, 268). As has been shown, all these arguments also play a role
in the contribution by Samuelson and Solow even though cost-push forces are by far more
pronounced than today. This interpretation of Samuelson and Solow (1960) is supported by a
remark of Samuelson (1960, 265) about monetary policy in the 1950s (my italics):
A careful reading of the Federal Reserve positions suggests the authorities are
willing to entertain the hypothesis that there are important cost-push mechanisms
operating in the present system. As Solow and I indicated at the 1959 meeting of
the American Economic Association, in our paper [Samuelson and Solow, 1960]
dealing with the apparent “Phillips curve” that roughly relates American wage
increases to the degree of unemployment in our system, I agree that tendencies
toward sellers’ inWation and related inWexibilities in the face of demand changes
do seem to throw up something of a dilemma for Vscal and monetary policy. [...]
With important cost-push forces assumed to be operating, there are many mod-
els in which it can be shown that some sacriVce in the requirement for price sta-
bility is needed if short- and long-term growth are to be maximized, if average
long-run unemployment is to be minimized, if optimal allocation of resources as
between diUerent occupations is to be facilitated.
In sum, the main idea behind the “menu of choice” for monetary policy in the 1950s and 1960s
was very close to that of today: Due to various deviations of the real world economy from its
perfect theoretical counterpart, zero inWation and full employment are diXcult to achieve at the
same time. This view, by downplaying these real world deVciencies, was opposed by Friedman.
In his framework, Samuelson’s and Solow’s pessimistic dilemma view was reinterpreted as
oUering an occasion for opportunistic but myopic policy surprises to push the economy away
from full employment and price stability to over-employment at the cost of surprise inWation.
Nonetheless, it should be clear after this exhaustive journey that if a policymaker had the
choice between Samuelson’s and Solow’s imperfect economy giving rise to a “menu of choice”
and Friedman’s perfect economy with no choice at all, every policymaker should choose the
latter one since the optimal choice would be not having a choice.
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4 Growth as an Objective of Economic
Policy in the Early 1960s: The Role of
Aggregate Demand
Abstract
This paper sheds light on economic policy discussions in the early 1960s about whether there
is an optimal level of demand to maximise the rate of growth. This discussion was inWuenced
by the cold war, which urged policy makers particularly in the USA to achieve higher rates of
growth than the Soviet Union. As it was assumed that good demand management can damp
the business cycle, regulating and deciding upon the level of demand pressure in the economy
was regarded as an important tool for economic policy. The main debate therefore evolved
around the question whether or not the economy should be run at high demand pressure and
inWation to foster growth or if some slack in the economy and deWationary tendencies are a
prerequisite for a prosperous growth path.
La croissance, objectif de la politique économique au début des années
1960: le rôle de la demande agrégée
Cet article traite des discussions du début des années 1960 concernant la détermination d’un
niveau de demande optimal susceptible de maximiser le taux de croissance. Ce débat eut lieu
dans le contexte de la guerre froide où les décideurs, notamment aux États-Unis, étaient tenus
de réaliser des taux de croissance supérieurs à ceux de l’Union soviétique. Supposant qu’une
maîtrise appropriée de la demande pouvait inWéchir le cycle économique, la régulation et la dé-
cision du niveau de la pression de la demande étaient considérées comme un instrument majeur
de la politique économique. Aussi, le débat a principalement consisté à déterminer si l’économie
pouvait ou non fonctionner en présence de fortes pressions inWationnistes et des niveaux de de-
mande élevés, favorables à la croissance, ou si un certain ralentissement de l’économie et des
tendances déWationnistes constituaient une condition préalable à une trajectoire de croissance
prospère.
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4.1 Introduction
Today, policy discussions in the 1960s are usually associated with the idea of a long-run trade-
oU between inWation and unemployment given by a stable Phillips curve—a belief that was
heavily countered by Phelps [1967] and Friedman [1968]. The debates in the 1960s, however,
went farther than just arguing about the optimal combination between unemployment and
inWation, that is, in today’s terms, moving along a stable Phillips curve. There also was a lively
discussion on the medium to long-run consequences of running the economy at diUerent levels
of demand pressure and hence at diUerent combinations of unemployment and inWation. These
debates focused on the impact of the rate of inWation on allocative eXciency, on the role of
strong demand for capital formation and labour market dynamics, as well as on the overall
impact of the state of demand on technical progress.
The discussion in the 1960s was based on three elements: First of all, growth became a most
important policy objective due to the Cold War. Many contributions in the 1960s thus focused
on the rate of growth from the point of view of economic policy and not necessarily from a
founded theoretical analysis. Second, even though nearly all authors were aware that growth in
the long run crucially depends particularly on technical progress, investment was nevertheless
regarded as the driving force of the growth process taking place within the timespan important
for economic policy. As investment was assumed to depend on the level of aggregate demand,
regulating the demand pressure by Vscal and monetary policies seemed to be a promising
approach to foster economic growth. In this view, stabilisation policies and active demand
management did not only have a short-run inWuence but were also important for the medium
to longer run. These two elements, that is, growth as an objective of economic policy and the
important role of demand policies, will be discussed in Section 4.2.
The third element in this debate was the perceived trade-oU between the rate of inWation
and the rate of unemployment as given by the Phillips curve. Even though most contributions
did not make reference to Phillips’ [1958] seminal paper, the conWict between the two variables
was at the heart of the discussion. This trade-oU emerged due to various imperfections in the
economy, most notably cost-push forces (for example, aggressive unions), causing inWationary
pressures even in the case of excess unemployment. Regulating the level of aggregate demand
in this debate thus not only meant to achieve the objective of high rates of growth, but also to
balance the rate of inWation versus the rate of unemployment (see, for example, Fellner [1960:
94U.]).
Hence, at least on theoretical grounds, inWation and unemployment were thought to be
closely connected to the rate of growth even though three diUerent lines of thought can be dis-
tinguished: on the one hand, many economists believed that a high-pressure economy would
be beneVcial for the rate of growth. Most arguments pointed at the stimulating environment for
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investment due to inWation lowering the real rate of interest and a high level of demand stabi-
lizing sales perspectives. These arguments were based on a Keynesian understanding of growth
theories, that is, the Harrod-Domar model [Harrod, 1939; 1948; Domar, 1946; 1947] in which
investment plays an important role for the rate of growth. However, many arguments were not
backed up by deeper analysis (see, for example, Scitovsky and Scitovsky [1964: 440]). On the
other hand, in particular Paish [1958; 1962; 1968] pointed out the positive eUects of strong com-
petitive pressures brought about by some slack in the economy. Growth in this framework did
not depend on accelerator-type investment dynamics, but on the consequences of strong com-
petitive pressures on Vrm-level eXciency and the need for innovations in order to survive in an
overall weak market. A third line of thought remained very sceptical about a strong inWuence
of the overall level of demand pressure on the rate of growth. Many economists, in particular
those focusing on Phillips curve analysis and related policy questions, stayed close to Keynes-
ian growth arguments, but based their sceptical view on empirical evidence which seemed to
show that the rate of inWation and unemployment have, if at all, only a small inWuence on the
rate of growth. These three diUerent views will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Section 4.4 will focus on a most interesting contribution by Black [1959] which disentan-
gles these diUerent views within the Phillips curve framework. The conclusion will outline
what might be learned from the discussion in the 1960s and what might have been lost since
Friedman’s introduction of a “natural rate of unemployment” into the Phillips curve concept.
4.2 Growth as an Objective of Economic Policy and the Role
of Stabilisation Policies
4.2.1 Growth as a Policy Objective in Times of the Cold War
The discussion about the role of the overall state of demand for the rate of growth started in the
1950s, but became particularly pronounced in the early 1960s due to the slow rate of growth in
the USA compared to the Soviet Union, and in the UK compared to the rest of the industrialised
world [Wilson, 1961: 4; Johnson, 1963a: 46]. The rate of growth hence became a Vrst priority
objective of policy [Tobin, 1964: 1] particularly in the USA due to the Cold War, which also
made economists talk about the “Soviet challenge” [Baran, 1960: 119] or the “Russian threat”
[Baumol, 1958: 57]. Whereas the USA only reached an average growth rate of 3.3 per cent in
the 1950s, the USSR achieved 7.6 per cent [Klein and Bodkin, 1964: 410].2 Furthermore, the
Cold War made it necessary to discuss growth as a matter of national security in the USA
[Newman, 1958: 245; Lewis, 1958: 377; Rostow, 1960: 110; Smith, 1960: 272; Commission on
Money and Credit, 1961: 9; Johnson, 1963c: 280; Wilson, 1963: 604U.; Klein and Bodkin, 1964:
369; Tobin, 1964: 5]. A high rate of growth was regarded to be of utmost importance, since “a
major objective of economic growth is to provide an expanding base for actual or potential
national security outlays” [Kendrick, 1964: 242].
2It is worth noting that some economists were less concerned with the apparently high growth rates of the Soviet
Union. Particularly Nutter [1962] pointed at the possibility of inaccurate statistics which probably overstated
Soviet growth rates and at special factors (for example “the expansion of territory and resources”) which might
have boosted growth rates of the Soviet Union in the short run.
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Not only the rate of growth as such, but also technical progress was regarded as an essential
factor in times of the Cold War. As both were assumed to be interrelated—“if technology helps
growth, growth in turn helps technology, and on technology defence largely depends” [Wil-
son, 1963: 605]—the rate of growth became the dominant policy objective. This obsession with
growth went so far that the rate of growth in many contributions was often treated “as an end
in itself” [AlhadeU et al., 1964: 531]. Even the “Golden Rule of Accumulation” by Phelps [1961]
as an important contemporary contribution to growth theory on how to achieve maximum
consumption was either just ignored or bypassed by many authors. Furthermore, individual
decisions on saving and investment as the ultimate benchmark for an optimal rate of growth
[Tobin, 1964: 2; Kendrick, 1964: 244] were also discarded in most contributions. For example,
Musgrave [1958: 609] was clearly aware that “the ultimate objective of economic activity is
consumption” but at the same time remarked about the “optimal rate of growth in the econ-
omy” in light of the high Russian growth rates that “this may be answered more or less easily
by reference to Russia: Whatever we do, the Russian rate of growth is likely to exceed ours,
simply because they are at a much earlier stage of the game; therefore, if we want to maintain
our relative advantage, we had better grow as fast as we can.”
Due to this competition with the Soviet Union, Fellner [1960: 98] emphasised that policies
aiming at a higher rate of saving in order to foster growth do not necessarily “violate the
time-preference scales of the public” as positive external eUects of a higher rate of growth (for
example on defence) are not taken into account by private decisions. Thus, the optimal rate
of growth was not regarded to be determined by individual preferences any longer, but be-
came subject to economic policy. Denison [1962: 69] even went as far as to suggest “that the
public be persuaded that acceleration of growth must be made an overriding national goal.
Moreover, it must probably be persuaded of this for reasons other than the increase in indi-
vidual welfare—probably reasons related to the external situation facing the country.” In the
same vein, Anderson and Cornwall [1961: 174] emphasised that “[i]f we wish to maintain our
market system and at the same time to avoid being outstripped by the Soviet Union, some way
will have to be found to manipulate the market forces to achieve the desired growth goals.”
Time preferences, thrift, and individual decisions as such hence were accepted as indicating
an optimal rate of growth in a fair-weather world, but given the threats of the Cold War even
Tobin [1964: 6] was not reluctant to state that “[s]ome hazards are great enough to bias our
choice to favor the future over the present” as “[a] high GNP might be the diUerence between
victory and defeat rather than the diUerence between more or less consumption.”
Growth as a policy objective hence involved strong interventions into the free market econ-
omy. This development was met with much scepticism. In particular Friedman [1959], who
pointed at the importance of individual decisions so that “[w]hatever rate of change in the sta-
tistical aggregate [output] results from the eUort of freemen to promote their own aspirations
is the right rate,” feared that the Cold War might create a diXcult and dangerous environment
for economic policy as “departures we must make to survive” may overcharge the corrective
forces of a free society. Johnson [1963b: 139] even went as far as to remark that “the recent
emphasis on the desirability of a high rate of growth seems to me to involve grafting on to a
free enterprise system standards appropriate to a planned economy with military and political
ambitions.” Johnson [1963a: 47] therefore critically noted that “[t]he movement towards some
form of economic planning for growth has gone farthest in the United Kingdom, with the es-
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tablishment of the National Economic Development Council” of which also Richard Lipsey, a
pioneer of Phillips curve analysis [Lipsey, 1960], was part of the staU [Lipsey, 1997: xxiv]. The
National Economic Development Council [1963b: viii] explicitly had the aim “to increase the
rate of sound growth.” Such a rate of growth was set to be equal to 4 per cent of national output
[National Economic Development Council, 1963b: iii]. In the USA, particularly the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee [1958] and the Commission on Money and Credit [1961] published studies
about the possibility of achieving a high rate of growth while maintaining price stability and
full employment.
4.2.2 The Role of Demand Management and Stabilisation Policies
Growth not only became a most important objective of economic policy, it also was thought
that economic policy has the appropriate tools to inWuence the rate of growth by managing
the economy accordingly. This optimism is most visible in Samuelson’s [1955: 337] statement
that “[w]ith proper Vscal and monetary policies, our economy can have full employment and
whatever rate of capital formation and growth it wants.” This optimism about Vne-tuning the
economy is also very pronounced in Anderson and Cornwall [1961: 174] as they remarked that
“[m]ost economists by now are accustomed to think of the government as an agency for damp-
ing Wuctuations and at least edging the economy toward full employment.” The economics
profession in the 1960s hence was very optimistic about managing the economy and there was
the belief that good demand management “ironed out the business cycle” [Harrod, 1967: 19].
In the same vein, Wilson [1961: 3] stated that “the trade cycle, if it has not been altogether
conquered, has been much subdued”. It is therefore not surprising that there was also an edited
volume published on the possible obsolescence of the business cycle [Bronfenbrenner, 1969: v].
In sum, stabilisation policies had two short-term objectives: On the one hand, “to regulate the
pressure of demand for labour” and on the other hand, “to keep the Wuctuations of the unem-
ployment percentage within fairly narrow limits” [Godley and Shepherd, 1964: 26]. Fine-tuning
the economy with respect to choosing and regulating the pressure of aggregated demand hence
seemed achievable by stabilisation policies so that “[i]t is for the Government to decide at what
pressure it wishes to run the economy, and to try to keep it there” [Godley and Shepherd, 1964:
26]. This optimistic attitude towards managing the economy is described by Minsky [1968: 45]
in retrospect about the early 1960s noting that it was believed that “business cycles as they had
been known would be a thing of the past” and that “the perfected tools of economic policy
would ‘Vne-tune’ the economy so that, period by period, it would stay on a course of sustained
growth.”
Thus, “sustained growth” relied on successful stabilisation policies to damp the business
cycle and to keep the economy at full capacity output (see, for example, Smith [1957: 53U.];
Phillips [1961: 367f.]). This implied that economic policy needed to assure that the growing
output of the economy will also be demanded [Musgrave, 1958: 607; Klein and Bodkin, 1964:
377]. In this sense, economic stability not only meant to keep the economy “at a happy mean”,
that is, to damp the ups and downs, but to assure “a level of activity very close to full employ-
ment” [Turner, 1958: 671]. Stabilisation policies thus had the diXcult task to maintain ongoing
full employment with minimal Wuctuations, which required a sophisticated analysis of the in-
terrelationships between economic variables and appropriate tools to analyse the impact of
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diUerent policies. One of the Vrst economists to incorporate such new methods regarding sta-
bilisation policies was Phillips [1954; 1957], who applied tools from engineering to the issues
of economic stability [Turnovsky, 2000: 296U.]. Phillips [1962: 9f.] furthermore was convinced
that conVdence about economic policy is an important stabiliser itself. Phillips’ intuition is that
expectations about a sound policy, especially aggressive in Vghting severe slumps, will stabilise
investment and as such the whole economy because of the thereby created conVdence that ex-
actly such an enormous downturn will not be likely to last for a long time. Also Balogh [1958:
232] pointed at the necessity of stabilisation policies to create conVdence as otherwise there
might be “shocking consequences”, that is, a strong economic downturn, so that “only foolish
people will not let sleeping accelerators lie”. Stabilisation policies hence were regarded as ne-
cessary to dull Harrod’s “knife-edge” [Solow, 1956: 65]. Samuelson [1957: 569] thus emphasised
that preventing the “excesses of the boom” but also “oUsetting slumps” will be beneVcial for
economic growth (see also Kendrick [1964: 239]). Stabilisation policies to achieve a maximal
rate of growth were also believed to be necessary in an otherwise neoclassical growth con-
text. For example, Cornwall [1963: 1f.] remarked that the long-run growth rate will depend on
supply-side factors if full employment can be achieved by a perfectly functioning price system.
If, however, full employment cannot be assured by the market system itself, demand policies
are a powerful and necessary tool to increase the rate of growth so that “the system moves
toward a long-run equilibrium growth rate determined solely by supply factors, as in the neo-
classical world” [Cornwall, 1963: 21]. Thus Cornwall [1963: 2] pointed out that demand policies
actually make it possible that the maximum growth rate (restricted by conditions on the supply
side) can be fully realised so that “growth can and should be looked upon as a problem of ade-
quate demand as long as an economy is subject to periodic recessions” (see also Nelson [1966:
1186] for a comparable approach and Johnson [1963a: 65f.] for a related and critical comment
on economic policy in Canada).
However, not all economists at that time thought that damping cyclical Wuctuations is a nec-
essary condition to achieve high rates of growth. For example, Fishman and Fishman [1958: 65]
pointed out that “[d]evoted followers of Schumpeter may . . . question whether it is possible to
maintain growth without cyclical Wuctuations, and whether any attempts to eliminate or even
sharply reduce cyclical Wuctuations may not result in economic stagnation” as “Schumpeter
believed that there is an inherent causal relationship between economic growth and cyclical
Wuctuations, and that cyclical Wuctuations are the mechanism through which growth occurs.”
Samuelson [1957: 566] hence speculated that “[p]erhaps the booms and the busts of the last cen-
tury were the inevitable costs of progress, the necessary price we must pay for vital growth.” In
the same vein, Newman [1958: 246] pointed at the “surging and pulsating character” of a grow-
ing economy and hence at a possible “conWict between growth and employment as objectives
of economic policy.”
This conWict seemed to be most pronounced if restrictive demand policies were necessary to
Vght inWationary pressures arising due to cost-push forces, that is, for example, unions pushing
up wages independently of the state of demand (see Bronfenbrenner and Holzman [1963: 600U.]
on the cost-push demand-pull debate in the 1950s and 1960s). This dilemma of Vghting cost-
push inWation by increasing the rate of unemployment made economists think about the long-
run consequences of such a restrictive policy. For example, Rostow [1960: 111] asked: “Does
control of inWation require in our democratic society a damping of the rate of growth?” In this
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respect Hoover [1960: 377] remarked about a study of the Joint Economic Committee [1959]
that this contribution puts forward the “central thesis of the sacriVce of growth on the altar of
price stabilization” (see also Wilson [1961: 3f.] and National Economic Development Council
[1964: 8] regarding the stop-and-go policies in the UK). In this sense, the Phillips curve trade-oU
was augmented by a third dimension [Smithies, 1958: 611; Phillips, 1962: 11; Klein and Bodkin,
1964: 386; Scott and McKean, 1964: 2]. Scitovsky and Scitovsky [1964: 429f.] hence pointed out
that “[t]he most controversial question . . . is how inWation on the one hand and unemployment
on the other aUect the rate of growth of the economy.” Also the Commission on Money and
Credit [1961: 12] remarked that “the possibility of conWict among these goals is a very real one.”
In sum, the discussion about an optimal level of demand pressure was inWuenced by the Cold
War (which made the rate of growth a most important policy goal), the belief in stabilisation
policies to overcome the business cycle and to keep the economy at a speciVc utilisation level
(which made the level of demand an important policy tool), and the possible conWict between
unemployment, inWation, and growth (which made the optimal level of demand a diXcult
policy choice). Three diUerent views about this optimal level of demand will be distinguished
in the next section.
4.3 Three DiUerent Views
4.3.1 The Keynesian View
The view most prevalent in many contributions might be labelled Keynesian since the authors
of these contributions particularly stress the role of demand-induced investment for the rate
of growth. The rate of investment, as in Harrod’s [1936; 1939] growth model, was at least
implicitly assumed to depend on the (expected) growth of aggregate demand. For example,
the National Economic Development Council [1963a: 44f.] remarked that “[t]he incentive to
invest is also likely to be greater when demand is high than when there is a good deal of excess
capacity.” The National Economic Development Council [1964: 7] hence stated that “growth is
encouraged by a high pressure of demand.”
This high level of demand was assumed to generate inWation via the Phillips relation as
employers compete for the last remaining factors of production. On a positive side, this higher
rate of inWation was viewed to be beneVcial for growth as proVts may be higher if wages lag
behind prices (see Klein and Bodkin [1964: 411]; for empirical falsiVcation of this argument, see
Bach [1958: 37], Kessel and Alchian [1960: 43U.], and Reuber [1962: 220f.]). This eUect might
even increase labour supply if workers are trying to keep their standard of living by working
more [Bach, 1958: 36]. Also, the real rate of interest might be lowered if the nominal rate does
not adjust fully to the higher rate of inWation, so that the marginal eXciency of capital rises
and therefore induces further investment [Kaldor, 1959: 289U.; Scitovsky and Scitovsky, 1964:
463f.]. The rise in prices, it was argued, may create an “optimistic atmosphere” [Baumol, 1958:
51] or a “general spirit of optimism” [Smithies, 1958: 612f.]. This positive eUect of inWation
for the rate of growth, however, was doubted by many scholars since it implied some kind
of money illusion. In particular Johnson [1963d: 64] opposed this line of thought as “[t]his
argument assumes that the rate of interest at which entrepreneurs can borrow is unaUected by
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the expectation of inWation, implying that though borrowers are aware of inWation lenders are
not” (see also Wilson [1961: 15]; Johnson [1966: 24]).
The beneVcial inWuence of a strong demand pressure on investment, however, is only the
most apparent one, and the proponents of maintaining excess demand emphasised additional
advantages of such a policy since most authors were fully aware that long-run growth also
depends on growth of the labour force and, even more importantly, on technical progress. The
level of demand was assumed to inWuence the rate of technical progress due to various reasons:
First of all, strong demand may cause shortages and bottlenecks, in particular on the labour
market. On the one hand, these bottlenecks were viewed as obstacles to further expansion, but
on the other hand it was thought that they would induce research and the application of new
means of productions to overcome the shortages. This mechanism was, for example, empha-
sised by the National Economic Development Council [1963a: 45] stating that “labour shortage
provides a strong incentive to invest in labour-saving equipment which will raise productivity.”
In the same vein, Scitovsky and Scitovsky [1964: 441] remark “that physical shortages of a pro-
ductive factor are the most powerful inducements for developing and adopting new methods
of production that economize that factor. A full-employment situation, therefore, by creating
both a general shortage of labor and speciVc bottlenecks of speciVc skills and types of labor
is especially favorable to labor-saving innovations and growth.” As every such innovation in-
volves risks and usually huge investments in new machinery, Scitovsky and Scitovsky [1964:
441] argue that the willingness to implement these innovations will be greater if there is high
conVdence that economic activity will remain on a high level (see also Turner [1958: 682]; Har-
rod [1967: 16f.; 1969: 325]). Furthermore, Scitovsky and Scitovsky [1964: 434] point out that
full employment will make unions and workers accept the introduction of such labour-saving
technical progress in a cooperative way (see also Balogh [1958: 231]; National Economic Devel-
opment Council [1963a: 45]). Based on the same arguments as outlined above, the Commission
on Money and Credit [1961: 43] concluded that “measures to stimulate aggregate demand to
attain low levels of unemployment are basic to an adequate rate of economic growth.”
The Commission on Money and Credit [1961: 43] also remarked that the induced technical
progress usually would lay oU workers. Therefore, inter-sectoral or inter-industry movements
of labour become necessary. This labour mobility was assumed to depend positively on demand
pressure, so that “a strong demand for labour increases mobility and therefore the eXciency of
resource allocation and indirectly the rate of growth” (Johnson [1963d: 64]; see also Samuel-
son and Solow [1960: 190]; National Economic Development Council [1963a: 27]). Thus, a high
demand pressure (a low rate of unemployment), was regarded as beneVcial for overall growth
as structural adjustments might be easier and the overall dynamism of the economy could be
higher. In this line of thought, Reuber [1962: 12] emphasised that “the problems of adjusting to
changing economic conditions, whatever the source of these changes, is much more diXcult
when the economy has considerable excess capacity than when it is running at full steam” (see
also Bach [1958: 38]). In sum, technical progress and the necessary structural adjustments were
assumed to be facilitated by a high demand pressure. At least in theory, a high rate of invest-
ment met a high rate of technical progress so that the stock of machinery, which was regarded
as the factual incorporation of this technical progress (see also Johansen [1959]; Solow [1960])
received frequent updates and improvements (see, for example, Fellner [1960: 94]). Further-
more, high mobility of labour was assumed to accompany this progressive economic setup.
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This positive relation between growth and the level of demand made the Keynesian view
prone to the Phillips curve trade-oU. A high level of demand seemed necessary to assure high
rates of economic growth, while inWation, at least at a certain point, was still regarded as an evil.
This conWict was especially pronounced if an increase in the unemployment rate seemed neces-
sary to achieve price stability, as then inWation had to be traded oU against unemployment and
a high rate of growth. This problem led Turner [1958: 684] to conclude that “growth cannot be
reconciled with price stability” (see also Balogh [1958: 239]; Fishman and Fishman [1958: 70f.]).
Wilson [1961:9] furthermore pointed at the issue that an anti-inWation policy inWation might
overshoot and therefore cause a loss in output and growth (see also Klein and Bodkin [1964:
425]). Chandler [1960: 214f.] therefore cautioned that policies which will “maximize the short-
run rate of growth” may lead to such a high rise in prices that necessary restrictive policies will
be accompanied by a “disappointment of widely held highly inWationary expectations” which
“could be quite damaging to employment, output, and growth”. The Keynesian view hence
faced the dilemma that there seemed to be an inherent conWict between unemployment and
the rate of growth on the one hand, and the rate of inWation on the other hand.
4.3.2 The Paishian View
In contrast to the Keynesian view, some economists proposed that an overall restrictive policy
would be necessary to foster growth. This view was particularly held by the British economist
Frank W. Paish, at that time professor at the London School of Economics. Paish [1962: 331f.]
supposed that “the permanent maintenance of the small proportion of unused capacity sug-
gested here would be more likely to increase than decrease the rate of growth of capacity.” For
Paish [1962: 94], especially very high levels of employment raise the problem of “bottle-necks”
in the economy which were thought to be an obstacle for growth, as well as a cause of inWation
and misallocation (see also Baumol [1958: 50U.]; Wilson [1961: 17]; National Economic Devel-
opment Council [1963a: 44]; Phillips [1968: 229]). Furthermore, Paish [1968, 22] argued that
overall eXciency would be increased by a higher level of unemployment and slack of demand
as there is “the need for Vrms to be eXcient in order to survive”. Those Vrms which were able to
stay in the market due to high demand are now sorted out or forced to raise their eXciency as
their “costs of production are above the average” [Paish, 1962: 94f.; see also Paish, 1958: 104f.].
Paish [1968: 22] therefore concluded that “[a] condition of excess demand . . . provides an ideal
climate for keeping ineXcient Vrms alive and thus for slowing down the improvement in the
average eXciency of the system as a whole.” Furthermore, the Commission on Money and
Credit [1961: 42] remarked that it might also be possible that high demand renders the use of
old machinery and less skilled labour necessary and proVtable, with negative eUects on average
productivity. Moreover, full employment may cause higher demand for consumption goods but
not for investment goods. Therefore, Bronfenbrenner [1963: 115f.] stated that “[i]nsofar as full
employment is associated with high consumption while rapid growth requires high saving and
investment, there is a trade-oU here too.” Klein and Bodkin [1964: 417] thus came to the con-
clusion with respect to the USA that “[t]his is the American problem in a nutshell—too much
consumption and too little capital formation holding down the rate of economic expansion.”
Also Long [1960: 152U.] pointed at the positive eUects of a higher rate of unemployment:
From the late 1940s to the late 1950s in the USA, real GNP per worker rose faster at high lev-
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els of unemployment while at the same time inWationary pressures were weak [Long, 1960:
153]. This might be explained by the following three diUerent eUects of a higher rate of unem-
ployment [Long, 1960: 156]. First of all, there is a “lubrication eUect”: A larger worker pool is
advantageous for an economy in continuous development as emerging enterprises then have
the possibility to acquire more workers than usually released by dying industries (see also Min-
sky [1961: 2]). This larger worker pool thus makes a high rate of growth compatible with price
stability as otherwise rising industries would have to bid away resources from other sectors
which would result in wage and price increases. Second, there is an “insecurity eUect” in the
sense that a high level of unemployment will discipline wage demands of workers and unions
and will furthermore discourage unnecessary job hopping. Third, the “pencil-sharpening ef-
fect” will set in: Slack in the economy and thus increased competition will force employers to
increase productivity and to resist high wage claims in order to keep costs down. In sum, all
three eUects of a higher unemployment rate might be considered beneVcial for achieving both
a high rate of growth and price stability.
Sumner [1968: 304U.], however, criticised these arguments and conclusions. Particularly the
eUect of permanent slack in the economy on investment is in the focus of attention as there
are good reasons to assume that permanently unused capacity will be detrimental for overall
long-term expectations and therefore for investment and the rate of growth (see also Scitovsky
and Scitovsky [1964: 442]). Also a study by Junankar [1970: 290] directly aimed at investigating
Paish’s hypothesis came to the conclusion that “[i]n all the models investigated spare capacity
aUected investment adversely. Thus the policy implications . . . are that in order to stimulate
investment and through it growth, the economy should be run within the full capacity zone.”
The advantage of Paish’s view with regard to economic policy is that growth and price
stability are not conWicting policy objectives as they are in the Keynesian case. To the contrary,
the resulting price stability due to excess capacity was assumed to be an important prerequisite
for growth. For example, Jacoby [1958: 645] points at the issue that inWation distorts investment
decisions by making the distinction between real and nominal values more diXcult (see also
Eckstein [1958: 361]). Furthermore, inWation may lower the rate of saving [Jacoby, 1957: 20].
Price stability also was assumed to indirectly have positive eUects on the rate of growth: a
speciVc contemporary argument against running the economy at high levels of employment
and in favour of price stability was the diXcult task of maintaining a balance-of-payments
equilibrium in a Vxed exchange rate system like Bretton Woods—a particular issue at that time
in the UK [Wilson, 1961: 17U.]. Disequilibria in the balance of payments might especially arise
in periods of high growth as imports also rise strongly (for example, to overcome bottlenecks;
see National Economic Development Council [1963a: 44]), while exports may be hampered by
the domestic rise in prices (see the empirical investigation by Ball et al. [1966]). Thus, there
was a perceived trade-oU between growth and keeping the balance of payments in equilibrium
[National Economic Development Council, 1964: 6; Klein and Bodkin, 1964: 414f.]. This was also
emphasised by Dow [1964: 399U.]: Running the economy at a low demand pressure and thus at
higher unemployment and in its wake greater price stability was regarded as a precondition for
achieving a high rate of growth while keeping the balance of payments in equilibrium. Thus,
some excess capacity and therefore “greater price stability seems desirable, partly for its own
sake, but largely as a means of getting the growth of exports to pay for the imports needed for
faster growth” [Dow, 1964: 403].
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Harrod [1963: 89], however, remained critical regarding the suggested beneVcial conse-
quences of low inWation due to slack in the economy: If investment is forestalled as a reaction
to excess capacity, the growth rate will be equally weak and inWationary pressures thus may
arise regardless of high unemployment as “it is easier to prevent an inWationary rise of incomes
if you are growing at a higher rate.”
In sum, the Paishian view suggested some excess capacity to increase the rate of growth
while keeping inWation in check. The trade-oU in this line of thought hence was very diUerent
to that of the Keynesian view: Growth and low inWation on the one hand, a higher rate of
unemployment on the other hand.
4.3.3 The Sceptical View and Empirical Evidence
Besides these two lines of thought, there were also economists who were very sceptical about
any inWuence of the overall level of demand on economic growth. For example, Johnson [1963b:
141] stated that “there is no a priori reason why, other things equal, the rate of growth should
vary with the average level of unemployment” and that “there is no a priori reason for ex-
pecting a higher normal level of employment, accompanied presumably by a higher rate of
price increase, to produce a higher rate of growth.” These economists remained sceptical not
necessarily on pure theoretical grounds, that is, they not always based their arguments on the
neoclassical growth model [Solow, 1956; 1957; Swan, 1956] in which the steady state rate of
growth depends solely on the growth rate of the labour supply and technical progress.
Most notably, Phillips [1962: 13f.] stayed within the Keynesian growth model, but his cal-
culations about the implications of a higher average unemployment rate and hence a smaller
amount of investment led him to the conclusion that the eUects of running the economy at
a (slightly) higher rate of unemployment are “extremely small”. Furthermore, the resulting
“possible extra incentive or compulsion to invest in cost-reducing equipment” [Phillips, 1962:
14] might counter any negative eUect of a higher rate of unemployment. Thus, for Phillips
[1962: 14], the rate of growth depends on structural factors like “the willingness to save, and
the more general inWuences of educational improvement, research, and so on”. On all these
structural determinants of the rate of growth “very small changes in aggregate demand and
unemployment” would not have a big inWuence. In sum, Phillips [1968: 229] concluded that
“[i]n my view the objective of . . . growth is almost independent of the objectives of short-term
economic management”.
Tobin [1964: 4U.] also took the point of view that full employment and the rate of growth are
not interrelated goals. An economy may proVt if unemployment is removed, as this enables a
generally higher consumption path without trading oU consumption today against consump-
tion tomorrow. However, in the long run, it is the growth of capacity and not Wuctuations
in its utilisation that determine the rate of growth. Furthermore, a too high demand pressure
above the growth rate of capacity will be frustrated by inWation. Demand policy hence should
be focused on the optimal combination between unemployment and inWation (as given by the
Phillips curve) and not on inWuencing the rate of growth. In this sense, Tobin [1964: 4] con-
cluded that “[f]ull employment is, therefore, not a reason for faster economic growth; each is
an objective in its own right.”
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Most economists remaining sceptical based their position on empirical research and evi-
dence. For example, Johnson [1963c: 279] remarked with respect to the bad growth perfor-
mance of both the USA and the UK, while there was high unemployment in the USA and
low unemployment in the UK, that growth and the rate of unemployment do not seem to be
interrelated.
Most interestingly, the very Vrst study which explicitly calculated gains and losses of lower
unemployment and higher rates of inWation, Reuber [1962], did not further discuss the inWuence
of diUerent levels of unemployment and inWation on the rate of growth as Reuber [1962: 7]
came to the conclusion “that there is no discernible relationship between the long-run rate of
economic growth and either the stability of prices or the level of unemployment” (see also
Reuber [1962: 87U.]; Reuber [1964: 113f.]). Therefore, the Phillips curve only shows a trade-oU
between unemployment and inWation on which economic policy has to focus [Reuber, 1962:
10]. The rate of growth thus should be fostered “by other branches of government equipped
with instruments that are better suited for inWuencing such factors as education and long-run
capital accumulation, on which the long-run rate of growth seems mainly to depend” [Reuber,
1964: 115].
With respect to the role of inWation for the rate of growth it was found empirically that
the inWuence of the rate of inWation was negligible in most cases [Bach, 1958: 34U.; Eck-
stein, 1958: 373; Bhatia, 1960: 108U.; Wilson, 1961: 6U.; Allais, 1969: 378]. However, some ex-
ceptions are worth mentioning: even though mild inWation as such might even be beneVcial
for growth [Johnson, 1963b: 140f.; Johnson, 1963d: 61; Conard, 1964: 95f.], sudden and unan-
ticipated changes, that is, a high variance in the rate of inWation, were found to be an obstacle
for growth [Klein and Bodkin, 1964: 412]. Even deWation, if steady and predictable, may not
conWict with rapid growth [Friedman, 1958; 251U.; Johnson, 1963d: 64]. Dorrance [1966, 94]
thus concluded that the rate of inWation becomes only important in times of strong increases
or decreases as “rapid inWation seriously inhibits growth.”
4.4 Growth and the Phillips Curve
To disentangle these diUerent views about the factors responsible for growth, Black [1959] re-
viewed this debate in a Phillips curve framework. Actually, Black [1959: 146] chose an upward-
sloping aggregate supply curve in employment-inWation space (see Figure 4.1). The relation
hence is not exactly a Phillips curve, but is nevertheless much in line with the main idea of the
Phillips curve that higher demand pressure causes wages and thus prices to rise. Moreover, the
curve strongly resembles the one used by Phillips [1954: 307f.].3 Additionally, the reason for the
shape of the curve comes close to the bargaining power explanation given by Phillips [1954:
307f.] as Black [1959: 146] also points at the higher bargaining power of diUerent groups in the
economy the closer the economy is to full employment. Furthermore, an unequal distribution
of demand across sectors (very much in line with Lipsey [1960, 17U.]) and the emergence of
3Black [1959: 145, n. 1] also thanked Phillips for “comments and suggestions” so that it can be assumed that
Phillips probably was not too opposed to Black’s assumptions. However, John Black, in a letter to the author
dated 2 February 2014, remarked that “I simply cannot recall what he said, on paper only as we never met.”
Therefore, one should not “infer any approval from Phillips.”
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bottlenecks are additional reasons why inWationary cost-push pressures arise in the economy
before full employment is reached. In general, the stronger the market imperfections are, the
more pronounced the conWict between inWation and unemployment becomes [Black, 1959: 149].
The location of the curve is assumed to depend on two forces: The curve as well as the level of
full employment (which coincides with full capacity utilisation) F will be shifted horizontally
to the right due to technical progress and population growth.4 Moreover, it can be endogenously
shifted to the right by induced investment which depends on the (previous) level of demand
[Black, 1959: 149]. Vertical shifts arise due to adjusting inWation expectations, “as both buyers
and sellers get attuned to regarding a given rate of increase of prices as normal”.5 In sum, both
shifts are not independent of the level of aggregate demand and the thereby achieved rate of
inWation and the level of employment (and output). However, horizontal and vertical shifts are
opposing forces. Whereas horizontal shifts to the right allow a higher rate of aggregate demand
at the same rate of inWation, upward shifts of the relation increase the conWict between inWation
and unemployment. Therefore, given the three parameters of the relation, that is, the slope of
the aggregate supply curve, the strength of induced investment, and the elasticity of inWation
expectations, Black [1959: 150] points out that there might be an “optimum rate of growth of
monetary demand, which will serve in the long run to maximise the rate of growth of actual
output”. This idea of an optimum level of aggregate demand is depicted in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The Trade-OU Between InWation, Employment, and Growth.
Source: Own illustration based on Black [1959: 149]. Redrawn and modiVed.
See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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4Following Leeson [1997: 158f.], these horizontal shifts might be also in line with Phillips [1954: 307f.].
5Lewis [1958: 379U.] also discusses some of these shifts in a price-level output diagram.
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At the aggregate demand level Y, the rightward shift of the curve due to induced investment
and the upward shift due to adjusting inWation expectations (dotted supply curves) are such
that the combined forces (dashed arrow) correspond to the maximal possible rightward shift
of the schedule (dashed curve) and at the same time of the full capacity boundary (dashed
vertical line). A higher level of aggregate demand such as Z does not induce the same capacity-
expanding eUect of investment6 while at the same time inWation expectations are strongly
elastic (in the Vgure this would even cause a combined upward shift of the relation). On the
other hand, a lower level of demand X, while causing only a minor adjustment of inWation
expectations, may fail to induce a strong rise in investment so that the combined rightward
shift of the relation will be weaker than that in Y.
Black [1959: 152] hence concluded that with this model it becomes possible to disentangle
diUerent views about the interdependencies between unemployment, inWation, and growth.
Believers in classical economic principles and of “a dynamic version of the quantity theory of
money” would argue that there is no pronounced conWict between inWation and unemploy-
ment (so that the curve is more like a kinked supply curve) and that inWation expectations
are strong. Investment decisions in this line of thought are not based on recent output levels,
but on the long-run proVtability of investment projects which depend on secular productivity
developments and the interest rate. Thus, any increase in aggregate demand will not succeed
in accelerating the rate of growth as the vertical forces are always stronger than the horizon-
tal ones. Keynesians, however, build their proposal of increasing aggregate demand upon the
assumption that inWation expectations are rather inelastic or at least that induced investment
more than compensates any upward shift of the relation. An increase in aggregate demand
hence is optimal even in the case of a conWict between inWation and unemployment as there is
always a positive level of demand pressure to maximise the rate of growth.
4.5 Conclusion
The discussion has shown that there was a lively debate in the 1960s about the optimal demand
pressure to maximise the rate of growth. Three elements of this debate stand out and are worth
recalling: First of all, the cold war made the rate of growth a most important policy objec-
tive. This overriding importance of the rate of the growth made it acceptable to discuss means
to foster a growth rate higher than indicated by individual preferences. One of those instru-
ments considered was—besides encouraging and promoting research, education, and technical
progress—the level of demand pressure. The state of aggregate demand was considered impor-
tant as demand-dependent investment was regarded as one of the driving forces of growth.
The second element of this debate was the belief that it is indeed possible to choose the level
of demand via Vscal and monetary policies. This element hence included an optimistic view
regarding the power of stabilisation policies to damp cyclical Wuctuations and to Vne-tune the
economy. Together, these two elements built the basis for the discussion about an optimal pres-
6Black [1959: 150f.] referred to Hayek’s business cycle theory [Hayek, 1931] and his emphasis on the misdirection
of investments in times of the boom (see for a discussion Hagemann and Trautwein [1998: 299f.]). Hence, even
though the absolute amount of investment might be higher in Z than in Y, the actual eUect on enhancing
productive capacity will not necessarily be greater.
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sure of demand to maximise the rate of growth (see, for example, Anderson and Cornwall
[1961: 163]). However, the choice of the aggregate demand pressure not only had implications
for the rate of growth, but also for the level of unemployment and the rate of inWation. This
third element in the debate, the Phillips curve, pointed at the possible conWict between all three
goals as discussed by Black [1959].
Many economists believed that a high demand pressure will have the beneVt of removing
unemployment as well as fostering growth by creating an optimistic outlook and due to positive
eUects of a higher rate of inWation on investment. Bruno and Easterly [1996: 139] therefore sum-
marise that “the traditional view that inWation was destructive [to growth] no longer seemed
so compelling. It was the Golden Age of the Phillips Curve, in which inWation and growth were
positively related” (see also Brown [2001: C32]). This Keynesian view can be called a “carrot
theory” [Lipsey, 2010: 171] which relied on the idea that “the best way to get more investment
is to have a rising demand for end-products and an assurance that this will continue. Look af-
ter the aggregate demand for end-products and investment will look after itself” [Harrod, 1967:
11]. However, the assumptions on which these arguments rested are questionable, in particular
the non-adjustment of the nominal rate of interest to a higher rate of inWation.
Critiques of this approach, most notably Paish, did not target this assumption in particular.
Rather the argument that technological change will proceed faster and investment will be
higher in a buoyant economy was criticised by the Paishian view. This line of thought feared
that a high demand pressure and the absence of the risk of failure will weaken market forces
as it will free Vrms from the competitive pressure to innovate in order to survive. This view
hence can be called a “stick theory” [Lipsey, 2010: 171] which was based on the assumption that
“[f]or a high rate of growth of output per man-hour we need an economic climate in which all
producers are under continual pressure to keep down their costs” [Paish, 1968: 22]. This view,
however, can be criticised in the sense that a temporary crisis may indeed assure the survival
of the Vttest. But ongoing slack in the economy may sooner or later harm the willingness to
invest and to take the risk usually associated with innovations.
Both approaches have in common that growth was considered as a variable that can be
inWuenced in the short and medium run by appropriate demand polices. It is, however, striking
to note that many contributions did not take fully into account the neoclassical proposition that
in the long run the rate of growth solely depends on population growth and technical progress,
so that, for example, a higher rate of saving and investment will only have transitional eUects.
Not only this issue, but also the fact that many contributions ignored important theoretical
concepts like the “Golden Rule” might be best explained by the pressing issues of the Cold War,
so that policy debates focused on the years immediately ahead. In this respect Tobin [1964: 9]
emphasised that even if in the long run there is no choice about the rate of growth, but only
about consumption levels, the transitional period might be very long so that practically and
within the timespan of economic policy, society can choose among diUerent rates of growth.
Moreover, there was a theoretical gap (to be closed by Cass [1965] and Koopmans [1965], based
on Ramsey [1928]) with regard to the choice of the optimal growth path in a transitional period
to the “Golden rule” consumption level. Johnson [1964: 24] critically remarked about this issue
that “[i]t is of little help to know where one should be going, if one is not told when one
ought to arrive.” The deVnition of an optimal rate of growth as an objective of economic policy
hence was regarded as more diXcult than other goals of economic policy like full employment
103
4 Growth as an Objective of Economic Policy in the Early 1960s
and price stability [Musgrave, 1958: 597; Commission on Money and Credit, 1961: 31; Reuber,
1962: 35f.; Johnson, 1963d: 65f.]. The Cold War furthermore might explain the general emphasis
on the rate of growth of output, and not always the rate of growth of per-capita income: For
example, Kendrick [1964: 249] remarked that although per-capita income is a better measure for
the quality of growth (see also Klein and Bodkin [1964: 379]), growth of output as such (even in
the case of declining per-capita income at the same time) is nevertheless “of signiVcance from
the military . . . viewpoint”.
However, not all demand-oriented contributions regarded a high level of demand as the only
necessary and suXcient condition for a rising output level. Technical progress, for example,
was considered as a “key factor” by the National Economic Development Council [1963b: 29U.]
and the Commission on Money and Credit [1961: 34] emphasised the importance of education
“to take full advantage of” technical developments. Nonetheless, even these long-run growth
forces like technical progress and ongoing increases in general eXciency (for example improved
labour market dynamics) were assumed to also depend partly on the level of aggregate demand.
In particular, investment was regarded as an important way to incorporate technical progress
into the economy.
A third group of economists doubted that the pressure of demand has a strong and remark-
able inWuence on the rate of growth. These economists took the point of view that growth
depends particularly on technical progress and that the temporary eUects on output due to a
rise in the utilisation level of available resources needs to be distinguished from the long-run
growth of capacity. Also Phillips belonged to this group, even though he argued within the
framework of Keynesian growth models. Nevertheless, Phillips believed that the driving forces
of growth are research and education and not demand-induced investment. Empirical stud-
ies found only a small inWuence of the rate of unemployment or of the rate of inWation on
economic growth—at least as long as the variance of inWation remained low.
The contribution by Black [1959] tried to disentangle these diUerent views within the Phillips-
curve framework and focused on the optimal demand pressure in order to maximise the rate of
growth. The trade-oU between inWation, unemployment, and growth hence took centre stage.
This debate found its end in the late 1960s with the introduction of Friedman’s “natural rate
of unemployment” as the more the economy was regarded in the sense of Friedman [1968],
the less did a discussion of these issues make sense—as the choice between inWation and un-
employment vanished so did the thereby connected questions. Since then, monetary policy is
assumed to be neutral (also with regard to the rate of growth) as pointed out by Friedman
[1968: 11]. In the framework of Black [1959], this implied that now the economy was regarded
as in the classical case, built upon the assumption of elastic price expectations and low induced
investment (and without a structural conWict between inWation and unemployment).
However, some modern theoretical approaches, like evolutionary theory based on the as-
sumption of endogenous and path-dependent technical change, still point at the likely case of
an important role of the state of aggregate demand and the long-run consequences of mon-
etary and Vscal policies. Factors like capacity utilisation, the level of unemployment, and the
rate of inWation in such a framework can still cause long-run impacts in the economy [Lipsey
and Scarth, 2011: xxxU.]. On these grounds Lipsey [2010, 167U.] suggested that the concept of a
unique natural rate of unemployment should be replaced by a non-accelerating inWation band
of unemployment (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: The Non-Accelerating InWation Band of Unemployment.
Source: Lipsey [2010: 168]. Redrawn. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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This implies that various combinations between inWation and unemployment can be possi-
ble since the system will not have a unique equilibrium (a natural rate of unemployment) any
more, as diUerent levels of unemployment can be compatible with the expected rate of inWation
(credibly Vxed by the central bank) around which the actual rate of inWation Wuctuates. There-
fore, the economy may end up, depending on the overall environment including endogenous
technical change and economic policy, in the range of the ellipse E but also F, both solutions
being compatible with an expected rate of the credible inWation target of the central bank (here:
2 per cent).7
In such a framework, some arguments of the debate in the 1960s, for example under which
circumstances—in this discussion high demand as in the ellipse E or strong competitive pressure
as in F—technical progress will be incorporated faster into the economy are probably worth to
be considered even today.
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5 Discussion
As has been shown in the three papers replicated in the Chapters 2 to 4, the Phillips curve was
usually not understood as oUering the opportunity of pushing the economy away from full
employment towards overemployment by means of inWation as the quote by Meltzer in the
general introduction (Section 1.1) suggested, but as a policy dilemma of choosing between the
mutually conWicting goals of price stability and full employment.1 The following discussion will
focus on this important detail, while also highlighting other notable results of my research. It
will be argued that the main issue evolved around the perceived incompatibility between price
stability and full employment, which particularly emerged due to a non-linear Phillips curve
and cost-push forces such as bottlenecks or strong unions. Furthermore, making use of the
trade-oU was recommended on the basis of (assumed) involuntary unemployment, for which
an increase in aggregate demand seemed to be the appropriate cure even though this kind of
policy implied a positive rate of inWation (Section 5.1 to 5.4).
In contrast to this “Keynesian” “dilemma view” in which the economy was trapped between
the long-run choice of full employment or price stability, Friedman argued that such a long-run
trade-oU between inWation and unemployment does neither exist nor would it be necessary at
all, since price stability and full employment are not conWicting policy objectives (Section 5.5).
Hence, from his point of view, “Keynesians” aimed at an over-full employment target by
making use of surprise inWation. On the other hand, Friedman’s criticism was regarded as
inappropriate and in deny of the whole issue by “Keynesians”, since in their view Friedman
simply redeVned the full employment level as that level to be in line with price stability, so that
no conWict between the two policy objectives exists by deVnition.
Section 5.6 will illustrate these diUerent positions and will show that both lines of thought
essentially had the same notion of the concept of full employment, which, however, implied
diUerent inWationary outcomes for various reasons. Moreover, it will be argued that the “Key-
nesian” explanation of a long-run Phillips curve trade-oU did not rest on the assumption that
inWation expectations do not fully adjust due to irrational behaviour, but due to the necessity
of restoring market-clearing relative prices.
Furthermore, as will be shown in Section 5.7, Phelps’ approaches to the Phillips curve dilemma
are much closer in many respects to the “Keynesian” view, even though no long-run trade-oU
exists. Furthermore, modern New Keynesian models incorporating rational expectations and
optimising households point at a very similar “cruel dilemma” if the baseline model is extended
by comparable assumptions to those of the 1960s, such as diUerent degrees of price stickiness
within a multi-sector economy (Section 5.8).
1Also Keynes, late in his life, became more and more concerned with this possible incompatibility of both goals
(see Hagemann 1988: 208f.).
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5.1 Price Stability versus Full Employment
It became very clear in all three papers that many economists had a strong preference for
price stability, even if this implied that full employment cannot be attained at the same time.
Probably the best and most prominent example within the Phillips curve discussion is Phillips
himself. As has been shown in Section 2.5, Phillips did not make use of the curve to advocate
inWationary policies, but instead proposed a lower employment level in order to Vght inWation.
Thus, there was clearly a trade-oU interpretation of the curve prevalent as soon as Phillips
focused on questions of actual economic policy. Phillips’ contribution was also interpreted by
contemporary economists in this way as, for example, Bodkin et al. (1966: 39) remarked that
“Phillips pointed out the implications of the Vtted relationship for the issue of a possible conWict
between the objectives of full employment and price level stability.” But, as is also the case with
Samuelson and Solow (1960), this trade-oUwas not perceived as a tool-kit to steer the economy
towards any level of economic activity by creating unexpected inWation. To the contrary, the
Phillips curve as a quantitative assessment of a beforehand rather qualitative debate seemed to
reveal the unpleasant fact that the two policy goals of full employment and price stability are
mutually conWicting objectives. Since Phillips’ original curve for the United Kingdom remained
in eUect stable for nearly one hundred years, the incompatibility between the two policy goals
seemed to be very hard to overcome. On the other hand, especially Samuelson and Solow
were much more sceptical regarding the stability of the curve, since endogenous forces such
as hysteresis and even inWation expectations were discussed. Nonetheless, a trade-oU between
price stability and full employment still existed, since the outcome of a low-pressure or high-
pressure economy was not clear at all. While inWation expectations might worsen the trade-oU
in a high-pressure economy, other dynamics on the labour market, such as an increase in the
mobility of labour, might work in the other direction. Thus, in some sense, the choice was not
regarded to be just important for the short run, but indeed was thought to have inWuences on
the long-run state of the economy.
This long-run eUect of the choice between a high and low demand-pressure economy was,
as has been shown in Chapter 4, an important policy issue in the 1960s in many contributions.
The Phillips curve thus was interpreted as not only showing a trade-oU between price stability
and full employment, but also indirectly between diUerent rates of economic growth. By tak-
ing the inWuence of the state of demand on the rate of growth into account, particularly the
“Keynesian” “cruel dilemma” became even crueller since price stability seemed to be neither
compatible with full employment nor with a high rate of economic growth.
Of course, Phillips as well as Samuelson and Solow and many other economists proposed
measures to shift the curve closer to the point of origin, but throughout most contributions
there was much scepticism or even pessimism regarding the possibility to achieve the compat-
ibility of full employment and price stability at the same time. However, as was also remarked
in Section 2.4, Phillips never gave a deVnition of full employment. Furthermore, as has been
shown in Subsection 1.3.4, the deVnition of full employment within the Phillips curve trade-oU
became subject to the policymaker’s or society’s preferences. This issue will be elaborated more
deeply in the next paragraphs.
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5.1.1 The DiXculty of DeVning “Full Employment”
Solow (1962: 2) very clearly stated the problem of arriving at a useful deVnition of full em-
ployment since in his view “[t]here is no simple and unambiguous measure of employment
which will tell us when it is ‘full’”.2 This issue arose since all diUerent types of unemployment
became in eUect endogenous to overall demand pressure: As has been shown in Subsection
1.3.2 the amount of frictional unemployment in Lipsey’s (1960) analysis depended negatively
on excess demand. Furthermore, the discussion of Lipsey’s (1965) contribution in Subsection
1.3.4 revealed that deVcient-demand and also structural unemployment became endogenous
concepts subject to the policymaker’s preferences. Modigliani (1986: 20) thus correctly stated
that the “acceptance of the Phillips Curve implied that the notion of a well deVned ‘full em-
ployment and associated «equilibrium unemployment»’ had to be abandoned.” Indeed, in the
same year as Friedman gave his Presidential Address, Tobin (1967: 102) stated that the concept
of full employment vanishes due to the Phillips curve trade-oU since “[w]e now think of a zone
of unemployment rates, each one associated with a certain rate of continuing inWation—the
less the unemployment the higher the rate of inWation.”3
A complementary example to Lipsey’s view, that preferences regarding unemployment and
the associated costs of removing it deVne the full employment level, is to be found in the study
by Klein and Bodkin (1964: 377) since they remarked that “[w]hether employment is high or
not is a question that cannot be answered deVnitely and in isolation. A certain degree of unem-
ployment measured, for example, as a percentage of labor force unemployed may be relatively
high for one type of economy and relatively low for another. The concepts of normal unem-
ployment, frictional unemployment, reasonably full employment, and related ideas must be
deVned in terms of an entire economic and social setting.” In this sense, full employment was
not an objective target but subject to society’s preferences. Klein and Bodkin (1964: 378) hence
pointed out that “[n]ational political tolerance of high unemployment is probably much lower
in Britain than in the United States.” Gordon (1965: 28, 43U.), for example, reported that ac-
tual values for the unemployment rate considered to be full employment between 1946 to 1962
were lower in Europe (2-3 per cent) than in the US (4 per cent) and that in general full em-
ployment was widely regarded as being more important than price stability with the exception
of Germany. Bowen (1965: 21) thus noted, while referring to the Phillips curve and the rather
high unemployment rate of 5 per cent in 1964 in the USA compared to other countries, that
“[w]hatever the reasons, it appears that the United States has in eUect ‘purchased’ a relatively
stable price level by tolerating a relatively high level of unemployment.”
In the same vein, Okun (1962: 1), in his well-known “Okun’s law” contribution, emphasised
that potential output as well as full employment are not objectively deVned, but are to be
understood as part of the Phillips curve trade-oU:
Potential GNP is a supply concept, a measure of productive capacity. But it is
not a measure of how much output could be generated by unlimited amounts of
aggregate demand. The nation would probably be most productive in the short-run
2See Rees (1957: 16U.) for a contemporary, but pre-Phillips curve, overview of diUerent deVnitions of full em-
ployment.
3A very close idea is expressed in Solow (1962: 3) and also in Tobin (1995b: 36).
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with inWationary pressure pushing the economy. But the social target of maximum
production and employment is constrained by a social desire for price stability
and free markets. The full employment goal must be understood as striving for
maximum production without inWationary pressure; or, more precisely, as aiming
for a point of balance between more output and greater stability, with appropriate
regard for the social valuation of these two objectives.
Thus, the deVnition of full employment as that level of unemployment which leads to price
stability, as for example proposed by Ohlin (1949: 5), came under attack since it was not certain
that “reasonably low levels of unemployment” (Rees 1957: 40) would be achieved.4 Johnson
(1963: 63) thus doubted the practical relevance of such a deVnition of full employment and
took side for the trade-oU view:
Given the existence of the Phil[l]ips curve (or at least of a relationship of some
kind between unemployment percentage and rate of wage increase), and the em-
pirical tradeoU between price stability and unemployment, it is of course always
possible to deVne full employment as that level of unemployment which is consis-
tent with price stability, and so to conclude that full employment and price stability
are not at all inconsistent. But there is nothing sacred or commandingly desirable
about the percentage of unemployment at which prices are stable, unless one starts
from the postulate that price stability has crash priority over other objectives [...].
In sum, full employment within the Phillips curve discussion was not clearly deVned. However,
contemporary estimates of the unemployment rate in line with some notion of full employment
implied that full employment and price stability are conWicting policy objectives. An analysis
of the inWationary consequences of these estimates of full employment will shed light on the
magnitude of the perceived policy dilemma.
5.1.2 The InWationary Consequences of Full Employment
Probably one of the most inWuential and prominent examples of a contemporary full employ-
ment objective in the 1960s is that of the Council of Economic Advisers (1962: 46) who stated
that “[i]n the existing economic circumstances, an unemployment rate of about 4 percent is a
reasonable and prudent full employment target for stabilization policy. If we move Vrmly to
reduce the impact of structural unemployment, we will be able to move the unemployment
target steadily from 4 percent to successively lower rates.”5 The Report was described by Solow
(1995: 195) as “a fair example of what people like me believed in 1961” which also included
to push the economy out of “operating with excess supply, involuntary unemployment, and
underutilized capacity.” This goal was also defended by Tobin (1995a: 134f.) as an estimate of
4Tobin (1983: 28) thus correctly remarked that “[w]hat Keynesians of that day were not prepared to do was to
identify as full employment equilibrium the point of price or inWation stability on the Phillips curve”.
5Laidler (1997: 95, n. 13) noted about the vagueness of this goal that “Arthur Okun was a member of the Council
staU during 1961, and a consultant thereafter for several years. The 4 per cent unemployment target was,
according to Ronald Bodkin, Okun’s colleague at Yale from 1962 until 1965, an informal assessment of what
might be possible, rather than the outcome of any systematic empirical study of the matter.”
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the “natural rate of unemployment” at that time. Furthermore, he also pointed at the misinter-
pretation that “Keynesian” economic policies were based on the creation of inWation:
Our central macroeconomic objective was to lower unemployment, 7 percent
in January 1961, to 4 percent, our tentative estimate of the inWation-safe unem-
ployment rate. [...] Critics looking back on the 1960s accuse the Kennedy-Johnson
economists of naïve belief in a Phillips trade-oU and of policies explicitly designed
to purchase lower unemployment with higher inWation. The criticism is not justi-
Ved. The council did not propose to push unemployment below what came to be
known as the “natural rate.”
Such a view that “Keynesian” employment policies were based on the creation of inWation is to
be found in Lucas and Sargent (1978: 56), who pointed at the “deliberate” inWationary character
of economic policy in “Keynesian” models:
A key element in all Keynesian models is a “tradeoU” between inWation and
real output: the higher is the inWation rate, the higher is output (or equivalently,
the lower is the rate of unemployment). For example, the models of the late 1960s
predicted a sustained unemployment rate in the United States of 4 percent as con-
sistent with a 4 percent annual rate of inWation. Many economists at that time
urged a deliberate policy of inWation on the basis of this prediction.
However, as will be more deeply elaborated in Section 5.4 and 5.6, inWation was regarded as
an unwelcome by-product of a full-employment policy. For example, also after Friedman’s
Presidential Address, Tobin and Ross (1971: 23) were convinced that the 4 per cent target was
an appropriate full employment estimate, even though it can only come about by accepting
some inWation:
One of the most dismal and best veriVed observations of modern economics is
that there is ordinarily a trade-oU between the rate of inWation and the rate of un-
employment. Less of one means more of the other. Hence, full employment (which
means an unemployment rate between 31/2 and 41/2 percent) can, on the average,
be sustained only with 4 to 5 percent inWation. Price stability ([...] meaning annual
inWation of no more than 1 to 2 percent) is possible only with more than 5 percent
unemployment.
Another full employment target, as was argued in Section 3.3, was the 3 per cent unemployment
rate discussed by Samuelson and Solow (1960), which also was inWationary since it implied a
rate of inWation of 4 to 5 per cent.6 Also other contemporary economists regarded such an un-
employment rate to be in line with full employment: For example, Bodkin (1966: 279) explicitly
suggested to take an unemployment rate of 3 per cent “as the ‘frictional’ level of unemploy-
ment and interpret this to be the ‘full employment’ level of the unemployment rate”. This goal
was without doubt inWuenced by Samuelson and Solow (1960), since in Bodkin et al. (1966: 46)
Samuelson’s and Solow’s 3 per cent goal is interpreted as a “[a] full-employment policy”. Klein
6Samuelson’s and Solow’s estimates were later reVned by Perry (1964, 1966), though the order of magnitude and
the interpretation regarding the incompatibility of both goals remained.
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and Bodkin (1964: 378) arrived at a similar estimate of full employment being “representative of
purely frictional unemployment”. Also Scitovsky and Scitovsky (1964: 433) concluded that “we
get approximately 3 percent of the labor force as an estimate of the short-time and irreducible
unemployment in a dynamic economy–an economy whose composition is ever changing, in
which labor is mobile, and people move in and out of the labor force.” Scitovsky and Scitovsky
(1964: 429) thus remarked about Samuelson and Solow (1960) and their estimate of the inWation-
ary eUects of an unemployment rate of 3 per cent that “a 5 percent annual price rise would be
the cost of full employment”. Hence, the 3 per cent unemployment rate considered by Samuel-
son and Solow (1960) was interpreted by contemporary economists as a reasonable guess of the
full employment level despite the fact that it implied a positive rate of inWation.
A comparison of Samuelson’s and Solow’s results with contemporary opinions of economists
about the employment and inWation objective in the next section will reveal some interesting
insights about the perceived conWict before the discussion became framed within the Phillips
curve trade-oU.
5.1.3 Samuelson and Solow and the Perceived Policy Dilemma
The Joint Economic Committee (1958a) published the results of a survey conducted among
“economic experts at colleges and universities” about the perceived conWict between the em-
ployment objective and price stability. The survey was conducted in 1958 from 10 September
until the end of October. Since the famous Phillips curve article was published in November
1958 the results are not inWuenced by Phillips’ or Samuelson’s and Solow’s Vndings.
Table 5.1 shows that the greater fraction7 of economists thought that the goals of “relatively
high employment and relatively high stability of the general price level” are compatible in the
short run and even more regarded them to be compatible in the long run.
Table 5.1: Opinions About the Compatibility of “Relatively High Employment and
Relatively High Stability of the General Price Level”.
Source: Joint Economic Committee (1958a: 3). Own calculations.
Compatible Not Compatible
Short Run 62.4% 37.6%
Long Run 74.9% 25.1%
An interesting detail to note is that no question was asked with respect to the deVnition of
“relatively high employment” (as in Table 5.1) or “maximum employment” (as in Table 5.2). This
suggests, in line with the other following questions, that the employment target was understood
as being part of a trade-oU, particularly with respect to the goal of price stability (as in Table
5.3).
7The Joint Economic Committee (1958a) published the shares of each fraction in per cent including non-
responders. The following values thus were recalculated on the sole basis of responders.
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Table 5.2: Opinions About Which Goal Should Be Favoured If Both Goals Are Not Fully
Compatible Policy Objectives.
Source: Joint Economic Committee (1958a: 4). Own calculations.
Goal to Be Favoured Percentage
Maximum Employment 74.4%
Price Stability 25.6%
For those who considered both goals to be mutually conWicting,8 the majority clearly favoured
the achievement of the employment goal as indicated in Table 5.2.
On the other hand, those who held the view that both goals can be achieved simultaneously
(as in Table 5.1) were also asked to indicate which level of unemployment they were ready to
accept for achieving price stability. As can be seen in Table 5.3, the opinions about which level
of unemployment was acceptable in order to achieve price stability diUered considerably. For
example, Samuelson’s and Solow’s (1960) estimate that 5 to 6 per cent of unemployment might
be needed to achieve price stability would have seemed acceptable to approximately 60 per
cent.9 On the other hand, this result also implies that for roughly 40 per cent the Samuelson
and Solow Phillips curve for the US would have been interpreted as a “cruel dilemma”, since
price stability could have been only achieved by unacceptably high rates of unemployment.
Table 5.3: Opinions About the Maximum Level of Unemployment Acceptable “for
Achieving a High Degree of Price Stability”.
Source: Joint Economic Committee (1958a: 3). Own calculations.
Maximum Level of Unemployment
Acceptable “for Achieving a High Degree
of Price Stability”
Percentage
Under 3 percent 3.9%
3 percent and under 4 percent 16.6%
4 percent and under 5 percent 19.8%
5 percent and under 6 percent 32.5%
6 percent and under 7 percent 13.1%
7 percent and under 8 percent 4.5%
8 percent and under 10 percent 4.9%
10 percent 4.1%
11 percent through 20 percent 0.6%
8That is, all economists, who answered with “not compatible” in Table 5.1. However, from the data provided by
the Joint Economic Committee (1958a), it seems that many also answered to this question even though they
answered with “compatible” in Table 5.1.
9That is, all economists in Table 5.3 from “5 percent and under 6 percent” to “11 percent through 20 percent”.
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Due to the fact that a not so small fraction of economists (14.1 per cent)10 indicated that
they were willing to accept rather high unemployment rates even above 7 per cent, Miernyk
(1960: 521) pointed at the problem of an “erosion in the concept of ‘full employment’ in this
country” about which Kaufman (1960: 173) remarked that “[f]ull employment is being sacriVced
at the altar of price stability.” These views further strengthen the argument that the deVnition
of full employment became subject to individual preferences regarding the two policy goals of
full employment and price stability, even though some were critically arguing that the concept
of full employment allows “no ‘buying-oU’ to solve a goal conWict” (Meidner 1969: 164).
From a diUerent perspective, the estimate of Samuelson and Solow (1960) that full employ-
ment, that is, 3 per cent of unemployment, would be accompanied by 4 to 5 per cent of inWation
was clearly not in line with the deVnition of price stability as indicated in Table 5.4.11 Only 16.1
per cent of economists12 would have regarded such a high rate of inWation to match their deV-
nition of price stability. Hence, from this perspective the contribution by Samuelson and Solow
(1960) must have disappointed the beforehand rather optimistic view of many economists that
both goals are indeed compatible.
Table 5.4: Opinions About the Rate of InWation Considered to Be in Line With a
“Satisfactorily ‘High Degree of Price Stability’”.
Source: Joint Economic Committee (1958a: 3). Own calculations.
Rate of InWation Considered to Be in Line
With a “Satisfactorily ‘High Degree of
Price Stability’”
Percentage
Under 1 percent 9.5%
1 percent and under 2 percent 29.9%
2 percent and under 3 percent 27.0%
3 percent 17.5%
4 percent 4.4%
5 percent 7.3%
6 percent through 10 percent 4.4%
The reasons for this possible incompatibility between the two policy objectives were lively
discussed within the debate on whether inWation was mainly driven by cost-push or demand-
pull forces. This debate will be reviewed in the following section.
10That is, all economists in Table 5.3 from “7 percent and under 8 percent” to “11 percent through 20 percent”.
11See also Robinson (1959: 452) summarising the very similar views about the maximum rate of inWation in line
with price stability as discussed in Joint Economic Committee (1958b).
12That is, all economists in Table 5.4 from “4 percent” to “6 percent through 10 percent”.
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5.2 The Cost-Push Demand-Pull Debate
The cost-push demand-pull debate was in focus within the discussion of the Samuelson and
Solow paper in Section 3.2. A further and deeper analysis of the diUerent lines of thought is
conducted in Schwarzer (2015d). Many economists worried that full employment and stable
prices seemed to be incompatible from the outset, that is, without severe interventions into the
market economy (for example, by imposing wage and price controls) or without implement-
ing profound structural measures (such as increasing labour mobility). InWation in this line of
thought hence was not the outcome of a too high level of aggregate demand, but emerged de-
spite non-frictional unemployment due to various market imperfections and thus was called
“premature inWation” (Solow 1966a: 42).13 Solow (1966a: 42) hence noted that “[t]his tendency
creates a dilemma for public policy.” In this view, the economy was prone to an inWationary
bias at full employment, so that both objectives of full employment and price stability seemed
to be mutually conWicting.
As has been shown in Section 2.4, this “cruel dilemma” was also very prevalent in Phillips’
own writings. The whole trade-oU discussion in his work is framed within this pessimistic
view. The aggressive bargaining behaviour of unions was regarded as one of the main reasons
(besides the important role of cyclical and sectoral Wuctuations as discussed in Subsection 1.3.3)
for this incompatibility of both goals.
On the other hand, as has been pointed out in Section 3.4, particularly Friedman took the
point of view that unions and market power in general cannot explain inWation without excess
demand, since only a rise in market power can be inWationary. Temporary cost-push pressures
on the way to full employment thus might be reasonable, but once the optimal wage is set
full employment can be achieved without endangering price stability. For Friedman hence no
“cruel dilemma” exists. Therefore, no steps to solve the dilemma (for example, guideposts) are
necessary. Since inWation in Friedman’s reasoning can only come about by a too high increase
of the money supply, only the concept of pure demand-pull inWation is accepted.
As is shown in Schwarzer (2015d), Friedman’s arguments were interpreted by the adherents
of the dilemma view as falling back into the L-shaped supply curve framework and thus as
being of no help with respect to the perceived policy dilemma (see also Section 5.4). Indeed,
it was fully recognised and acknowledged that inWation ultimately can only come about by
an increase in the money supply (or by a higher velocity). However, the starting point of this
increase in the money supply was not regarded to be due to the deliberate attempt of the mon-
etary authority to achieve some excess demand and thus a rise in the activity level above full
employment, but due to strong unions pushing up wages and prices, which, if not accommo-
dated, would result in severe unemployment. Even though this problem was also noted by
13Also Keynes (1936: 301) remarked: “That the wage-unit may tend to rise before full employment has been
reached, requires little comment or explanation. Since each group of workers will gain, cet. par., by a rise in
its own wages, there is naturally for all groups a pressure in this direction, which entrepreneurs will be more
ready to meet when they are doing better business. For this reason a proportion of any increase in eUective
demand is likely to be absorbed in satisfying the upward tendency of the wage-unit.” Kalecki (1943: 326) thus
argued “that unemployment is an integral part of the ‘normal’ capitalist system” in order to achieve price
stability (among other goals).
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Friedman (1963: 39 and 1966b: 31), it was not interpreted as an issue of much importance, since
unions would not have the inherent tendency to press for ever higher undue wage increases.
Thus, even though Friedman’s “natural rate of unemployment” is inWuenced by cost-push
factors such as market power and other market imperfections, these market imperfections only
determine the level of wages (and thus the level of employment), but do not, as in the dilemma
view, have an ongoing eUect on the rate of change of wages.14 Cost-push forces such as strong
unions thus are responsible for a higher level of real wages and therefore for a higher “natural
rate” compared to a fully competitive labour market. However, at this “natural rate” there is no
ongoing inWationary pressure for higher wages. As is argued in Schwarzer (2015d), Friedman’s
concept of the “natural rate of unemployment” can be regarded as an elegant way to avoid the
dilemma problem by redeVning the full employment level and by arguing within a diUerent
framework of the inWationary process which by assumption excludes any cost-push forces of
inWation. In this view, for Friedman the “natural rate of unemployment” and the unemployment
rate in line with price stability both coincide with the full employment level (assuming inWation
expectations to be zero). Thus, simply by deVnition there is no dilemma any more and the only
kind of inWation that can emerge at the full employment level is that of demand inWation. This
sort of inWation, however, can easily be cured by restrictive monetary policy.
But does this kind of reasoning imply that “Keynesians” aimed at over-full instead of full
employment? At least from Friedman’s statements this seems to be the implicit and explicit
accusation: As pointed out in the conclusion of Chapter 3, the unemployment rate considered
by Samuelson and Solow to be more or less in in line with full employment (3 per cent) is
interpreted by Friedman as being lower than the “natural rate of unemployment”. This, of
course, might be just coincidence, but Friedman (1966a: 60) also explicitly accused Solow that
“he wants to cut out these price rises [due to aggressive unions] in order to be able to maintain a
higher level of aggregate demand than would otherwise be consistent with price stability”, that
is, as is made clear in the next sentences, the “natural rate of unemployment”. In this respect,
the “Keynesian” notion of full employment was interpreted by Friedman to be lower than the
“natural rate of unemployment”. Hence, in Friedman’s view, a policy which tries to peg the
“Keynesian” unemployment rate regarded to be in line with full employment is “committed
to a path of perpetual inWation at an ever-increasing rate” (Friedman 1966a: 60f.). Thus, from
Friedman’s perspective the “Keynesian” approach aimed at achieving over-full employment by
means of aggregate demand management while keeping inWation in check by incomes policies.
But Solow (1966a: 41f.) and other adherents of the dilemma view framed the issue diUer-
ently by remarking that “[t]he problem is that modern mixed capitalist economies tend to
generate unacceptably fast increases in money wages and prices while there is not general ex-
cess demand.” Furthermore, Solow (1966b: 64) remarked that not strong unions are necessarily
responsible for the dilemma by emphasising that “I am not resting my case on a theory of cost-
push inWation. [...] The case it seems to me rests only on the degree of tightness in the economy
at which the price level begins to rise unacceptably rapidly.” In this view, the issue at hand
was that there is inWationary pressure at full employment or even despite underemployment.
From this perspective, Friedman’s criticism was interpreted as denying the whole issue. By re-
deVning the full employment level as that level of unemployment in line with price stability,
14This important point was brought to my attention by Solow in a letter of August 2013.
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the dilemma to choose between price stability and full employment disappeared. Friedman’s
approach thus was regarded as shifting the full employment level to the right within a Phillips
curve framework.
However, before these two diUerent perspectives can be reconciled (Section 5.6), two impor-
tant issues regarding the Phillips curve debate in the 1960s are to be analysed and discussed:
The important role of involuntary unemployment (Section 5.3) and the non-linearity of the
Phillips curve (Section 5.4), which can give rise to an inWationary bias at full employment
(and in the “Keynesian” view also at the “natural rate of unemployment”), even if, as in Tobin
(1972b: 14), strong unions are not regarded as the main source of ongoing inWation.
5.3 The Role of Involuntary Unemployment
When a trade-oU between unemployment and inWation was discussed, it was not assumed that
the economy had already settled at full employment so that the trade-oU would have to be
regarded as one between reducing voluntary unemployment at the cost of inWation. Particu-
larly within the cost-push demand-pull debate the amount of unemployment in line with price
stability was assumed to consist not only of frictional unemployment, since otherwise no such
dilemma would have emerged.
Thus, in the “Keynesian” Phillips curve analysis price stability did not automatically im-
ply full employment, but was also compatible with involuntary15 unemployment—“an individ-
ual and social evil” (Council of Economic Advisers 1962: 44). Full employment in this line of
thought thus was not just deVned as that level of unemployment at which prices would be
stable—a point of view, for example, taken by Lucas (1978: 355):
As recently as the 1960’s it was widely believed that there was some level of
aggregate unemployment with the property that when unemployment exceeded
this rate, expansionary monetary and Vscal measures would be noninWationary,
while at rates below this critical level they would lead to inWation. One could then
identify unemployment rates at or below this full-employment level as frictional
or voluntary, and unemployment in excess of this level as involuntary.
Probably the best example of the role of involuntary unemployment within the Phillips curve
discussion can be found in the contribution by Reuber (1962) as is outlined in Schwarzer
(2015a). Reuber for the Vrst time calculated the costs and beneVts of diUerent positions on the
Phillips curve by focusing on the Canadian economy. His trade-oU model thus is exactly that
kind of approach criticised by Phelps and Friedman and there clearly is no other possible in-
terpretation than that of a stable trade-oU between inWation and unemployment. Furthermore,
Reuber is indeed proposing to reduce unemployment by nearly 5 percentage points (from the
prevailing unemployment rate in Canada of 7.2 to 2.25 per cent) at the cost of accepting an
15Notably, well-known economists before Keynes (1936: 15f.), that is, particularly Cassel and Wicksell, also fo-
cused on the issue of involuntary unemployment (see Boianovsky and Trautwein 2003). However, involuntary
unemployment due to a lack of demand in these theories is more connected to disequilibrium phenomena
during business cycles than to Keynes’ notion of involuntary unemployment at macroeconomic equilibrium
(see Boianovsky and Trautwein 2003: 428f.).
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inWation rate of 3.75 per cent instead of price stability (which would require an unemployment
rate of 5 per cent). Thus, Reuber’s contribution seems to be “exhibit A” for proposing an in-
Wationary policy in order to reduce unemployment beyond that level compatible with price
stability.
However, his contribution is very explicit about the kind of unemployment which should
be removed by the Phillips curve trade-oU: For Reuber (1962: 35), full employment is achieved
when the “owners of productive services, including labour services, succeed in voluntarily sell-
ing as much of these inputs as they want at the prevailing market price” and if “all members
of the population able and willing to work at the going wage rate can Vnd a job” (Reuber
1962: 87). This deVnition of full employment clearly points at the absence of involuntary un-
employment.16 Hence, with respect to the policy choice between inWation and unemployment,
this distinction between both types of unemployment becomes crucial as remarked by Reuber
(1962: 35):
Involuntary unemployment occurs to the extent that inputs being voluntarily
oUered at the prevailing price are not being purchased. The return from idleness to
such factors is presumably less than the return from employment; otherwise they
would not be oUered on the market. Accordingly the eXciency of the economy will
be improved if this involuntary unemployment is eliminated. This is in contrast to
voluntary unemployment where the gains from idleness apparently outweigh the
returns of employment at the prevailing price; consequently the eXciency of the
economy would not be enhanced by forcibly reducing this type of unemployment.
From this it follows that reducing voluntary unemployment in Reuber’s study is not on the
agenda since the removal of voluntary unemployment by accepting inWation would only cause
a net loss in sum.17
Thus, it is involuntary unemployment which should be removed by expansionary economic
policy, since Reuber (1962: 151) also emphasised with respect to the contemporary economic sit-
uation in Canada that “[h]eavy unemployment is caused by an inadequate demand for labour.”
Of course, before proposing such an increase in aggregate demand, Reuber also investigated
whether the high unemployment rate in Canada was not caused by other factors than a de-
Vciency of demand. Indeed, clearly separating deVcient-demand involuntary from structural
unemployment might be diXcult as also noted by Reuber (1962: 81). However, due to the his-
torically high rate of Canadian unemployment, even though it was accompanied by a strong
growth of the labour force, Reuber (1962: 49) emphasised that growth of demand did not equally
expand so that Reuber (1962: 55) chose to speak of “excess unemployment” and “high involun-
tary unemployment” (Reuber 1962: 219).
Furthermore, Reuber (1962: 267) emphasised that unemployment, contrary to inWation, is a
macroeconomic concern which must be dealt with by aggregate demand policies, since individ-
16Lucas (1978: 355), not surprisingly, rejects the concept of involuntary unemployment. Indeed, for example, in
Lucas and Rapping (1969b: 748) non-frictional unemployment is fully voluntary. See De Vroey (2004) for a
further discussion.
17The assumption of involuntary unemployment as the main reason for proposing a reduction of unemploy-
ment within the Phillips curve discussion was also later defended by various authors. See, for example, Rees
(1970b: 238, n. 1).
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ual action will not be suXcient if aggregate demand is lacking, while inWation can be regarded
as an issue with which each individual can successfully deal with on its own:
The population itself by anticipating price inWation can eliminate most of the
distributive eUects of unanticipated price changes; and, indeed, during periods of
steadily rising prices in the past has done so to a signiVcant degree. There appears
to be much less scope for the population by its own devices to cope with the
distributive eUects of unemployment, be it anticipated or not.
In this sense, involuntary unemployment has to be regarded as one important feature of the
trade-oU discussion, since this kind of unemployment can and should be cured by aggregate
demand management. Indeed, no one other than Solow (1962: 4) also stated regarding unem-
ployment in the USA “that the truth lies with the inadequate-demand school”,18 so that “[a]n
expansion of aggregate demand is certainly necessary and very likely suXcient to reduce the
unemployment rate to 4 per cent of the labor force” (Solow 1962: 8), even if this implies some
inWation (see Solow 1962: 14).
On the other hand, for the line of thought following Friedman’s arguments “unemployment
was seen as a primarilymicroeconomic concern” (Dixon 1995: 70) and thus not as an objective of
macroeconomic policy as in Reuber’s analysis. In Friedman’s reasoning macroeconomic policy
to push the economy to full employment is superWuous as such a policy is neither necessary
nor appropriate (see Subsection 5.6.2.3).
As will be shown in the following discussion, the assumption of involuntary unemployment
remained an important element for arguing in favour of making use of a long-run trade-oU
between unemployment and inWation even after Friedman’s and Phelps’ contributions to the
trade-oU debate. Before the focus will shift to this issue, another important reason for the
assumption of a long-run trade-oU and the Phillips curve dilemma will be discussed in the next
section.
5.4 The Non-Linearity of the Phillips Curve
The issue of involuntary unemployment at price stability already gave rise to the Phillips curve
dilemma, which was further complicated by the assumption of and empirical evidence for a
non-linear Phillips curve. This non-linearity had important implications not only for the rate
of inWation at full employment, but also for the role of stabilisation policies and for the high
perceived costs of achieving price stability.
As pointed out in Chapter 2, Phillips himself stressed the non-linearity of the curve many
times. Besides being important for stability analysis (for example, Phillips 1961: 365U.; see Sec-
tion 2.5), the non-linearity also had important policy implications since a higher rate of wage
changes (or inWation) than predicted by the curve will be realised if the economy Wuctuates as
remarked by Phillips (1958b: 299):
18Also Viner (1963: 22), an economist certainly not renowned for following simple-minded “Keynesianism”, spoke
of involuntary unemployment regarding the US economy at the beginning of the 1960s.
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Because of the strong curvature of the Vtted relation in the region of low per-
centage unemployment, there will be a lower average rate of increase of wage rates
if unemployment is held constant at a given level than there will be if unemploy-
ment is allowed to Wuctuate about that level.
This issue was also noted by Samuelson and Solow (1960: 190). Thus, removing cyclical Wuctua-
tions by active stabilisation policies was one possibility to lessen the inWationary bias due to the
non-linearity of the curve (see also Hansen 1962: 337). In this respect, the notion of keeping un-
employment at a given level did not necessarily point at the usual trade-oU interpretation, but
Vrst of all at the beneVcial eUects of removing Wuctuations around that level (as also discussed
in Subsection 4.2.2).
However, not only cyclical Wuctuations but also demand Wuctuations among diUerent sectors
in the economy were discussed as another important reason for the perceived inWationary bias.
This mechanism was also emphasised by Phillips (1962: 12), whereas the main references for
this argument are Schultze (1959) and Lipsey (1960) as discussed in Subsection 1.3.3.19 Even
though Schultze (1959: 45) did not base his argument explicitly on a non-linear Phillips curve
(as in Lipsey 1960: 17U.), but in essence on the same grounds by assuming downwardly sticky
wages or prices, the eUect is similar: Since a shift of demand between sectors will cause a rise
of wages and prices in sectors receiving additional demand, while in those sectors which face
a reduction of demand prices do not fall equally strong, a rise in the general price level occurs
even without excess aggregate demand. From this it follows, in Schultze’s (1959: 134) words,
that “[c]reeping inWation is associated with the dynamics of resource allocation”, and therefore
the normal outcome of a growing and changing economy. Such a built-in inWationary bias,
however, implied a “conWict between high employment and stable prices” (Rees 1958: 654).
The whole Phillips curve discussion hence was embedded into a dynamic model or anal-
ysis and not restricted to a static labour-supply labour-demand framework as in Friedman’s
approach which was discussed in Subsection 1.3.2.
This dynamic view of the Phillips curve can be best explained by focusing on Lipsey’s con-
tributions once again: not only due to his role within the Phillips curve discussion, but also
since the following arguments were written down before Friedman’s attack on the curve, so
that they are not suspicious of being just an ex post justiVcation for a long-run trade-oU. Par-
ticularly in Lipsey’s textbook (1963; 1966)20 it becomes clear that, even without induced excess
demand because of a too expansionary economic policy, the economy may face temporary sec-
toral excess demand and inWation due to changing consumers’ preferences and bottlenecks in
the economy.
19Lipsey, during a personal conversation in Vancouver on 23 June 2013, remarked that he was not aware of
Schultze’s contribution at the time he wrote his 1960 piece. The role of separated labour markets, wage and
price rigidities, and the implications for the rate of inWation were widely discussed throughout the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s. See, for example, Rees (1950: 260), Clark (1951: 20), Hansen (1957: 78), Henderson (1962: 340f.), Dow
(1964: 360, n. 2), Olivera (1964: 323), Archibald (1969: 129), Thirlwall (1969: 66U.), Archibald (1970: 213f.), Rees
(1970b: 236), and Brechling (1973). For a further discussion see Forder (2014: 76U.).
20Even though the discussion focuses on the second edition of Lipsey’s textbook, very similar statements can be
found in the Vrst edition. For an analysis of the role of the Phillips curve in diUerent textbooks over time see
Forder (2015).
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As the starting point for his discussion, Lipsey (1966: 703) focuses on the L-shaped supply
curve (see Figure 5.1) and its favourable policy implications, since the L-shaped supply curve is
described as “[t]he relation between changes in the price level and the volume of employment
when there is no policy conWict between full employment [point f in Figure 5.1] and stable
prices.” For example, a constellation as given by point x, that is, a positive rate of inWation
despite a considerable amount of unemployed resources, is excluded in this approach.
Figure 5.1: Lipsey’s Textbook L-Shaped Supply Curve.
Source: Lipsey (1966: 703). Redrawn and amended. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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Lipsey (1966: 704), however, points out that this theory “has not stood up well to testing”, so
that a competing theory, the Phillips curve, is presented (see Figure 5.2).
The grey shaded area shows the relationship between employment and inWation. Lipsey
(1966: 704) remarks while describing the relation that “[t]he closer the economy is to full em-
ployment, the more likely it is that any change in demand will cause a price change and the
less likely it is that it will cause an employment change, but, no matter how high the level
of resource use is, it is always possible to expand the rate of production a little bit, so that a
rise in demand is always accompanied by some rise in output.” This description suggests the
usual trade-oU interpretation at Vrst. But Lipsey (1966: 704f., my italics) goes on noting that
“the economy does not suddenly move from a situation of underemployment of resources and
constant prices to a situation of full (constant) employment with varying prices; instead, the
economy moves by degrees from one to the other.” Hence, constant prices are related to un-
deremployment while full employment and price stability once again are depicted as being
mutually conWicting.
Also the original caption of Lipsey’s textbook Phillips curve explicitly points at this dilemma
as it is “[t]he relation between changes in the price level and the volume of employment when
there is a policy conWict between full employment and stable prices.” On the other hand, any
position on the curve other than price stability is interpreted as a disequilibrium in the economy
by Lipsey (1966: 705):
Situations such as the one shown by points e and g [in Figure 5.2] [...] repre-
sent disequilibrium positions: if the inWation does eventually eliminate the excess
demand, the level of resource utilisation will fall back to that compatible with a
stable price level [point h].
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Figure 5.2: Lipsey’s Textbook Phillips Curve.
Source: Lipsey (1966: 703). Redrawn and amended. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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At least at Vrst sight, this statement by pointing at excess demand interferes with the notion
that full employment should be an equilibrium and not a disequilibrium phenomenon. Fur-
thermore, Lipsey (1966: 705) argues that such a disequilibrium situation can be maintained by
economic policy:
This [inWation eliminating excess demand] does not aUect the fact that, if the
central authorities are prepared to take steps to allow the inWation to continue, they
can achieve a level of unemployment lower than that which would obtain if there
were no inWation. Also, the more rapid the rate of price inWation the authorities are
willing to take steps to maintain, the lower the rate of unemployment they need
to accept. Of course, to maintain a level of unemployment below h per cent, the
authorities must take steps to ensure a continuing disequilibrium with continuing
inWationary pressures in the economy.
This Phillips curve interpretation resembles the trade-oU view criticised in particular by Fried-
man (1968).
However, a deeper analysis shows that the relationship between inWation and unemployment
was thought to be far more complex and took place within a framework diUerent to that of
Friedman. Fortunately, Lipsey (1966: 717U.) indeed gave a detailed account of the model he
had in mind to explain this kind of relationship. In his view, the underlying dynamics in an
economy which can be best described by a relation as in Figure 5.2 emerge due to a slowly
adjusting economy subject to continuous shocks: Since movements of factors of production
are slow compared to changing demand patterns, bottlenecks are most likely to develop in
diUerent markets at diUerent points in time (this explanation is also used in Lipsey’s trade-oU
contribution of 1965: 245 which was discussed in Subsection 1.3.4). Thus, if aggregate demand
is increased in order to remove unemployment it will not be equally distributed among all
markets, so that some markets may still face excess supply while others are operating at their
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capacity limit.21 This unequal distribution of demand hence pushes up the aggregate price level
(as shown in Subsection 1.3.3) despite unemployment in the economy (Lipsey 1966: 718):22
As aggregate demand goes on increasing, excess demand will develop in some
market and price will begin to rise in that market. This will happen while there is
still excess supply in other markets. As aggregate demand goes on increasing, more
and more markets will begin to develop excess demand. In everyday language we
might say that bottlenecks and shortages begin to develop in some parts of the
economy. Eventually, prices will be rising in enough markets to oUset the eUects
of price reductions in other markets, so that the average level of prices will begin to
rise. As long as excess supply exists in any market, the level of resource utilisation
can be increased (i.e., the level of unemployment lowered) by raising aggregate
demand. But the more markets there are in which excess demand already exists,
the more any further rise in demand will serve merely to increase excess demands
in these markets (and so speed up the rate of inWation) and the less it will serve to
reduce excess supplies in other markets (and so increase the level of resource use).
Thus, the higher the level of aggregate demand, the greater the eUect on price and
the less the eUect on employment of yet further increases in demand.
Lipsey (1966: 718f.) points out that there are indeed deeper underlying reasons why excess
demand develops more rapidly in one market than in other markets. For Lipsey, the main
source is not to be found in a static short-run analysis but in the dynamics of economic change
(for example changes in consumers’ preferences) in a growing economy:
Should we be surprised by this [that some markets face excess supply while
others excess demand]? No, not as long as the economy is subject to the kinds
of changes that necessarily accompany economic growth. As productivity grows,
some supplies expand faster than other supplies, and as real incomes grow, some
demands expand faster than other demands. Except in the most unlikely of circum-
stances, we would expect these changes to bring about a reallocation of resources.
Since such changes do not happen instantaneously, we would expect some markets
to be exhibiting excess supplies while other markets exhibit excess demands.
21This is contrary to the argument surrounding the L-shaped supply curve: Here, the underlying assumption is
that all individual markets behave in the same way and demand is equally distributed between these markets
(see Lipsey 1966: 717f.). This implies that “the economy must be in equilibrium when the economy is at the
point of full employment without inWation indicated by f [in Figure 5.1]” (Lipsey 1966: 717).
22A very close concept is described in Keynes (1936: 300f.) as “semi-inWation”:
If there is a perfect balance in the respective quantities of specialised unemployed resources,
the point of full employment will be reached for all of them simultaneously. But, in general, the
demand for some services and commodities will reach a level beyond which their supply is, for
the time being, perfectly inelastic, whilst in other directions there is still a substantial surplus of
resources without employment. Thus as output increases, a series of “bottle-necks” will be succes-
sively reached, where the supply of particular commodities ceases to be elastic and their prices
have to rise to whatever level is necessary to divert demand into other directions.
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Hence, inWation in the aggregate is the outcome of necessary adjustments of relative prices
to reWect changes in the distribution of demand between sectors. Due to the non-linearity of
the Phillips curve in each sector, this inWation emerges as an unwelcome, but nevertheless
unavoidable, outcome of economic change as pointed out by Lipsey (1966: 719):
If the theory of price is correct, we do expect that prices will work as a mech-
anism to direct resources to where demand is greatest so that there is a continual
movement in the direction of equilibrium, but since the equilibrium values are
themselves always changing, we never expect equilibrium to exist simultaneously
in all markets. Thus we should not really be surprised that the empirical evidence
at the macro level refutes the idea of the L-shaped curve [...] [Figure 5.1] and sup-
ports the idea of the smooth curve shown [...] [Figure 5.2].
The Phillips curve in Lipsey’s textbook hence did not oUer a trade-oU between unemployment
and inWation in the sense that a policymaker can force a lower unemployment rate than a “natu-
ral rate”, that is, full employment, by accepting a deceptive acceleration of inWation. Rather, the
curve shows that full employment (macro-equilibrium) is not necessarily compatible with zero
inWation due to the various underlying inWationary forces of a growing and changing economy
(micro-disequilibria). In this sense, ongoing sectoral disequilibria and price adjustments at full
employment are the natural outcome of a dynamic economy.23 Interestingly, Lipsey (1978: 57)
remarked that also Phillips shared this kind of explanation:
In private conversation Phillips always stressed the fact that economic growth
would leave the economy in a perpetual state of disequilibriumwhich, because dis-
turbances were continually occurring, would leave individual markets chasing a
moving target that they never reached. For this reason he saw markets in microdis-
equilibrium, even when the economy was in some sense in macroequilibrium.
This, rather than the behaviour of a labour search model, was to him the most im-
portant explanation of why the ceiling level of output was only asymp[t]otically
approached, as with the Phillips curve, rather than being a constraint that sud-
denly bound absolutely, as in the dichotomized version of the model [L-shaped
supply curve].
Lipsey (1966: 842), however, emphasised that a deeper analysis of this conWict and a search for
possible solutions is indeed necessary as “the policy conWict between inWation and unemploy-
ment is one of the most serious problems of macroeconomic policy.” Hence, Lipsey (1966: 851)
pointed out that “[u]ntil successful policies for reducing or eliminating the conWict have been
23This explanation of a trade-oU was also included in the Vrst US edition of Lipsey’s textbook (Lipsey and Steiner
1966: 717U.). However, the trade-oU is more pronounced in the second edition as Lipsey and Steiner (1969: 773)
speak of a “trade-oU between full employment and stable prices”. Bottlenecks and structural changes are still
regarded as the main source of inWationary pressure on the way to full employment (see Lipsey and Steiner
1969: 771). Hence, the Phillips curve shows a trade-oU as “[i]t is clear that price rises occur well before full-
employment levels are reached” (Lipsey and Steiner 1969: 773). The chapter on this trade-oU interpretation of
the Phillips curve was also included in the third edition of his UK textbook (Lipsey 1971: 709U.), even though
it was written in 1970 and hence considerably after Friedman (1968). In the fourth edition (Lipsey 1975: 803U.),
Friedman’s critique is Vnally addressed.
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designed, it is necessary to choose between the two competing policy objectives. How much
inWation is it worth having in order to gain a further reduction in unemployment?” This choice,
however, depends on individual preferences and hence “the Vnal choice of how we value these
two goals relative to each other becomes a political one.” Even though it is a political choice,
Lipsey (1966: 857f.) is in favour of a full-employment policy since “we cannot argue about the
advantages and disadvantages in the case of full-employment policy since the only alternative
to having a full-employment policy administered by the government is to let unemployment
settle at whatever level the private market determines. The evidence of history is that this will
mean accepting quite high rates quite often.”
As has been shown, Lipsey throughout his contributions indeed presented the Phillips curve
as oUering a long-run trade-oU between inWation and unemployment. Without doubt at least a
conWict between full employment and price stability is clearly stated. But there is no trade-oU
in Friedman’s sense, which builds upon unexpected inWation as an instrument to reduce unem-
ployment in the short run. Lipsey’s approach rather describes the dynamic adjustment mech-
anisms in a growing and changing economy. InWation hence is a by-product of an economy
moving towards its full employment level, reaching bottlenecks at any stage of this process.
Furthermore, even at full employment demand patterns are constantly changing and sector-
speciVc shocks occur. Since the necessary adjustments on the supply side take time and as rela-
tive price changes rely on the upward movement of prices due to nominal downward rigidities,
ongoing inWation at full employment is the outcome to be expected.
In Lipsey’s own words (1966: 850f.), the conWict between both policy goals emerges as “[o]ne
reason why inWation sets in before full employment is reached is that in a growing, changing
economy, the pattern of consumers’ demand is constantly changing, and with it also the pat-
tern of derived demand for factors.” Hence, if the adjustment on and between markets were
instantaneous, the reason for this conWict would vanish. But, as Lipsey (1966: 851) goes on
“[s]uch re-allocations of resources take time and often entail the retraining of labour and its
movement from one geographical area to another. [...] Thus, if aggregate demand expands,
shortages and bottlenecks and consequent inWationary pressure will develop, even though there
are unemployed resources. If movement of these resources could be speeded up considerably,
then bottlenecks and shortages would be less likely to occur in expanding areas until over-all
unemployment were at a very low level.”24
Lipsey’s trade-oU interpretation of the Phillips curve hence should be regarded as the ex-
pression of a conWict between full employment and price stability. Whereas the conventional
wisdom (as in Meltzer’s quote in Section 1.1) regarding the trade-oU implies an optimistic
notion about using the tools of aggregate demand management to arrive at a desired unem-
ployment rate at the cost of or even by the means of high(er) inWation, Lipsey’s assessment of
the trade-oU view is a rather pessimistic one: Due to various reasons, and be it only the limited
speed of sectoral labour movements, an ever changing economy cannot attain full employment
without inWation.
24Brechling (1973: 360), however, noted that dispersion among sectors persisted “over considerable periods of
time” in the USA as well as in the UK (see also Brechling 1967). In this respect, Thomas and Stoney (1971: 97U.)
came to the conclusion that the average annual wage change in the UK for the years from 1950 to 1966 had
been higher by 2 percentage points due to such unemployment dispersion.
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This assessment of Lipsey’s work is reinforced by Lipsey’s reaction to the Phelps-Friedman
critique in the fourth edition of his textbook (Lipsey 1975). Friedman’s and Phelps’ explanation
of the inWation of the 1970s in Lipsey’s (1975: 804) view is based on an “orthodox demand-
pull theory” extended by inWation expectations. Due to this assumption of pure demand-pull
inWation, all other sources of inWation in a growing and changing economy which are the
driving forces of Lipsey’s interpretation of the conWict between full employment and price
stability are ignored by Phelps and Friedman. Therefore, in Lipsey’s (1975: 803) view, Friedman
and Phelps do not argue within the Phillips curve framework, but instead propose “[a] revival
of the L-shaped relation” by modifying the conWict-free L-shaped supply curve as they add a
“natural rate of unemployment” to this concept. In his textbook, this Vgure (see Figure 5.3) is
titled accordingly as “[t]he new theory of the L-shaped relation with a non-zero natural rate of
unemployment (UN)” (Lipsey 1975: 804).
Figure 5.3: The “Natural Rate” as an L-Shaped Supply Curve Concept.
Source: Lipsey (1975: 804). Redrawn and amended. See Chapter “Copyright and Permissions” for further information.
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The “natural rate” in this diagram just replaces the one hundred per cent mark at the kink
as the maximal attainable and inWation-free level of employment. If demand is pushed beyond
this level then policy-makers will “bring about an inWation that explodes into ever faster rates
of price increases” (Lipsey 1975: 803). But there is no further change to the diagram such as
the distinction between a short-run and a long-run Phillips curve. This indicates that Lipsey
indeed interpreted Phelps and Friedman as falling back into a framework of pure demand-pull
inWation. Not only Lipsey, but also Bodkin et al. (1966: 280, n. 2) explicitly interpreted this
upcoming line of thought this way.25 Furthermore, as is shown in Schwarzer (2015d), also other
economists had very similar views regarding Friedman’s reinterpretation of the Phillips curve.
25Bodkin et al. (1966: 280, n. 2), of course, did not refer to Phelps (1967) or Friedman (1968), but to Coyne (1958: 10),
the Governor of the Bank of Canada from 1955 to 1961, who took the point of view that there is no conWict
between full employment and price stability so that “[t]he idea that readiness to create or tolerate inWation
can make a useful contribution to the problem of maintaining a high and expanding level of employment and
output, is in danger of becoming the great economic fallacy of the day.” For a further discussion see Schwarzer
(2015a).
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In sum, Lipsey did not alter the Phillips curve diagram by including the distinction between
the vertical long-run curve and the non-vertical short-run Phillips curve. Indeed, his choice to
present the critique of Phelps and Friedman in the conWict-free L-shaped supply curve diagram
shows how much weight Lipsey put on the underlying reasons for the Phillips curve conWict—a
conWict which is still presented as the outcome of a growing and changing economy (see Lipsey
1975: 801U.).
This emphasis on embedding the Phillips curve into a dynamic economy is crucial. As Phelps
(1968a: 682) correctly noted, bottlenecks cannot account for ongoing inWationary pressure as
soon as the economy has adjusted. However, as Lipsey (1978: 58, n. 9) remarked, the idea of
a growing and changing economy was also the basis for Tobin’s 1971 Presidential Address
(1972b: 9U.), in which factors such as “new products, new processes, new tastes and fashions,
new developments of land and natural resources, obsolescent industries and declining areas
[...] keep markets in perpetual disequilibrium” (Tobin 1972b: 10). Due to these ongoing sectoral
disequilibria even at full employment it follows that necessary relative price adjustments al-
ways occur. But since the Phillips curve is non-linear these price adjustments imply that “[f]ull
employment in the sense of equality of vacancies and unemployment is not compatible with
price stability” (Tobin 1972b: 10).
Tobin (1972b: 2, my italics) hence remarked that “various criteria of full employment co-
incide in a theoretical full stationary equilibrium”, for example, the absence of involuntary
unemployment (“Keynesian” full employment) and the “natural rate of unemployment” (Fried-
man’s notion of full employment). Thus, the full employment level in both lines of thought is
the same within such a static analysis. However, since “[t]he economy is in perpetual sectoral
disequilibrium even when it has settled into a stochastic macro-equilibrium” it follows that this
“full long-run equilibrium” in which the rate of inWation would play no role for unemployment
“is not an equilibrium that the system ever approaches” (Tobin 1972b: 11). Hence, as soon as
the assumption of a static economy is dropped in exchange for a dynamic perspective, a trade-
oU between full employment and price stability emerges once again and the “natural rate of
unemployment” as that rate which is “compatible with zero or some other constant inWation
rate” (Tobin 1972b: 2) therefore “dictates higher unemployment”.
Thus, as in the cost-push demand-pull debate, Friedman’s introduction of the “natural rate of
unemployment” was interpreted as shifting the full employment target to the right (in a Phillips
curve diagram) in order to make the “natural rate” compatible with price stability. Of course,
if money wages and prices are as Wexible upwards as they are downwards (an assumption
within Friedman’s framework as will be shown in the next section), then no trade-oU in such
a dynamic economy will exist. Thus, with Wexible wages and prices no inWationary bias is to
be expected even in a constantly growing and changing economy, so that full employment and
price stability are not mutually conWicting policy objectives.
Unfortunately, after Friedman’s Presidential Address the issue of an inWationary bias at full
employment which may give rise to a long-run trade-oU between full employment and price
stability became mixed up with the important role of not fully adjusting inWation expectations
in order to arrive at a long-run trade-oU. Also “Keynesians” started to argue within Friedman’s
framework, so that they shifted their emphasis on the possibility of non-adjusting inWation
expectations in general and thus got involved in an unnecessary uphill battle. The next section
will shed light on this debate.
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5.5 The Phillips Curve After Friedman: A “Keynesian” Uphill
Battle?
The introduction of Friedman’s “natural rate of unemployment” was particularly connected
to the incorporation of (adaptive) inWation expectations having a unit weight in the Phillips
curve. But, as is argued in more detail in Schwarzer (2015d), Friedman’s “natural rate” concept
also denied any issue of an inWationary bias at full employment, particularly due to aggres-
sive unions. However, a closer look at the deVnition of the “natural rate of unemployment”
reveals that Friedman also included all other possible cost-push forces into this deVnition and
so bypassed the widely discussed issue of premature inWation and of an inWationary bias at full
employment.26
Since the absolute value of the “natural rate of unemployment” is subject to all kinds of
market imperfections, including those imperfections giving rise to an inWationary bias in a
growing and changing economy, particularly the “stochastic variability in demands and sup-
plies” or also “the costs of mobility” (Friedman 1968: 8), it can be argued that any reason for
an inWationary bias at full employment is deVned out of existence. In other words, the “natural
rate of unemployment” has to be so high that the disinWationary or deWationary tendencies due
to a lack of aggregate demand counter any other possible (cost-push) sources of inWationary
pressure. In this sense, Tobin’s view (as outlined in Section 5.4) that full employment at the
“natural rate” implies a lower volume of employment than the “Keynesian” full employment
level is quite correct.
However, in contrast to “Keynesians”, Friedman did not assume that there is a strong asym-
metry with respect to upward and downward wage and price Wexibility (which implies a linear
Phillips curve). Thus, even though Friedman also took sectoral demand and supply shifts into
account, there is no need for a positive rate of inWation in order to facilitate price adjustments.
To the contrary, Friedman (1968: 13, my italics) feared that a permanent rise in the price level
will not facilitate relative price adjustments, but will rather render wages and prices more
(downwardly) sticky. Hence, the achievement of price stability27 will preserve the important
26Similar to the disclaimer on Keynes in the Preface, I would like to add a short disclaimer on Friedman. It is
not argued within this thesis and in other papers of mine that Friedman wilfully deVned away the “Keyne-
sian” problem of an inWationary bias at full employment. It is, however, argued that it was perceived in this
way by many adherents of the dilemma view. Furthermore, I would take side with Friedman regarding the
impossibility of ongoing wage pushes by unions if unions actually can be understood as being subject to the
usual optimal pricing behaviour of monopolies. Then indeed only rising market power but not a high level
of market power can be inWationary (see critically Solow 1968: 5). However, even though many arguments
presented here are in line with the reasoning that there is no inherent conWict for Friedman between full em-
ployment and price stability, also Friedman in some contributions expressed doubts about the compatibility
of both goals: For example, the problem posed by price rigidities for achieving full employment without inWa-
tion was emphasised in Friedman (1948: 254f.). Nelson (2008: 103U.) furthermore remarked that price rigidities
play an important role throughout Friedman’s contributions. On the other hand, Friedman’s explanation of
the short-run trade-oU seems to rest on a framework of price Wexibility (see, for example, Tobin 1995b: 33, n.
1). This was also the view of Modigliani (1977: 4f.) which Friedman (1977a: 12f.) strongly disputed. But see
Modigliani’s rejoinder in Friedman (1977a: 19f.).
27Besides the positive eUects of price stability outlined in the quotation, Friedman (1977a: 12) also remarked that
“[t]he major reason for favoring zero inWation is that I believe it is almost impossible to have a political set-up
which will be consistent with steady-state inWation, unless that steady state is zero, or close to it.”
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(downward) Wexibility of wages and prices:
Our economic system will work best when producers and consumers, employers
and employees, can proceed with full conVdence that the average level of prices
will behave in a known way in the future—preferably that it will be highly stable.
Under any conceivable institutional arrangements, and certainly under those that
now prevail in the United States, there is only a limited amount of Wexibility in
prices and wages. We need to conserve this Wexibility to achieve changes in relative
prices and wages that are required to adjust to dynamic changes in tastes and
technology. We should not dissipate it simply to achieve changes in the absolute
level of prices that serve no economic function.
Thus, in order to facilitate those relative price adjustments necessary in a changing economy,
that is, to “keep the machine well oiled” (Friedman 1968: 13), it is price stability which will
assure and foster the necessary Wexibility of prices and wages so that no “cruel dilemma” exists
even in the case of a dynamic economy. On the other hand, for “Keynesians”, a positive rate of
inWation was assumed to be a solution for downward, and thus to a certain extent also relative,
price and wage inWexibility.28 In this respect, Friedman started from the assumption of a lim-
ited but apparently suXcient downward Wexibility, which becomes endangered by permanent
positive rates of inWation, while “Keynesians” started from the assumption of an insuXcient
downward Wexibility which necessarily must lead to a positive rate of inWation as a second-
best solution if full employment is to be achieved.
However, as will be argued within the next paragraphs, “Keynesians” fought an uphill battle
after Friedman’s Presidential Address, since now it was Friedman’s view of the Phillips curve
trade-oU which framed the discussion. Friedman’s new framework not only included the well-
known emphasis on the mechanism of surprise inWation and thus a change in causality of the
Phillips curve with prices leading quantities, but particularly also the implicit assumption that
full employment is compatible with price stability from the outset.
A deeper analysis of the reaction of the economics profession to Tobin’s (1972b) restatement
of the long-run trade-oU will show how far the pendulum has swung in favour of Friedman’s
interpretation. Even though Tobin’s contributions at the beginning of the 1970s do not match
the view of Lipsey and other economists in all details, they are nonetheless a fair representation
of how the Phillips curve was understood by “Keynesians”. However, there is one important
element which is by far more pronounced by Tobin: money illusion.
This important role of money illusion for the “Keynesian” Phillips curve was also emphasised
by Friedman (1975: 17):29
28But, as pointed out in Section 3.2, Samuelson and Solow (1960: 187) emphasised—very much in line with Fried-
man’s concerns—that money wage stickiness might be endogenous, so that periods of low unemployment may
“breed an inWationary bias”.
29As has been noted in the Preface, Keynes emphasised that workers not only care about their absolute real wage,
but also about their relative position. Thus, since a reduction of the nominal wage of an individual would not
only reduce the real wage of this individual, but also worsens the position of this individual compared to other
workers, such a reduction of the nominal wage is usually resisted. On the other hand, if a rise in the price
level occurs, all workers are worse oU, though the relative positions remain unchanged. Therefore, a rise in
the price level is more acceptable to the individual worker than a fall of the nominal wage.
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Indeed the whole Keynesian argument for the possibility of a full employment
policy arose out of the supposition that it was possible to get workers (at least
in the 1930s when Keynes wrote The General Theory) to accept lower real wages
produced by inWation that they would not have accepted in the direct form of a
reduction in nominal wages.
Exactly this mechanism is brought forward in Tobin (1972b: 4) by stating that “Phillips curve
doctrine [...] is in an important sense the postwar analogue of Keynesian wage and employment
theory, while natural rate doctrine is the contemporary version of the classical position Keynes
was opposing.” Even some years before, and thus at the same time as Friedman started to attack
the long-run Phillips curve, Tobin (1967: 103) remarked that “[t]he Phillips curve idea is in a
sense a reincarnation in dynamic guise of the original Keynesian idea of irrational ‘money
illusion’ in the supply of labor. The Phillips curve says that increases in money wages—and
more generally, other money incomes—are in some signiVcant degree prized for themselves,
even if they do not result in equivalent gains in real incomes.” From this it follows that the
“Phillips curve doctrine implies that lower unemployment can be purchased at the cost of
faster inWation” (Tobin 1972b: 4). Hence, if workers care more about (relative) nominal wages
than about the real wage as such,30 then a lower unemployment rate becomes possible due to
non-adjusting wage demands to the higher rate of inWation and the fall of the real wage. Tobin
(1972b: 4f.) thus argued that a rise in aggregate demand and the rate of inWation can lower the
rate of (involuntary) unemployment.
However, already before Tobin’s Presidential Address was given and published, closely re-
lated arguments had been stated by Tobin and Ross (1971), which spurred a further debate
between Tobin and Ross (1972), Tobin (1973) and Tullock (1972, 1973). This debate will be re-
viewed in the next paragraphs to show how the discussion became blurred between inWation
as a means of relative price adjustments and as a tool to lower real wages in general.
In their essay, which was published in The New York Review of Books and thus addressed
a broader audience, Tobin and Ross (1971: 23) remarked that “[t]he cruel choice between two
evils, unemployment and inWation, has become the major economic issue of the day.” This
incompatibility between full employment and price stability is once again, as discussed in
Section 5.2, explained by “strong unions and corporations”. However, as in Tobin (1972b), even
without market power an inWationary bias in the economywill result by assuming downwardly
sticky wages and prices paired with shifting demand between sectors. Due to these nominal
downward rigidities of wages and prices “there is only one direction in which they can move
in response to changing economic conditions” (Tobin and Ross 1971: 23) to allow for relative
price adjustments. In this sense, Tobin and Ross (1971: 26) emphasised that “even in the best
of circumstances, the unpleasant fact remains that full employment implies creeping inWation.”
Nominal but not real downward stickiness of wages and prices, which suggests some sort
30Alchian (1970: 44, n. 27) pointed out that this kind of behaviour does not point at irrational money illusion
within a search model of labour market dynamics: A cut in money wages provides diUerent information to
the individual than a rise in the general price level, since the cut in money wages is perceived as an individually
lower wage (with wages at other Vrms potentially still higher), while the rise in the price level suggests that
real wages everywhere else have also fallen. Thus, within a search model of the labour market, employees
would chose unemployment due to a fall in their money wage in order to search for a better paid job, while
they would stay at the present Vrm (and thus chose employment) if there is a rise in the general level of prices.
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of money illusion, thus points at the beneVcial role of inWation for restoring market clearing
relative prices.
But instead of sticking to this argument, Tobin and Ross (1971: 23) also focused on another
eUect of money illusion which comes about if wages in general do not adjust fully to the rate
of inWation by arguing that “[i]nWation is a peaceful and anonymous resolution of these in-
consistent and conWicting claims” which arise when “unemployment is low” so that “labor and
management can claim wages and proVts which add up to more than 100 percent of the value
of output they produce at current prices” (see also Tobin 1972b: 13). Hence by inWation these
undue claims are discounted so that they stay within the budget constraint of the economy.
But this necessarily assumes that both parties suUer from money illusion in the sense that both
parties seem to be content with a higher nominal, but in eUect the same real sum of wages or
proVts. Tobin and Ross (1971: 24) thus noted with respect to Friedman’s critique that his “argu-
ment rests on an appealing but unveriVed assumption: that you can’t fool all of the people all
of the time. If labor and business are making inconsistent demands, then in Friedman’s view
a mere renumbering of prices and wages through inWation will not resolve the conWict.” Tobin
and Ross (1971: 24) hence emphasised that “[s]o long as wages and prices are set in dollars,
and money retains its age-old power to deceive, inWation can be used to resolve economic con-
Wict.” Furthermore, it is indeed recognised that “‘money-illusion’ is a transient phenomenon”
(Tobin and Ross 1971: 24). However, since “the period of adjustment is measured in decades
rather than years” it follows that “the Phillips trade-oU is real enough for the practitioners of
economic policy” (Tobin and Ross 1971: 24). This kind of money illusion thus does not point
at the beneVcial eUect of inWation for restoring market-clearing relative wages and prices, so
that a non-adjustment to the current rate of inWation can be fully in line with economic ratio-
nality, but is indeed compatible with Friedman’s approach that a permanently lower level of
unemployment can only come about by non-adjusting inWation expectations in general so that
the absolute real wage is lower throughout the economy than it would be without such money
illusion.
In his comment Tullock (1972: 426) hence critically remarked about these statements that
“[i]t is one of the virtues of Tobin’s latest presentation of the ‘Keynesian’ position [...] that
he quite frankly bases his reasoning on the possibility of fooling the workers.” Even though
Tullock (1972: 427) noted that Keynes’ approaches and “Keynesianism” are not quite the same,
he nevertheless emphasised that in order to have the desired eUect of reducing unemployment
by unexpected inWation “[t]he Keynesian who wishes to fool the workers must conceal that
desire as carefully as did Keynes himself.” According to Tullock (1972: 430), however, while
Keynes argued for reWation if unemployment is caused by a contractive shock to the money
supply, “Keynesians” made use of inWation “as a treatment for all unemployment.” Tullock
(1972: 429) thus noted that Tobin’s “article is an exceptionally lucid and candid presentation of
the straights to which Keynesians have been reduced.”
Indeed, the arguments of Tobin and Ross (1971) were poorly presented, notwithstanding the
fact that the target audience was not the economics profession but the general public.
Tobin and Ross (1972: 432f.) replied to Tullock by pointing at the same asymmetric dynam-
ics and implications of sectoral disequilibria as in Tobin (1972b), which “do not betray any
permanent or fundamental money illusion” (Tobin and Ross 1972: 433). Thus, they (1972: 432)
emphasised that “[w]e do not advocate deception as a national policy” and that “[w]e do not
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even believe in ‘money illusion.’” But as in Tobin’s Presidential Address (1972b: 4f., 13), it is
assumed that a one-time increase in the rate of inWation may lower the level of real wages
in general while the real wage then would rise in line with productivity (see Tobin and Ross
1972: 436).31
Despite this emphasis on money illusion, Tobin and Ross (1972: 433) stressed that their pro-
posal is based on the assumption of involuntary unemployment since “[i]f we thought that
unemployment of 6 percent of the labor force was voluntary and optimal, we would not ad-
31This result needs some clariVcation (see the misunderstanding in Tullock 1972: 427). Assume a standard wage
change Phillips curve wˆt = γ + α (u∗ − ut) + cpˆet with the rate of change of wages wˆ, a threshold rate of
unemployment u∗ at which the rate of inWation pˆ starts to rise (since wages begin to rise stronger than pro-
ductivity growth γ), and the realised rate of unemployment u, while the subscripts t and t−1 denote periods.
The coeXcient α determines the slope of the short-run Phillips curve while productivity growth in each period
is assumed to be the same and exogenous. This productivity growth is assumed to be fully transformed into
nominal wage growth. The weight of inWation expectations pˆe in the Phillips curve is given by the coeXcient
c, which is 1 in the “natural rate” framework, somewhere between 0 and 1 in the case of a long-run trade-oU,
and 0 if the short-run and long-run Phillips curve coincide. If adaptive inWation expectations are assumed then
pˆet = pˆ
e
t−1 + δ
(
pˆt−1 − pˆet−1
)
with δ as a learning or adjustment coeXcient. If δ = 1 then pˆet = pˆt−1 which
will be assumed in the following equation without having an important eUect on the general result (see for a
contemporary discussion Solow 1969: 3U.). The Phillips curve thus is given by wˆt = γ+α (u∗ − ut)+ cpˆt−1.
If prices are driven by unit-labour costs then pˆ = wˆ − γ in any period. From this it follows that the Phillips
curve becomes wˆt = γ+α (u∗ − ut)+c (wˆt−1 − γ). Equilibrium requires that inWation expectations are ful-
Vlled, that is, pˆet = pˆt or given the above assumption of simpliVed adaptive inWation expectations pˆt−1 = pˆt
which implies that wˆt−1 = wˆt. Substituting wˆt−1 with wˆt and solving for wˆt the equilibrium change of wage
rates is given by wˆt = α1−c (u
∗ − ut) + γ. Thus, if 0 ≤ c < 1 there is a stable rate of inWation or deWation
even if the realised unemployment rate deviates from u∗. Nominal wages then rise in line with the realised
(equilibrium) rate of inWation α1−c (u
∗ − ut) and with productivity growth γ, so that real wages rise one for
one with productivity. However, until this stable rate of inWation is realised and thus an expectational equi-
librium achieved, wage changes did not take full account of the rate of inWation due to the assumption that
inWation expectations do not have a unit weight in the Phillips curve. The cumulated loss over time (which can
be calculated by summing up the diUerence between actual and expected rates of inWation in each period) will
be exactly the diUerence between the old and new stable rate of inWation. Thus, even though nominal wages
in the end rise in line with the realised rate of inWation and productivity growth (so that real wage growth
matches productivity growth in equilibrium), the level of the realised growth path of real wages is lower than
before. This implies that in each period realised real wages are lower in their level as they would be without
money illusion, that is, if c = 1. The question thus is whether or not one should interpret the result that real
wages rise in line with productivity even if there is money illusion in the sense that “[t]his does not mean that
labor is losing out” (Tobin and Ross 1971: 24; see also Tobin and Ross 1972: 436 and Solow 1968: 8), or if the
permanently lower level of real wages implies that “it is necessary to impose upon the workers a continuous
reduction in their wages by way of inWation” (Tullock 1973: 827) since the old growth path of real wages is
not achieved. In order to decide between these two views, the crucial question is why nominal wages actually
tend to rise faster in both views the lower the rate of unemployment becomes. If this rise in the change of
wage rates is due to the assumption that workers are only willing to supply more labour at a higher (expected)
real wage as in Friedman’s view, then money illusion clearly fools the workers. On the other hand, if the rise
of wage rate changes is due to adjustment processes of an economy in continuous states of disequilibria as
in Tobin’s view, then it is not perfectly clear if workers are fooled or not, since then a rise in the change of
wage rates cannot be simply interpreted as a demand for higher real wages in general (see also the discussion
in Tobin 1972b: 5U.). The analysis above furthermore shows that Friedman’s (1966a: 60) statement that the
“‘natural’ level of unemployment” is the unemployment level “at which real wages would have a tendency to
behave in accordance with productivity” is not a suXcient condition for arriving at a unique “natural rate” as
long as c is not equal to 1.
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vocate measures to reduce it.” In their (1972: 433) view, the “natural rate of unemployment”
which is compatible with zero inWation does not point at voluntary unemployment, “it just de-
Vnes it so”. From this it follows that “if the unemployment is involuntary, then there are gains
in eliminating it and these must be balanced against the inWationary costs” (Tobin and Ross
1972: 434).
In his reply, Tullock (1973: 828) once again framed the discussion within the “natural rate”
model, without taking into account the sectoral disequilibria argument and the inWationary
bias which can occur due to non-linear sectoral Phillips curves.32 Thus, instead of focusing on
the argument that sectoral shifts of demand necessarily cause a rise in the general price level
if there is downward wage and price stickiness, Tullock once again pointed at the deliberate
creation of inWation to lower real wages in general.
As has been pointed out before, the arguments in favour of a long-run trade-oU were poorly
presented. In Tobin and Ross (1972: 433), but also especially in Tobin’s Presidential Address, To-
bin (1972b: 3) indeed remarked that “a general rise in prices is a neutral and universal method
of reducing real wages, the only method in a decentralized and uncontrolled economy. InWation
would not be needed, we may infer, if by government compulsion, economy-wide bargaining,
or social compact, all money wage rates could be scaled down together.” Therefore, “[p]rice in-
Wation [...] is a neutral method of making arbitrary money wage paths conform to the realities
of productivity growth, neutral in preserving the structure of relative wages” (Tobin 1972b: 13).
However, these excessive wage claims are presented as the result of ongoing sectoral disequi-
libria and the struggle of workers to preserve their relative position which may even lead to a
wage-wage spiral (see Tobin 1972b: 11U., 1973: 983f. and 1995b: 37f.), so that “[w]hen labor mar-
kets provide as many jobs as there are willing workers, there is inWation, perhaps accelerating
inWation” (Tobin 1972b: 9).
Thus, even though Tobin based his main message on the notion of inWation as an adjustment
mechanism for sectoral disequilibria, the idea that it is indeed possible or even necessary to
lower all real wages in general is discussed as well.33 In sum, Tobin’s arguments were in line
with those of earlier economists arguing in favour of a long-run trade-oU, or to be more precise,
about the unfortunate implication of an inWationary bias at full employment due to a non-linear
Phillips curve as was discussed in Section 5.4. Nonetheless, the presentation of these arguments
could have been more clear and straightforward, that is, without pointing at the important role
of inWation for restoring a market clearing real wage. Though this argument might be worth
a consideration from a theoretical point of view, it is nevertheless essentially based on money
illusion since workers are assumed to care more about their relative than about their absolute
real wage34—an assumption surely misplaced regarding the intention to counter Friedman’s
32Also Tobin (1972a: 859) discussing Friedman (1970, 1971) critically remarked about the Phillips curve used in
Friedman’s analysis that “[a]ggregation is always risky, but it seems particularly inappropriate to pretend that
aggregate variables obey the relationships that would be expected in a single homogeneous product and labor
market.”
33This fall in the real wage, however, ultimately follows from the assumption of a positive but diminishing
marginal product of labour, so that the removal of involuntary unemployment (for example by an increase in
aggregate demand) may bring about a fall of the real wage (see Tobin 1972b: 4). A lower real wage thus is an
eUect but not the cause of a lower unemployment rate.
34See Leontief (1936: 195f.) and Keynes (1937: 209).
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attack on the Phillips curve.
However, not only Tobin, but also other “Keynesians” started to argue within Friedman’s
framework, that is, making a case for a long-run Phillips curve trade-oU based on money illu-
sion. The best example is Solow. As was discussed in Chapter 3, Samuelson and Solow (1960)
had been very cautious regarding the possibility of a long-run trade-oU due to the likely ad-
justment of inWation expectations. Furthermore, they argued within the “inWationary bias”
framework. Solow (1969), on the other hand, directly aimed at addressing Friedman’s proposi-
tions by focusing on an econometric test of the no-long-run trade-oU postulate. Since the data
suggested that there is not a complete adjustment of inWation expectations to past inWation
rates, he (1969: 17) concluded that “there is a trade-oU between the speed of price increase and
the real state of the economy. It is less favorable in the long run than it is at Vrst. It may not
be ‘permanent’; but it lasts long enough for me.” In a comparable contribution, Solow (1968: 8)
remarked about the results of diUerent econometric studies with respect to inWation expecta-
tions that “the degree of money-illusion [...] is surprising.” Regarding his own results Solow
(1968: 14) noted that “[f]or time spans that matter, there is no natural rate of unemployment”
so that “a genuine trade-oU between inWation on [the] one hand and employment and output
on the other” remains.
Even though Solow (1978: 208f.) also pointed at the likely inWationary bias if wages and
prices are downwardly sticky so that the only way of relative price adjustments is via inWation,
his 1969 contribution with its emphasis on not fully adjusting inWation expectations in general
nevertheless shows that the overall framing of the trade-oU remained within Friedman’s “nat-
ural rate” model and not within the “Keynesian” disequilibrium-dynamics approach.35 But as
has been shown, in Friedman’s model there is “[n]o tradeoU, no choice, no agonizing decisions”
(Tobin 1972b: 15) from the outset, so that arguing within Friedman’s framework by pointing at
the empirical evidence for not fully adjusting inWation expectations did not do a favour to the
“Keynesian” issue of the perceived incompatibility between full employment and price stability.
This emphasis on the importance of money illusion is even more surprising since “Keynesians”
and Friedman, as will be argued in the next section, essentially had much in common regarding
the notion of full employment from a theoretical point of view, even though the inWationary
outcomes were diUerent and from each individual perspective the notion of full employment
diverged.
5.6 Full Employment and InWation: “Keynesians” and
Friedman
5.6.1 A Synthesis
This section will illustrate the diUerent perspectives about the Phillips curve dilemma to show
how each line of thought was perceived by the opposing one. Figure 5.4 focuses on the “Key-
nesian” perspective of the trade-oU discussion. Since this diagram picks up only one among
35Indeed, also within the NIRU model of Modigliani and Papademos (1975) a long-run trade-oU is assumed on
the basis of not fully adjusting inWation expectations in the sense of Friedman (see Schwarzer 2015b).
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many, but from the evidence presented here the most prominent, explanation for a trade-oU
between price stability and full employment, some qualiVcations are necessary which will be
discussed in Subsection 5.6.2. This and the following diagrams thus are to be understood as
highly stylized illustrations of the diUerent perspectives about the trade-oU between inWation
and unemployment.36
In the “Keynesian” perspective unemployment Wuctuates (with assumed equal amplitude)
between a low “Keynesian” unemployment rate UKL and a high “Keynesian” unemployment
rate UKH . The mean unemployment rate over the cycle matches the “Keynesian” full employ-
ment target FK which, due to the negatively sloped non-linear Phillips curve, would be in
line with price stability (indicating no excess supply or demand on the labour market as out-
lined in Subsection 1.3.2 and thus in line with the notion of full employment) if there were
no Wuctuations.37 Because of the non-linearity of the curve, these cyclical Wuctuations around
the “Keynesian” full employment level cause a positive rate of inWation pˆK . Thus, a “cruel
dilemma” emerges since full employment and price stability are mutually conWicting policy
objectives.
A diUerent (but complementary) interpretation which would bring about the same inWation-
ary result is based on the assumption (as discussed in Subsection 1.3.3) that aggregate demand
is unequally distributed among the sectors in the economy, so that (in a two sector model)
one sector faces excess demand (UKL) whereas the other one faces excess supply (UKH ). Once
again due to the non-linearity of the curve the same inWationary outcome pˆK would emerge.
Note that no “cruel dilemma” is to be endured if cyclical Wuctuations can be successfully
countered by active stabilisation policies or if unemployment dispersion can be completely
removed in the second interpretation. Indeed, particularly Phillips himself but also many other
economists suggested such measures exactly on these grounds.38
36At least the illustration of the “Keynesian” perspective is very much in line with the diagrams in Gray and
Lipsey (1974) and thus with the views of one of the most important proponents (Lipsey) of this reasoning for a
trade-oU between price stability and full employment. Gray and Lipsey (1974: 4, n. 4) also emphasised in line
with Tobin (1972b) that “[t]he natural rate of unemployment is much harder to deVne in a growing economy
where technology, real income and the pattern of demand are all changing continuously so that, given Vnite
adjustment times, the economy will be in a perpetual state of disequilibrium.”
37However, in some contributions the full employment level (frictional unemployment) was not thought to be
where the Phillips curve crossed the horizontal axis and thus would be in principle in line with price stability
in a non-Wuctuating economy as in the diagram, but was located to the left (see, for example, Bowen 1960a: 205)
and thus pointed at a positive rate of inWation even in the absence of cyclical or sectoral Wuctuations. On the
other hand, such diagrams were used to illustrate the main issue of the incompatibility of both goals (in Bowen
due to institutional cost-push forces, that is, inappropriate wage- and price-setting institutions). Hence, to infer
from such diagrams that the “Keynesian” full employment was necessarily an overemployment target not in
line with price stability would go too far. Furthermore, also other full employment concepts can be interpreted
as an overemployment or excess demand target: For example, for Beveridge (1944: 18) full employment “means
having always more vacant jobs than unemployed men, not slightly fewer jobs” which implies excess demand
for labour.
38However, for Lipsey (1960: 19, n. 4) it is not quite clear that successful stabilisation polices would help to
eliminate the inWationary bias due to sectoral unemployment dispersion since “[i]t might be expected that a
stable period would give time for the classical adjustment mechanism—movements of labour between markets
and changes in relative prices—to reduce the degree of sectoral inequality. On the other hand, it might well
be that cyclical Wuctuations in employment aided the markets in adjusting to changes in demand and in
techniques, and that the removal of these Wuctuations would increase the average degree of inequality existing
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Figure 5.4: Full Employment and InWation: The “Keynesian” Perspective.
Source: Own illustration.
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From the Keynesian perspective, Friedman’s introduction of the “natural rate of unemploy-
ment”, due to being compatible with price stability by deVnition, thus was understood as ef-
fectively shifting the full employment level to the right (to FF ) as indicated by the arrow. In
order to achieve price stability the economy thus has to Wuctuate (with assumed equal ampli-
tude) between UFL and UFH (dashed grey lines). This higher mean unemployment becomes
necessary due to the non-linearity of the curve. Friedman’s proposals hence were interpreted
as sweeping aside the “cruel dilemma” by deVnition, since by incorporating all kinds of market
imperfections into the “natural rate of unemployment” his notion of full employment became
compatible with price stability from the outset.
From Friedman’s perspective, however, the “Keynesian” full employment level was inter-
preted as an overemployment target (see Figure 5.5). As pointed out before, Friedman did not
assume perfect, but at least suXcient price Wexibility. Furthermore, there is no indication that
an asymmetric price reaction is assumed, that is, that there is no relative downward stickiness
of prices and wages. The relation between unemployment and inWation thus is illustrated as a
downward sloping linear Phillips curve. Price stability and Friedman’s full employment level
FF hence are compatible, even if there are cyclical or sectoral Wuctuations between UFL and
UFH . In his view, the rate of inWation pˆK thus cannot be the outcome of such Wuctuations
around the full employment level as in the “Keynesian” perspective. Instead, pˆK can only be
understood as an engineered unexpected inWation so that the economy can be steered away
from its “natural rate of unemployment” FF . From his perspective, the “Keynesian” full em-
ployment level FK (associated with the inWation rate pˆK ) thus must be an overemployment
goal, which also implies a bias towards keeping the range of economic Wuctuations closer to
the point of origin (UKL and UKH ; grey). The adjustment of inWation expectations will shift
between markets.”
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the short-run Phillips curve upwards (as indicated by the upward arrow), so that accelerating
inWation becomes necessary in order to keep the economy at FK .
Figure 5.5: Full Employment and InWation: Friedman’s Perspective.
Source: Own illustration.
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However, from the point of view of the history of economic thought, both lines of thought
were essentially pointing at the same full employment level, that is, frictional unemployment,
but the inWationary outcomes were quite diUerent. Even though it has been argued in this
discussion that no objective deVnition of full employment within the Phillips curve trade-
oU framework existed, the important role of involuntary unemployment (see Section 5.3) for
proposing expansionary policies also made clear that “Keynesians” aimed at pushing the econ-
omy towards its voluntary unemployment rate, that is, the frictional unemployment rate (see
Subsection 5.1.2): For example, Lewis (1958: 377) explicitly stated that “[o]ur employment ob-
jective is to minimize all but so-called frictional unemployment.” As another example, the Com-
mission on Money and Credit (1961: 28) emphasised “that an appropriate target for low level
unemployment to use as a guide for monetary, credit, and Vscal measures is one somewhere
near the point where the number of unVlled vacancies is about the same as the number of
unemployed” which points at the absence of involuntary unemployment due to a deVciency of
demand (see Commission on Money and Credit 1961: 38). Nonetheless, even then “there would
still be many unemployed, and there would probably be some upward pressure on wages and
prices” (Commission on Money and Credit 1961: 38f.).
This general notion that full employment is achieved if unemployment is at its frictional
level is very much in line with Friedman’s (1975: 14) view that “[u]nemployment is zero –
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which is to say, as measured, equal to ‘frictional’ or ‘transitional’ unemployment, or to use the
terminology I adopted some years ago from Wicksell, at its ‘natural’ rate.”39
Figure 5.6: Full Employment and InWation: A Synthesis.
Source: Own illustration.
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Even if this general similarity of the notion of full employment is accepted, the inWationary
outcomes were diUerent within both lines of thought. This issue is illustrated in Figure 5.6. The
“Keynesian” and Friedman’s full employment level (FK and FF ) in this diagram coincide at
Friedman’s “natural rate of unemployment”. This full employment level is in line with price
stability in both views if there are no cyclical or sectoral Wuctuations, that is, if a “static” econ-
omy is assumed. However, whereas in the “Keynesian” Phillips curve debate full employment
seemed to be only achievable by accepting some rate of inWation pˆK as soon as a dynamic econ-
omy prone to cyclical or sectoral Wuctuations (as indicated by the arrows; grey) is assumed (due
to the non-linearity of the curve), for Friedman any rate of inWation (including price stability)
is essentially in line with full employment even if such Wuctuations occur. The “Keynesian”
system thus was prone to an inWationary bias as illustrated by the upward arrow, so that the
“cruel dilemma” emerged, while no such endogenous inWationary force is to be found within
Friedman’s framework.
Nonetheless, the general compatibility of the two views about the underlying characteristics
of the full employment level should not cause the impression that both lines of thought are not
very diUerent. Indeed, they are and some qualiVcations are necessary.
39Modigliani (1986: 23) even remarked that “Friedman’s famous ‘natural rate’ [...] broadly coincides with Keynes’
‘full employment’.” Moreover, also Friedman (in Snowdon and Vane 1999a: 130f.) stated that his “natural rate”
and Keynes’ concept of full employment are very similar. See also Tobin (1997: 5U.). Of course, the under-
lying reasons for frictional unemployment are not necessarily similar among diUerent lines of thought. For
example, Schumpeter regarded frictional unemployment to be caused by the process of “creative destruction”
while Beveridge particularly highlighted the importance of frictions in the labour market (see Boianovsky and
Trautwein 2003: 390f. and 2010: 255).
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5.6.2 QualiVcations
5.6.2.1 DiUerent Views About the Structure of the Economy
Friedman (1966a: 55) remarked that the “natural” rate of unemployment is equal to the notion of
a “structural” or a “normal” or an “average” rate of unemployment in “a well-adjusted economic
system”. This deVnition not only implies that the rate of inWation is in line with inWation
expectations, but also that the price system adjusted accordingly. Only then is it the case that
“there is an inVnitely large number of monetary policies and price behaviour which will keep
unemployment at its natural level—once people’s anticipations are adjusted to that pattern of
price behavior” (Friedman 1966a: 61).
In his Nobel Lecture, Friedman (1977b: 464U.) discussed the possibility that the Phillips curve
becomes positively sloped at high rates of inWation, so that a high rate of inWation causes a
higher “natural rate of unemployment” since the whole economic and institutional structure
needs time to adjust in order to fully deal with this high rate of inWation and the likely ef-
fect of a higher variance thereof (for example, the optimal length of contracts might change).
But in the long run the original “natural rate of unemployment” will be restored. Thus Fried-
man (1977b: 468) remarked that “the long-run Phillips curve would again be vertical and we
would be back at the natural-rate hypothesis, though perhaps for a diUerent range of inWa-
tion rates than that for which it was Vrst suggested.” From this it follows, however, “that once
these institutional changes were made, and economic agents had adjusted their practices and
anticipations to them, a reversal to the earlier monetary framework or even the adoption in
the new monetary framework of a successful policy of low inWation would in its turn require
new adjustments, and these might have many of the same adverse transitional eUects on the
level of employment.” Friedman thus understood his “natural rate of unemployment” as that
rate at which inWation expectations are satisVed and to which the whole economic system ad-
justed.40 Therefore, even steady deWation is in line with keeping the economy at its “natural
rate”. As already pointed out, Friedman’s preference for price stability rested on the assumption
that the Wexibility of wages and prices is suXcient to keep the economy at full employment de-
spite cyclical or sectoral Wuctuations. Furthermore, Friedman (1958: 252) also was very sceptical
about the possibility that inWation facilitates relative price adjustments since “once it becomes
widely recognized that prices are rising, the advantages [...] will disappear”.
The “Keynesian” analysis, on the other hand, started with the assumption of a given struc-
ture of the economy including slow adjustments on the supply side as well as nominal down-
ward rigidity. The non-linearity of empirically estimated Phillips curves (see Subsection 1.3.1)
seemed to bolster this view. Thus, as remarked by Solow (1995: 199), “[i]n those days the Phillips
curve was the particular way we coped with the idea of imperfectly Wexible wages.” Given this
institutional structure, price stability was not in line with full employment from the outset and
thus seemed to be no practical target for economic policy if not accompanied by supply side
adjustments (which were, of course, endorsed; see Section 2.4 and 3.3).
As was discussed in Lipsey’s 1965 trade-oU contribution in Subsection 1.3.4, shifting the
curve closer to the point of origin by supply side polices to lessen or even remove the conWict
40Solow (1986: S31) thus remarked that “the vertical long-run Phillips curve story [...] does, however, put quite a
lot of strain on the notion of ‘fully adjusted’.”
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between both policy goals also comes at a cost (such as retraining) which society must be will-
ing to bear. Hence, the trade-oU between price stability and full employment prevailed, since
accepting the cost of more inWation for less unemployment could be regarded as a substitute
to costly supply side policies. In this sense, there was indeed a trade-oU interpretation of the
Phillips curve.
Without such structural measures, achieving price stability seemed only possible by accept-
ing involuntary unemployment on the average since “an attempt to restrict aggregate demand
so severely as to eliminate all risk of an increase in the general price level might well involve
keeping the economy far below full employment” (Council of Economic Advisers 1962: 47).
Friedman’s framework thus excludes any policy dilemma if the economy is given enough
time to adjust, while the “Keynesian” approach focused on the inWationary consequences of
the, at that time prevailing, structure of the economy as given by empirical research such as
the Phillips curve.
5.6.2.2 Accelerating InWation at Full Employment
A further important issue to be discussed is that Tobin (1972b: 9) pointed at the possibility of
accelerating inWation at full employment (see Section 5.5), which is in contrast to Friedman’s
stable rate of inWation at the “natural rate of unemployment”, and in general suggestive of the
notion of overemployment by means of deception.
Figure 5.7 once again shows the “Keynesian” perspective by incorporating a non-linear
Phillips curve and Wuctuations between UKL and UKH around the full employment level FK .41
Note that full employment and price stability are compatible if there are no cyclical Wuctu-
ations. If it is assumed that the initial long-run Phillips curve (light grey) is in line with an
expected inWation rate of zero, then cyclical Wuctuations cause a gap between the expected
and the realised inWation rate pˆ′. By assuming adaptive expectations as in Friedman’s writings,
fully adjusting inWation expectations shift the curve upwards (dark grey). If cyclical Wuctua-
tions persist, then once again a gap between expected inWation (pˆ′) and realised inWation (pˆ′′)
emerges. The following adjustment thus shifts the curve upwards again (black). Keeping the
economy at FK therefore is possible only by accelerating inWation which involves a continuous
disappointment of inWation expectations.
Based on this reasoning, accelerating inWation indeed has to follow from targeting any other
mean unemployment rate (taking into account cyclical Wuctuations) other than that in line with
price stability (given that inWation expectations are zero initially). Due to the non-linearity of
the curve this mean unemployment rate lies to the right of FK . In this respect, Friedman’s “nat-
ural rate of unemployment” which is in line with a stable rate of inWation (including complete
price stability) is indeed higher than such a “Keynesian” full employment level.
In line with Tobin’s view that full employment might cause accelerating inWation, Gray and
Lipsey (1974: 17) argued that their analysis shows that the “natural rate of unemployment”,
which they regard to be located at FK , is not compatible with a stable rate of inWation but
must necessarily lead to accelerating inWation.
41The following discussion is based on Gray and Lipsey (1974).
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Figure 5.7: Accelerating InWation at Full Employment.
Source: Own illustration.
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Even though their result comes about due to a misinterpretation of Friedman’s “natural
rate”,42 it is nonetheless very helpful from the point of view of the history of economic thought
since this misunderstanding emphasises the perceived diUerent inWationary outcomes even
though both lines of thought essentially aimed at the same level of full employment, that is, the
“natural rate of unemployment”. Indeed, this misunderstanding shows how “Keynesians” kept
sticking to their notion of full employment (compatible with their interpretation of Friedman’s
“natural rate”), while criticising Friedman’s view that this full employment level can be in line
with price stability, since from the “Keynesian” perspective the “natural rate” at FK implied a
positive if not accelerating rate of inWation.
As has been argued, both concepts are indeed similar in a “static”, that is, not Wuctuat-
ing economy, but may diverge in a “dynamic”, that is, Wuctuating economic environment.
Nonetheless, from this perspective the “Keynesian” full employment target (if not accompa-
nied by successful stabilisation policies which eliminate all cyclical Wuctuations) loses much of
its appeal due to the built-in acceleration of inWation if inWation expectations adapt fully.
42Since at the “natural rate” expectations must be realised by deVnition, no acceleration of inWation due to con-
stantly adjusting inWation expectations will occur. Gray and Lipsey (1974), however, did not single out this
necessary condition for the “natural rate” but instead interpreted Friedman’s (1968: 8) explanation of the “nat-
ural rate” as “the constant rate of unemployment that would emerge in an unchanging economy when all
markets were in equilibrium but where there was some unemployment due to labour turnover” (Gray and
Lipsey 1974: 17), which for them indicates that the “natural rate” is located at FK . This unemployment rate
is in line with Lipsey’s 1960 notion of frictional unemployment and zero excess demand or supply as dis-
cussed in Subsection 1.3.2. However, Gray and Lipsey (1974: 17) were aware that it might be “merely [...] a
terminological dispute” (which it indeed was).
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As has been shown in Section 2.2, the issue of accelerating inWation due to adjusting inWation
expectations was also discussed by Phillips and by many other contemporary economists. But
the discussion was often focused on the goods market where buyers, who expected rising prices,
prepone their purchases and thus essentially cause the rise in prices they expected, so that
a “general ‘Wight from cash’” (Brown 1955: 195) emerges (see, for example, Bronfenbrenner
1954: 32, Bowen 1960b: 336, and also the discussion in Scitovsky and Scitovsky 1964: 447).43
This mechanism to explain accelerating inWation in Phillips’ writings thus is very diUerent
from the one under discussion which is based on Friedman’s framework of adaptive expecta-
tions having a unit weight in the Phillips curve so that keeping unemployment lower than the
“natural rate” can only come about by accelerating inWation.
“Keynesians”, however, argued that accelerating inWation can be the outcome of keeping
the economy at full employment (as in Figure 5.7). This issue of accelerating inWation at full
employment was not only emphasised in the various contributions by Tobin already discussed,
but also put forward many times by Lipsey (1978, 1982, 1984, 1990a, b). In retrospective, this line
of reasoning might be regarded as an attempt to provide an explanation or even justiVcation
for an unavoidable acceleration of inWation at full employment after Friedman’s critique. In
this respect, Friedman’s accusation that “Keynesians” targeted an overemployment goal which
led to accelerating inWation in the 1970s was turned on its head by “Keynesians” who argued
that full employment at the “natural rate” may involve accelerating inWation on reasonable
grounds.
Even though this approach of getting full employment or the “natural rate” in line with ac-
celerating inWation was based on a misinterpretation of the “natural rate” concept, this line
of reasoning perfectly shows how the “Keynesian” discussion became more and more trapped
within Friedman’s framework. By arguing within Friedman’s “natural rate” concept, the “Key-
nesian” full employment level can only be in line with either accelerating inWation or with a
stable rate of inWation if inWation expectations in general do not fully adjust, that is, if there is
indeed money illusion.
This result, however, comes about since it is assumed that cyclical, and not sectoral, Wuctua-
tions are responsible for the inWationary bias. The story looks quite diUerent if the alternative
explanation for an inWationary bias at full employment is assumed, that is, if sectoral shifts
in demand cause sectoral disequilibria as already outlined in Lipsey (1960) and discussed in
Subsection 1.3.3 and Section 5.4. Figure 5.7 can also be interpreted on such a sectoral level:
If some sectors are facing excess supply (UKH ) while others excess demand (UKL), the mean
unemployment rate once again is at FK and the emerging inWation rate is pˆ′. But contrary to
the previous analysis, no acceleration must occur as also emphasised by Rees (1970b: 237):
The importance of this point is that the rise in the price level need not accel-
erate in order to aUect unemployment. So long as the pricing behaviour of Vrms
is asymmetrical for price cuts and price increases, moderate inWation generates
43Forder (2010b: 502) shows that the role of inWation expectations on the supply side was also widely discussed
at the time. See also Young et al. (2004: 115). The clearest description of the accelerationist hypothesis before
Friedman might be attributed to Lindahl (see Boianovsky and Trautwein 2006a: 881f.), even though Lindahl
did not argue within the framework of a “natural rate of unemployment” (see Boianovsky and Trautwein
2006a: 891U.).
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higher output and employment than price stability, even when it is fully antici-
pated.
Since relative price adjustments are necessary but not possible due to downwardly sticky wages
and prices, it is perfectly reasonable for the bargaining groups of some sectors to have money
illusion in the sense that this higher rate of inWation does not become fully incorporated into the
pricing behaviour of every sector (particularly those facing excess supply; see Tobin 1972b: 11f.
and 1995b: 38f.). Thus, pˆ′ can be a stable rate of inWation provided that only nominal but not
real downward stickiness is assumed in those sectors facing excess supply.44
As has been shown, “Keynesians” and Friedman in principle held the same view regarding
the notion of full employment, that is, voluntary frictional unemployment. “Keynesians”, how-
ever, attached by far more importance to pushing the economy towards this full employment
level as will be argued in the next subsection.
5.6.2.3 “Natural” or “Unnatural” Unemployment?
An important diUerence between the two lines of thought is that Friedman (1977b: 459) re-
garded a high “natural rate of unemployment” not necessarily as something to worry about:
There is a tendency to take it for granted that a high level of recorded unem-
ployment is evidence of ineXcient use of resources, and conversely. This view is
seriously in error. A low level of unemployment may be a sign of a forced-draft
economy that is using its resources ineXciently and is inducing workers to sacri-
Vce leisure for goods that they value less highly than the leisure under the mistaken
belief that their real wages will be higher than they prove to be. Or a low natural
rate of unemployment may reWect institutional arrangements that inhibit change.
A highly static rigid economy may have a Vxed place for everyone whereas a dy-
namic, highly progressive economy, which oUers everchanging opportunities and
fosters Wexibility, may have a high natural rate of unemployment.
Very much in line with Friedman’s statements on the optimal rate of growth (as given by
individual preferences; see Subsection 4.2.1), Friedman (1959) took a similar perspective with
respect to the optimal level of employment:
The appropriate goal for employment is the fullest opportunity for each individ-
ual to use his own resources in accordance with his own aspirations and to develop
his capacities to the fullest, subject only to the condition that he not interfere with
the opportunity for others to do likewise. This is vastly more diXcult to achieve
and to describe than full employment, deVned in terms of the number of people
having something called a job regardless of its adaptation to the capacities and
44Of course, additional assumptions which are beyond the scope of this discussion might be of importance for the
emerging rate of inWation and its stability: For example, price (and income) elasticities and cost functions as
well as the level and growth of labour productivity of the diUerent sectors might be very important. Further-
more, the speed of movement between the diUerent sectors as well as the speciVc wage-setting mechanism
of each sector (for example, wage-setting should be independent of wage developments in other sectors) are
other issues to be taken into account.
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aspirations of the jobholder. There is little problem of achieving full employment
in a prison or a slave state.
Thus, one is inclined to argue that for Friedman—and in contrast to “Keynesians”45—the goal of
full employment does not necessarily correspond to a low rate of unemployment. Furthermore,
Friedman (1963: 40) expressed serious doubts about the concept of full employment as such:
I have been using the word “full employment,” as if it were a well-deVned term.
It is far from that; it is almost impossible to deVne full employment in a way that
is logically precise, and yet corresponds to what we have loosely in mind. The
reason is partly that we really do not want full employment, but the opposite.
What almost all of us would like is a kind of world in which we could have all the
good things in life without working any more than we wanted to. Employment is
a means, not an end.
Furthermore, there is an important diUerence regarding the necessity to accurately estimate the
full employment level—a point more deeply elaborated in Schwarzer (2015b).46 Since Friedman
was conVdent that the “natural rate of unemployment” will always be achieved by a constant
growth rate of the money supply, there is no need in Friedman’s framework to estimate the
“natural rate”. Indeed, estimates might be counterproductive, since monetary policy might be
prone to more destabilising activism if it tries to target an (outdated) estimate of the “natural
rate of unemployment” (see Friedman 1968: 10f., 14f.). Thus, for Friedman (1996) “an accurate
estimate [of the natural rate] is not necessary for a proper monetary policy.”
This kind of reasoning is in contrast to the main ideas of Phillips himself and of subsequent
contributions, particularly those of Modigliani and Papademos (1975, 1976, 1978) who devel-
oped the “Non-InWationary Rate of Unemployment” (NIRU) as a “Keynesian” alternative to
the “natural rate” concept. While both the NIRU and the “natural rate” are in principle com-
patible with the same full employment level, within the NIRU concept the necessity of active
stabilisation policies to steer the economy towards the NIRU is emphasised. The important role
assigned to active aggregate demand management thus is by far more pronounced than within
the “natural rate” framework: Of course, and as pointed out by Friedman himself, temporary
deviations from his “natural rate” are possible even though “‘temporary’ may be a fairly long
period” (Friedman 1966a: 59). It might even take “a couple of decades” (Friedman 1968: 11) until
full adjustment to a change in the rate of inWation is made. The long run thus refers from a
theoretical point of view to a situation “when expectations are on the average realized” (Fried-
man 1977b: 469). From a practical point of view, however, deviations from the “natural rate” are
possible and “it may take a long chronological time before they are reversed and Vnally elim-
inated as anticipations adjust” (Friedman 1977b: 470). Solow (1976: 5) hence emphasised this
45For example, Harrod (1967: 17) emphasised that “I prefer the Swedish target, which they cannot of course
achieve fully, of having the unemployed at 0%. [...] We should have a similar target, if we are to be entitled to
rank ourselves as civilized.”
46This issue of arriving at a meaningful employment target still plays an important role today. For example, the
Federal Reserve System (2012)—known for its dual mandate of achieving “maximum employment” and “stable
prices”—stated with respect to the employment goal that “assessments of the maximum level of employment”
for which the “longer-run normal rate of unemployment” plays an important role “are necessarily uncertain
and subject to revision.”
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diUerence between the theoretical indisputability of the neutrality of money in the long run
on the one hand and the practical implications for economic policy on the other hand as “the
real question is not so much whether that argument is true as whether it is relevant in calendar
time. It is very important to realize this. Failure to realize it has triggered innumerable wasted
words.”
In a nutshell, Friedman’s view about the economy in general and the “natural rate” and
full employment in particular was that individual preferences will determine these market
outcomes, so that there is no reason to estimate the “natural rate” or the full employment level.
Indeed, since no perfectly precise deVnition of full employment exists,47 no measurement seems
possible and no target can be set. However, this poses no problem for his framework, since
knowledge about the exact value of the “natural rate” is not necessary for a proper monetary
policy because the economy will always home in at the “natural rate of unemployment” by its
own devices. The “Keynesian” issue of an inherently unstable economy (see Section 2.2) giving
rise to involuntary unemployment thus plays no role within the self-stabilising “natural rate”
framework in which all unemployment is in eUect voluntary. However, since the “natural rate
of unemployment” is that rate of unemployment at which inWation expectations are realised,
full employment in such a framework Vrst of all refers to a state of equilibrium with respect
to expectations, but not necessarily—as emphasised in the Keynesian view—to an equilibrium
regarding quantities supplied and demanded on the labour market at the going real wage.
Thus, in contrast to Friedman, “Keynesians” and many economists during the Phillips curve
discussion were much more concerned with the issue of how to achieve full employment and
also how to deVne and measure it. As has been shown in Subsection 5.1.1, however, the def-
inition of full employment was indeed vague since the Phillips curve seemed to provide an
inVnite amount of possible full employment candidates if full employment is deVned as that
rate of unemployment just low enough that inWation does not become unacceptable. Nonethe-
less, the general issue of how to deVne and measure the full employment level did not induce
“Keynesians” to abandon active aggregate demand policy altogether. Rather, an estimate of the
full employment level seemed just necessary for sound economic policy.
In sum, Friedman’s “natural rate of unemployment” not only provided a unique full employ-
ment level once again, but also deprived the Phillips curve of the perceived policy dilemma.
This happened in two ways: First, by arguing that demand management can do nothing about
the rate of unemployment in the long run, so that less unemployment than given by the current
“natural rate” can only be achieved by supply side policies (see Friedman 1968: 9 and 1975: 24).
This view was, for example, expressed by Laidler (1975: 46f.):
Does this [the natural rate hypothesis] then mean that the pursuit of high em-
ployment must be given up as an aim of policy in this country? This is the popular
caricature of the monetarist position. The implication of the natural unemploy-
ment rate hypothesis is that, if higher employment levels than are consistent with
47In the same vein, Lucas (1978: 355) remarked about the deVnition of full employment that “[n]either of these
approaches leads to an operational deVnition of full employment. Neither yields a coherent view as to why
unemployment is a problem, or as to the costs and beneVts involved in economic policies which aUect un-
employment rates. The diXculties are not the measurement error problems which necessarily arise in applied
economics. They arise because the ‘thing’ to be measured does not exist.”
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a vertical long-run Phillips curve are desired, the way to achieve them is to oper-
ate with policies directed towards the structure of the labour market and not with
“demand management” policies. [...]
Monetarist analysis suggests that it is the tools of high employment policy, rather
than its goals, which must be changed.
However, this position does not necessarily stand in conWict with the “Keynesian” view since
nearly any economist proposed supply-side policies to make both goals more compatible with
one another (see Subsection 1.3.4 and Section 2.4 and 3.3). In the meantime, a positive rate of
inWation seemed to be the price to pay for full employment in an imperfect economy prone to
an inWationary bias.
While these “monetarist” proposals were not in stark contrast to the “Keynesian” position,
the second way of depriving the Phillips curve of its dilemma interpretation certainly was:
Friedman’s view suggested that full employment is compatible with price stability from the
outset, so that the “natural rate” is not only to be regarded as the only feasible, but also as
a desirable goal of economic policy.48 This view, as Dixon (1995: 70) pointed out, thus had
important implications for the conduct of economic policy regarding unemployment as “[t]he
terminology ‘natural rate’ served to divert attention from the word ‘full’, and hence to accept
that in equilibrium there might be unemployment, and indeed that since this unemployment
was ‘natural’ it was not necessarily a bad thing.”
Friedman’s framework hence not only emphasised (adaptive) inWation expectations and the
vertical Phillips curve at the “natural rate”, but also deprived the Phillips curve of the policy
dilemma. Friedman’s reinterpretation, by being based on the assumption of solely voluntary
unemployment at the “natural rate”, however, implied that causality had now to run from un-
expected inWation to unemployment, whereas in the “Keynesian” view, by being based on in-
voluntary unemployment, causation ran from unemployment to inWation (see Nevile 1979: 111;
see also Rees 1970a: 309 discussing Lucas and Rapping 1969a, b).
There is, however, one important contributor to the Phillips curve discussion who incorpo-
rated and combined “Keynesian” elements of imperfect markets with the “monetarist” adaptive
expectations approach: Edmund Phelps. A closer look at his writings as is done in the next sec-
tion will reveal important diUerences to Friedman and will also strengthen the argument that
the “Keynesian” dilemma debate became framed within a diUerent theoretical approach.
5.7 Phelps versus Friedman: ReVning or Reframing the
Trade-OU?
Phelps’ contributions to the Phillips curve (Phelps 1967, 1968a, 1970, 1972) are discussed in
greater detail in Schwarzer (2015c). This section thus will focus on important elements in
Phelps’ writings closely connected to the argument that the Phillips curve was reinterpreted
within a diUerent theoretical framework particularly by Friedman. As has been shown, Fried-
man not only criticised the long-run trade-oU but also emphasised the view that active eco-
48Solow, in a letter to the author in August 2013, thus remarked that “[t]he use of the clever phrase ‘natural rate’
[...] conveys the idea of desirability without actually saying so.”
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nomic policy is not necessary at all since the economy will always home in at the “natural rate
of unemployment” (see Leijonhufvud in Snowdon 2004: 125f.). Moreover, economic policy is
not regarded to be stabilising due to time lags as well as data and model uncertainty (to say
nothing of politico-economic concerns). Furthermore, in Friedman’s framework no inherent
conWict between price stability and full employment exists. Friedman thus never proposed to
make use of the short-run Phillips-curve trade-oU.
In this sense, Friedman’s contributions stand in strong contrast to Phelps’ writings, partic-
ularly Phelps (1967, 1972). Even though Phelps (1967) also incorporated adaptive inWation ex-
pectations into the Phillips curve and arrived at a vertical long-run relation, Phelps (1967: 255)
nonetheless avoided the connotation “natural” and chose to speak of an “‘equilibrium’ un-
employment ratio” instead. Even though both unemployment rates share the same necessary
condition that inWation expectations must be fulVlled, they can be diUerent with respect to
the level of unemployment. While Friedman essentially assumed that the “natural rate” is com-
pletely decoupled from the rate of inWation,49 Phelps’ “‘equilibrium’ unemployment ratio” is not
necessarily so (see Phelps 1971: 42U.; see also Phelps 1970: 160f. and 1972: 35U.). One possible
cause of this inWuence of the rate of inWation on Phelps’ “‘equilibrium’ unemployment ratio”
is that the height of the inWation tax on money holdings may aUect labour supply decisions.
Another important reason is the possibility of hysteresis (see Phelps 1972: 73U.). Furthermore,
individual decisions on the labour market, for example due to risk aversion, may lead to a sub-
optimal aggregate outcome (see Phelps 1972: 83U.). In this respect, Phelps did not regard the
emerging “‘equilibrium’ unemployment ratio” as an optimal and exogenously given unemploy-
ment rate of which departures due to aggregate demand policies will not increase economic
welfare as in Friedman’s view.
For these reasons, but also due to the fact that Phelps was much more optimistic about
Vne tuning the economy, Phelps’ contributions to the Phillips curve are not to be regarded
as a critique about the trade-oU, but as a reVnement. Indeed, especially Phelps (1967, 1972)
strongly endorsed to make use of the trade-oU even if the trade-oU will vanish in the long run
and even if the trade-oU is based on deception. Since the gain in employment due to surprise
inWation is only temporary, but the resulting higher rate of inWation in eUect eternally, it is
society’s time preference which becomes important. The higher the time preference, the more
inWationary economic policy should be ceteris paribus. Phelps’ 1967 contribution thus extended
the beforehand rather timeless Phillips curve trade-oU (as in Subsection 1.3.4) by an analysis
incorporating many periods.
The interesting detail with respect to the “cruel dilemma” is that Phelps also assumed that
the motive of the policymaker is to increase aggregate demand in order to remove involuntary
unemployment. This involuntary unemployment, however, is not spread throughout the econ-
omy, but is located in some sectors of the economy due to separated markets and an unequal
distribution of demand (as discussed in Subsection 1.3.3 and Section 5.4). These assumptions
thus are still very much in line with the “dilemma view”. But the important eUect of a posi-
tive rate of inWation, the facilitation of relative price adjustments, does not play a role in this
model. Instead, since real wages in all sectors are implicitly assumed to be downwardly rigid,
49As outlined in Subsection 5.6.2.1 it should be mentioned that Friedman (1976: 232U. and 1977b: 459U.) indeed
discussed the possibility of a positive slope of the long-run Phillips curve for high rates of inWation.
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all nominal wages (and not just those in sectors facing excess demand) adjust to the new rate
of inWation. Until this catching up with the new rate of inWation has Vnished, however, there
is “involuntary over-employment” (Phelps 1967: 266) since people “work too much [...] as a
consequence of incorrect expectations” (Phelps 1967: 266, n. 1) so that they “over-estimate the
real-wage content of their current money wage bargains” (Phelps 1968b: 293). This is particu-
larly true for excess demand sectors where no involuntary unemployment was prevalent at the
beginning. Furthermore, due to the adjustment of inWation expectations the trade-oU is only a
short-run one and, in contrast to the “dilemma view”, there is no long-run eUect of a positive
rate of inWation on the rate of unemployment. Thus, even though the reason (involuntary un-
employment) to opt for a positive rate of inWation is nearly the same, the mechanism by which
inWation alters the rate of unemployment is very diUerent. In Phelps (1967) it is unexpected in-
Wation (as in Friedman’s writings) which increases the activity level of the economy in general,
while in the “dilemma view” changing demand patterns and other sectoral shocks bring the
economy into ongoing disequilibria which cause inWation in the aggregate due to non-linear
Phillips curves at the sectoral level, so that relative price adjustments can only come about by
rising prices in those sectors facing excess demand.
Such a mechanism, however, was described in Phelps’ second main contribution to the
Phillips curve: Phelps (1968a: 704f.) pointed out that nominal downward rigidity may make
a case to opt for a positive rate of inWation in order to facilitate relative wage adjustments.
Thus, for some small rates of inWation, money illusion may be prevalent and a long-run trade-
oU thus can exist. This concept hence is very much in line with the “Keynesian” view, even
though Phelps also makes use of the term “money illusion” which at Vrst sight implies that
the behaviour of economic subjects (by not taking full account of the rate of inWation) is not
in line with economic rationality, even though it perfectly can be if money wages are down-
wardly sticky for whatever reason, so that market-clearing relative wages and prices can only
be restored by a rise of wages and prices in excess demand sectors.
In sum, Phelps’ contributions strikingly show how “Keynesian” elements and arguments
were reinterpreted. Though sectoral disequilibria as in Subsection 1.3.3 are discussed in the 1967
paper, it is nonetheless assumed that it is unexpected inWation throughout the whole economy
which exerts an inWuence on the employment level. InWation is thus deprived of its “lubricating
eUect” (Rees 1970b: 236) and the trade-oU cannot be a long-run one. Even though the 1968
model is much closer to the traditional view in many respects (for example, the Phillips curve
is interpreted as a disequilibrium relation), the possibility of a long-run trade-oU is discussed
as being based on money illusion and thus has a negative connotation from the outset.
Nonetheless, due to this complete reinterpretation of the curve, that is, by making a distinc-
tion between a short-run and a long-run Phillips curve, Forder (2014: 211) argues that Friedman
and Phelps had not necessarily “killed oU the idea of a long-run exploitable relationship” but
rather “invented the idea of a short-run exploitable relationship.” While this statement does
not really Vt to Friedman, who never thought about using the short-run trade-oU based on
deception for economic policy, it is certainly true with respect to Phelps’ writings. Contrary to
Friedman, Phelps’ contributions to the Phillips curve are focused on making use of inWationary
policies to push the economy away from its potentially suboptimal equilibrium level. In this
sense, Phelps, though usually regarded as being close to Friedman’s view, explicitly treated the
Phillips curve as a tool for trading oU (surprise) inWation for (over-full) employment. As has
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been shown, such a trade-oU view was not that prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, since it was
the incompatibility between full employment and price stability that was mainly discussed.
InWation thus was not thought to be useful as an instrument of deception, but as a mechanism
of relative price adjustments.
The remaining question is whether or not the “Keynesian” interpretation of the Phillips
curve as representing a “dilemma” due to an inWationary bias at full employment still has some
relevance today. Within the next section it will be argued that it has, even though the negative
connotation vanished.
5.8 The “Cruel Dilemma” – Still Alive?
As has been shown in this thesis, the “Keynesian” “cruel dilemma” was deVned out of exis-
tence with the introduction of Friedman’s “natural rate of unemployment”. Barro and Gordon
(1983a: 601), however, take a diUerent point of view (although missing the point as will be
shown below) by noting that “[s]ome people have argued that policymakers do not face a ‘cruel
choice’ between inWation and unemployment in a natural rate environment. This argument is
misleading in a context where monetary institutions do not allow for policy choice to be com-
mitted.” Of course, in their model (see also Barro and Gordon 1983b) an inWationary bias exists
since the central bank faces a commitment and time-inconsistency problem (see Kydland and
Prescott 1977). Thus, due to a myopically optimising central bank which makes use of surprise
inWation, a positive average rate of inWation even at full employment or at the “natural rate”
will evolve. Even though the outcome is comparable, the underlying mechanism and concept is
very diUerent. First of all, as in Friedman’s reinterpretation, the causality of the Phillips curve
runs from unexpected inWation to unemployment, that is, monetary policy is based on “the po-
tential for creating inWation shocks, ex post” (Barro and Gordon 1983b: 101).50 Furthermore, in
the Barro-Gordon model, the central bank’s motive to inWate the economy is that the “natural
rate of unemployment” is higher than a benchmark distortion-free equilibrium unemployment
rate due to market imperfections such as unemployment insurance or income taxation (see
Barro and Gordon 1983a: 593 and 1983b: 103). From this it follows that “more government is
inWationary” (Barro and Gordon 1983a: 600). However, while the policymaker’s motive to opt
for a positive rate of inWation at Vrst sight seems to be the same as in the “Keynesian” dilemma
model, there are important diUerences. In the Barro-Gordon model surprise inWation does only
have a (short-run) positive eUect on the amount of employment, which otherwise would not
have been supplied, for example, due to government imposed taxes which render additional
employment unattractive. Hence, if the (voluntary) employment level is considered to be too
low within this model, then the solution to this problem is not to be found in aggregate de-
mand management, but in removing these distortions: “if income taxes produce a distortion
in individual labour supply so that private and social beneVts of work do not conform, one
might consider a tax reform, but not expansive monetary policy” (Spahn 2016). On the other
hand, within the “Keynesian” dilemma view inWation serves the purpose of facilitating relative
50For a critical inquiry regarding this assumption that monetary policy directly controls the rate of inWation (as in
Barro and Gordon 1983a: 594), which completely neglects the usually slow monetary transmission mechanism,
see Goodhart and Huang (1998: 378f.) and Spahn (2016).
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price adjustments at full employment. Furthermore, the proposal of an increase in aggregate
demand (which may bring about inWation) was based on the assumption of involuntary un-
employment due to a lack of demand. Hence, while in the Barro-Gordon model inWation can
be used to reduce (voluntary) unemployment only in the short run by fooling people, it has
important long-run employment consequences in the dilemma model due to the lubricating
eUect of inWation which does not rest on economic policy surprises. From this it follows that
the emerging dilemma in the Barro-Gordon model is clearly diUerent from the approach of the
1960s.
A more recent inquiry about the possible beneVcial eUects of inWation on employment by
Akerlof et al. (1996) explicitly builds upon the assumptions of the “cruel dilemma” by making
reference to Schultze (1959), Samuelson and Solow (1960), and Tobin (1972b). Due to nominal
downward wage rigidity, which is explained by fairness considerations and the like,51 Vrm-
speciVc shocks have a larger eUect on employment if there is complete price stability compared
to an economy which experiences a positive trend inWation.52 As in the dilemma view, inWation
acts as a substitute for downwardly Wexible wages, since with nominal downward rigidities,
but without positive trend inWation, real wages will remain too high for too long after a Vrm-
speciVc shock, so that a loss in employment occurs. Therefore, very much in line with the
results of the discussion in Section 5.6, Akerlof et al. (1996: 25f.) make a distinction between
the NAIRU53 and the “LSRU (lowest sustainable rate of unemployment)”. While both rates co-
incide assuming no downward wage rigidity (so that there is no dilemma as in Friedman’s
framework), no unique NAIRU exists in the case of downwardly rigid wages since then, as
in the “Keynesian” view, a long-run trade-oU between inWation and unemployment emerges.
Achieving a zero rate of inWation thus comes at the cost of an increase in the rate of unemploy-
ment between 2.1 and 2.6 percentage points (compared to the unemployment rate emerging at
3 per cent of inWation; see Akerlof et al. 1996: 31, 50).
Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) focused on testing this hypothesis. For Germany, nominal
downward wage rigidity implies that a positive rate of inWation (up to 3 percent) indeed has
some beneVcial eUect on the “lowest sustainable rate of unemployment”. The results from their
empirical analysis suggest that the LSRU is higher by 1 percentage point if zero inWation is
targeted. Despite strong nominal downward rigidities in Germany,54 the eUect thus remains
rather small. This is explained by the fact that there is positive nominal wage growth even
at zero inWation due to productivity growth55 (see Knoppik and Beissinger 2003: 636), so that
relative wage adjustments are still possible despite nominal downward rigidities. Nonetheless,
51See also the discussion in Spahn (2000: 21f.) why nominal downward rigidities can be reasonable from a mi-
croeconomic point of view.
52See for a discussion Beissinger and Möller (2000: 99f.).
53The NAIRU (non-accelerating inWation rate of unemployment) and the “natural rate of unemployment” are used
synonymously by Akerlof et al. (1996), even though there are important diUerences as outlined in Schwarzer
(2015b).
54Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) show that nominal downward rigidity is also widespread in Europe.
55The important role of productivity growth was incorporated into the Phillips curve framework in Kuh (1967).
Archibald et al. (1974: 117), however, argued that changes in productivity alter the demand for and/or supply
of labour and thus excess demand, so that productivity changes as such should not be an explanatory variable
of wage rate changes unless productivity changes improve the measurement of excess demand.
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the accumulated loss in output and employment over time of a zero inWation target can still be
considered to be substantial.
However, as pointed out by Gordon (1996: 62), Mankiw (1996: 69), and Ball and Mankiw
(1994: 249), the results of Akerlof et al. (1996) (and those of Tobin 1972b as discussed in Section
5.4) may not hold if a zero inWation target is actually implemented. Downwardly sticky wages
might just be the result of a positive average rate of inWation, while nominal downward Wexi-
bility may emerge if complete price stability is achieved.56 This argument is close to Friedman’s
concern (see Section 5.5) that an ongoing positive rate of inWation will increase nominal rigidi-
ties, while the achievement of price stability will preserve the not perfect, but albeit suXcient,
Wexibility to achieve full employment and price stability at the same time.
In this line of argument, Stüber and Beissinger (2012: 878) extended the research of Knoppik
and Beissinger (2003). The model incorporates the idea that in a low inWation environment
with downwardly rigid wages Vrms will take into account that high nominal wage increases
and their eUects on real wages cannot be reversed easily and timely. Thus, by paying attention
to the inWationary environment, Vrms adjust their nominal wage increases accordingly.57 Based
on the empirical evidence presented in their article, Stüber and Beissinger (2012: 878) concluded
that the adjustment of Vrms’ behaviour indeed compensates for the otherwise expected positive
eUects on real wage growth and on aggregate real wages in a low inWation environment, which
would usually cause a loss of employment.
In contrast to the results just presented, no “cruel dilemma” exists in models featuring full
price Wexibility, that is, in New Classical (for example, Lucas 1975) and Real Business Cycle
models (for example, Kydland and Prescott 1982 and Long and Plosser 1983). Activist eco-
nomic policy, and particularly monetary policy, in these models hence only disturbs otherwise
optimal market allocations (see Spahn 2016). Furthermore, since unemployment is assumed to
be essentially voluntary, the “Keynesian” motive for removing involuntary unemployment by
accepting the inWationary side-eUect vanished. The Phillips curve trade-oU in these models thus
boils down to the short-lived eUect of surprise inWation, which pushes the economy into some
state of over-full employment. However, this increase in employment has to be considered to
be involuntary, since given the correct information about the rate of inWation the additional
labour would not have been supplied.
Also in the standard New Keynesian model no “cruel dilemma” exists, so that the optimal
rate of inWation is essentially zero.58 This emphasis on price stability can be explained by the
disturbing eUect of a non-zero average rate of inWation on relative prices due to the assumed
sluggishness of price adjustments (see Woodford 2003: 383, 396, 405U. and Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe 2011: 689). This result comes about since the usually assumed Calvo (1983) pricing does
56A diUerent issue is whether or not fully Wexible wages are desirable from the point of view of macroeconomic
stability. As pointed out in Section 2.5, Phillips noted that a high degree of price and wage Wexibility may
indeed be destabilising. See for a discussion of this issue also Spahn (2000: 22).
57A related approach regarding price setting is discussed in Ball and Mankiw (1994). Since rigidities endogenously
depend on the inWationary environment, no “cruel dilemma” emerges.
58This result holds true even though there is a long-run trade-oU between inWation and unemployment in the
basic New Keynesian model since price setters discount future price developments and proVts, so that expected
inWation does not have a unit weight in the Phillips curve (this long-run trade-oU being nonetheless small).
See Clarida et al. (1999: 1676, n. 38), Woodford (2003: 187), and McCallum (2004: 21f.).
157
5 Discussion
not allow adjustments to trend inWation for all Vrms (see Woodford 2003: 213). However, if
indexation is allowed in the New Keynesian model then a stable positive rate of inWation has
no such negative eUect (see Woodford 2003: 403).59 Thus, in contrast to the role of inWation
within the “cruel dilemma” model, relative price adjustments are not facilitated by but rather
become necessary because of a positive average rate of inWation, which disturbs the relative
price structure. Furthermore, the beneVcial eUect of inWation in the dilemma model particularly
rests on the assumption of a non-linear Phillips curve, so that price rigidities are asymmetric,
while the New Keynesian model is based on symmetric price rigidities.
However, by incorporating asymmetric rigidities,60 by introducing not only price but also
wage stickiness (as in Erceg et al. 2000), or by taking into account sector-speciVc shocks, the
zero inWation target ceases to be optimal also in the New Keynesian model. Rather, it can be
shown that optimal monetary policy in such cases should stabilise the output gap or a price
index which gives more weight to sectors with stronger rigidities (see Woodford 2003: 417f.,
435U. and 2011: 803U.), since then even a small price reaction can be a sign of a great output gap
in the rigid sector while price changes in the Wexible sector may be just due to equilibrating
relative price adjustments (see Mankiw and Reis 2003: 1069f.).61
Both solutions, that is, output-gap stabilisation or targeting a tailored price index, however,
imply that the average rate of inWation as faced by consumers can be diUerent from zero by
following this optimal policy (at least during the adjustment period). Since the central bank still
stabilises some kind of price index which, however, does not represent the development of the
cost of living (as measured by a price index based on expenditure shares) any more (see Mankiw
and Reis 2003: 1069f. and Woodford 2011: 811f.), no “cruel dilemma” might exist at Vrst sight
(since the targeted price index is close to being stable), even though the cost of living might
be rising.62 This solution hence merely deVnes away the issue as posed by the debate of an
inWationary bias at full employment even though there is essentially no diUerence between the
results of modern and past approaches. For example, shifts in relative demand within a multi-
sector model may pose the same issue of a (short-run) trade-oU between economic activity
and inWation to monetary policy as a cost-push shock in a one-sector model (see Woodford
2011: 808).
59Furthermore, with complete indexation the costs associated with relative price dispersion vanish, so that deWa-
tion (as in Friedman 1969) can be optimal (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2011: 694). This result is also derived
if complete price Wexibility is assumed (see Woodford 2003: 479 and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2011: 684). For
a discussion of the optimal rate of inWation within diUerent models see also King and Wolman (1996).
60The asymmetry of rigidities is usually modelled by assuming sector-speciVc Calvo “lotteries” (time-dependent
rigidities). Thus, price changes in these models are diUerent between sectors with respect to their timing (see,
for example, Carvalho 2006: 5, 22 and Woodford 2011: 805), but there is no other asymmetry or non-linearity
of the Phillips curve, such as relative nominal downward stickiness, assumed. For a multi-sector model which
features menu costs instead and thus is state-dependent see Nakamura and Steinsson (2010).
61The same result holds true in the case of a monetary union, so that each sector can be understood as representing
a member nation (see Benigno 2004).
62For example, in the two-sector model of Aoki (2001: 68U.) no negative welfare implications arise from this
approach, since average consumer price inWation plays no role in the utility function of the household due to a
lack of money in the model, so that the typical “inWation tax” does not emerge. Thus, optimal monetary policy
stabilises the output gap and inWation in the sticky-price sector (“core inWation”), while paying essentially
no attention to price changes in the Wexible-price sector, which arise due to necessary relative price changes
caused by shocks (for example, oil price shocks).
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The “cruel dilemma” hence arises since monetary policy cannot stabilise the output gap and
inWation at the same time if a shock occurs. Of course, this does not point at a long-run trade-
oU between a zero output gap and price stability (since monetary policy is usually assumed
to be neutral in the long run; see Boianovsky and Trautwein 2006b: 183), but still at a short-
run one during the stabilisation period. Nonetheless, since in the original “cruel dilemma”
ongoing (and even endogenous) shocks to the economy are assumed, the short-run issue of
trading oU inWation for unemployment essentially becomes a long-run one, since each time the
policymaker either has to accept the resulting eUects on employment or on inWation.
Thus, by incorporating central arguments of the Phillips curve discussion of the 1960s, a
conWict between the objectives of price stability and full employment (or of closing the output
gap in modern models) once again exists. Hence, from a theoretical perspective a (long-run)
trade-oU which does not rest on the irrationality of economic agents, but on the dynamics
of relative price adjustments within non-perfect markets, can also be derived in the current
mainstream model based on microfoundations and rational expectations.
Of course, it can be rightly argued that the outcome of a model always depends on the un-
derlying assumptions, so that the fact that also the New Keynesian model can be adjusted in
such a way as to arrive at the desired result of a “cruel dilemma” proves nothing in itself. From
this perspective, the issue of whether or not a long-run trade-oU between price stability and
full employment exists is an empirical question. Unfortunately, taking full account of all em-
pirical results regarding the relation between these two objectives would require a thesis on its
own. There is, however, some prima facie evidence that policymakers still pay attention to the
“cruel dilemma”, though it is not always communicated that way. The non-zero inWation target
of modern central banks63 is often justiVed by referring to the same arguments as in the “cruel
dilemma”: For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia (2013) emphasises business cycle Wuc-
tuations, while the Bank of Israel (2007: 19) explicitly points at the facilitation of relative price
adjustments due to a positive inWation target if there are nominal downward rigidities (see
also Section 3.5). These issues also played a role during the evaluation of the monetary strat-
egy of the European Central Bank (1998) and its goal of a “below, but close to, 2%” rise of the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro area (see European Central Bank
2003a, b). Even though nominal downward rigidities and the emerging inWationary bias have
no pronounced role in the oXcial statements of the European Central Bank, inWation diUer-
entials and the beneVcial role of a positive inWation target for relative price-level adjustments
within the Euro area have (see European Central Bank 2011: 67). In this sense, the argument
for a positive inWation target in order to facilitate relative price adjustments is also part of the
strategy of the European Central Bank.
Of course, other reasons for aiming at a positive inWation target exist, such as the zero lower
bound (see Bernanke and Mishkin 1997: 109f.).64 Nonetheless, if complete price stability were
possible without any eUects on output and employment then it would not be reasonable to
opt for a positive inWation target—a point of view also endorsed very recently by Snower
(2015: 109). Of course, oXcially no “cruel dilemma” exists since the low but non-zero rate of
63See the overview in Roger (2010: 47) and Hammond (2012: 9).
64For an earlier elaboration of this argument see Vickrey (1954, 1959).
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inWation is still interpreted to be in line with price stability.65 In this sense, the “cruel dilemma”
of the 1960s is still alive but lost its negative connotation.
Even though the lubricating eUect of a small positive rate of inWation can also be derived
within current models and even though this mechanism played an important role for the long-
run trade-oU explanation in the 1960s, it would be too narrow to conclude that the whole
Phillips curve debate boils down to this issue of relative price adjustments. As has been shown
in this thesis, also other explanations for a long-run trade-oU, particularly the possibility of
non-adjusting inWation expectations in general, were discussed. Thus, Friedman’s account of
the Phillips curve debate is not just to be downplayed as a “Phillips Curve myth” (Forder
2010a, 2014). A more balanced view is appropriate and will be elaborated in the following
concluding chapter.
65See Svensson (1999: 197U.) for a discussion about the notion and deVnition of “price stability”. Furthermore,
current methods of estimating consumer price inWation tend to overstate the “true” rate of inWation (see
European Central Bank 2011: 66f.; see critically Wynne and Rodriguez-Palenzuela 2004). But this problem,
which “makes the terms of trade seem less favorable than they really are” (Rees 1959: 91), was also prevalent
and lively debated in times of the “cruel dilemma” (see Reinsdorf and Triplett 2009: 30 and Rippy 2014).
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When Lucas and Sargent (1978) presented their demolishing criticism about “Keynesian macro-
economics”, in which this line of thought was labelled as being “of no value in guiding policy”
(Lucas and Sargent 1978: 50), since the underlying doctrine was “fundamentally Wawed” (Lucas
and Sargent 1978: 49), the Phillips curve had already lost its “dilemma” interpretation which
was one of the central elements discussed in this Ph.D. thesis. Furthermore, since the Phillips
curve became embedded into “An Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle” (Lucas 1975),
so that the relation between economic activity and inWation only shows up due to monetary
shocks, the macroeconomic implication was turned on its head: The “Keynesian” view that
inWation emerges at full employment due to relative price adjustments necessary in a growing
and changing economy—an argument not even discussed in Lucas and Sargent (1978)66—was
replaced by the surprise inWation mechanism, so that it is unexpected inWation which pushes
the economy away from full employment.
Not surprisingly, Solow (1978: 203U.) and Modigliani (1978: 194U.) expressed their disagree-
ment with Lucas and Sargent (1978). However, Modigliani (1978: 194) also noted about the
conference that “I have been following all the speakers and discussants as though I were fol-
lowing a match. Whoever was speaking was right, and the next one was right too. So, now I
must reconcile all these ideas.”
In some sense, Modigliani’s impression of being torn between diUerent views—all of them
right in their own way—comes close to this author’s Vnal thoughts about the Phillips curve
debate and how to arrive at a conclusion: Making use of the Phillips curve as a short-run
adjustment function as in Phillips’ writings seems to be as reasonable as to interpret it as
a long-run trade-oU between full employment and price stability as in Lipsey’s and Tobin’s
contributions, while Friedman’s critique and Lucas’ extensions are not less appealing from
a theoretical point of view. Indeed, this summary will show that each interpretation had its
merits within the speciVc framework it was being discussed, while arguing that the policy
implications which followed from each line of thought cannot be assessed without taking into
account the underlying assumptions such as involuntary unemployment or less than perfect
price Wexibility.
Chapter 2 put the Phillips curve in context by focusing on Phillips’ research programme in
general and on his contributions to the Phillips curve in particular. It turned out that Phillips
interpreted his curve in two diUerent ways: On the one hand, Phillips referred to his curve
as a disequilibrium relation which indicated the speed of adjustment (strength of wage rate
changes) if the economy is out of equilibrium (as indicated by the unemployment rate). This
view was also particularly emphasised by Lipsey (1960). Phillips made use of the estimates of
66Lucas, in a correspondence with the author dated 16 August 2015, remarked that he has no memory of Tobin’s
1972b paper.
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his empirical curve to calibrate his complex and sophisticated models on stabilisation policies.
In this respect, the curve was interpreted as a short-run adjustment relation.
On the other hand, in Phillips’ contributions to actual economic policy issues the curve is
clearly interpreted as a stable long-run relation, which can be used to guide economic policy
regarding the achievable combinations of inWation and unemployment. This does not imply
though, that Phillips thought about making use of an inWationary policy in order to reduce
unemployment without limits. To the contrary, the curve indicated the limits of economic
policy, that is, the unemployment rate that had to be accepted for price stability. Knowles and
Winsten (1959: 114), though exaggerating and in general being very critical about Phillips’
estimates, are thus nevertheless essentially correct by remarking that “[i]n isolation, the curve
could be taken to suggest the existence of a Natural Law operating with the inevitability and
precision of the laws of classical physics and, if we were to look no further, it might indeed
seem plausible that to condemn 21
2
or 51
2
per cent of industrial workers to idleness was the
price of halting a too rapid rise in wage rates.” Regarding the price to pay for price stability,
economists of the 1950s and 1960s indeed thought about doing “business with the dragon—
buying some reduction in the degree of inWation by feeding him a certain number of jobs”
(Lerner 1967: 3).67 The Phillips curve thus “lent support to the notion that full-employment is
incompatible with a constant price level” (Eagly 1964: 171). It hence was interpreted as oUering
a more or less stable “menu of choice”: “The dishes listed in the left-hand column of the menu
are states of over-full, full or less than full employment; the column of prices on the right-hand
side gives the cost in terms of inWation that must be paid for each” (Rees 1970b: 227). But this
“menu of choice”, as was argued in the paper on Samuelson and Solow in Chapter 3, must be
interpreted in light of the cost-push demand-pull debate in which the Phillips curve seemed to
show that full employment and price stability are mutually conWicting policy goals.
The trade-oU interpretation hence is undeniably visible and Phillips also did not bother to
criticise Samuelson and Solow (1960) for their “menu of choice” reading of the curve, which,
however was part of the “cruel dilemma”. Forder (2014: 208) argues that Phillips did not com-
plain about how his curve was being used as a trade-oU relationship because he died in 1975,
at a time at which, according to Forder, the interpretation that the Phillips curve represented
such a long-run exploitable trade-oU (the “myth” in Friedman’s 1976 Nobel Lecture) had not
yet been popular among economists. Thus, in his view, Phillips had no reason to criticise con-
temporary economists since there was no such trade-oU view and thus nothing to complain
about. However, as has been shown in Section 2.5, Phillips did not express his disagreement
with Samuelson and Solow (1960) and other economists since he essentially fully agreed with
their view about the trade-oU as given by the Phillips curve. In this sense, the statement that
“Phillips himself is nothing but an innocent bystander” (Forder 2014: 209) is at odds with the
results presented here about Phillips’ view of the trade-oU between price stability and full em-
ployment, which unfortunately emerged due to cost-push forces as he made clear in his paper
on the Australian Phillips curve (Section 2.4).
In sum, the “cruel dilemma” and the question of “what terms of trade actually prevail” (Rees
67Since “[t]he unemployed are thus the innocent lambs led to slaughter through conventional stabilization tactics”
(Weintraub 1972: 117), some economists such as Wallich and Weintraub (1971) favoured a (tax-based) incomes
policy instead of reducing aggregate demand.
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1959: 91) was a pressing issue in an already ongoing discussion about “Full Employment at
Whatever Cost” (Viner 1950). Rees (1959: 91), for example, also Vts perfect into this trade-oU
view (my italics; see also Rees 1958: 654):
It is clear that there is some level of unemployment high enough to check price
rises by curtailing the demand for goods and services and to check wage rises by
curtailing the demand for labor. But much depends on how high this rate is and
whether it is regarded as tolerable or excessive. More broadly, we may ask on what
terms can decreases in unemployment be exchanged for increases in prices? This
question concerns not merely the “terms of trade” at a single point but the way
they change as the unemployment rate varies.
For example, we might Vnd that a 4 per cent average unemployment rate over
the whole business cycle implies an average annual price rise of 2 per cent but that
a 5 per cent average unemployment rate is consistent with price stability. In this
case we might regard price stability as worth the cost. However, we might Vnd
that increasing the average unemployment rate from 4 to 5 per cent reduces the
average rate of price rise from 2 per cent to 1.5 per cent. In this case we might
prefer the lower rate of unemployment.
The trade-oU view was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Even though Samuelson and
Solow (1960) clearly argued within the “cruel dilemma” and were sceptical about the stability
of the curve, there is nonetheless a (long-run) trade-oU interpretation of the Phillips curve
as was also conceded by Solow (2002: 74) in retrospective. Jones (1968: 4) (and later Frisch
1977: 1293) are thus essentially correct by remarking that “some noted economists [Samuelson
and Solow] have suggested that we can choose between diUerent degrees of unemployment
and price stability.” Furthermore, all commentators discussing the Samuelson and Solow paper
at the conference (see Section 3.3) clearly argued within a trade-oU framework even though
there are diUerences to Samuelson and Solow (1960), as, for example, Lerner basically based his
reasoning on an accelerationist model.68
This accelerationist version of the Phillips curve replaced the “dilemma view” after Fried-
man’s attack. Friedman’s position not only stood in contrast to the economic debates in the
1950s and 1960s with respect to the Phillips curve trade-oU, but also regarding the inWuence of
the rate of unemployment and that of inWation on the rate of growth as was discussed in Chap-
ter 4. The “cruel dilemma” in the “Keynesian” view (Subsection 4.3.1) became aggravated by
taking the negative implications of a low-pressure economy for the rate of growth into account,
since it was assumed that “today’s actual output inWuences tomorrow’s productive capacity”
(Okun 1962: 2). Thus, Plosser’s (1989: 52) view that the “Keynesian” approach was based on a
static economy is not correct. On the other hand, the “Paishian” position (Subsection 4.3.2) was
68The evolution of Lerner’s view is an interesting story itself. Lerner (1949: 194) pointed out that through unantici-
pated inWation “[p]eople are induced to do things other than what they really intend” which particularly also
includes the higher supply of labour as “[w]orkers may be induced by high or by rising money wages to work
harder than they would if they were clearly aware of the shrinking purchasing power of money”. On the other
hand, Lerner (1967: 3) was more in favour of making use of the trade-oU “[s]ince it is marginal equivalence
which gives us an optimum, we should strive for the point between low and high full employment where the
harm from additional inWation is just equal to the good from the accompanying increase in employment.”
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much more comfortable: From Paish’s point of view price stability came only at the negligible
cost of a higher rate of unemployment, while the rate of growth was maximised by the constant
pressure on producers to increase productivity. Friedman and other economists such as Phillips
and Reuber were either convinced by theoretical reasoning or by empirical evidence that the
rate of growth is independent of short-run variables such as inWation and unemployment (Sub-
section 4.3.3). This, however, did not also imply that a long-run trade-oU between inWation and
unemployment was dismissed at the same time. To the contrary, particularly Phillips himself,
but also other economists, such as Reuber, indeed discussed policy issues on the basis of a stable
Phillips curve while others critically argued that “[s]uch a loose relation is not very useful to
the policy-maker” (Reynolds 1960: 197).
In sum and with respect to the Vrst research question about whether or not the Phillips curve
was interpreted as a stable long-run relationship which oUered a “menu of choice” between in-
Wation and unemployment (and even growth), it has to be conceded that such a trade-oU view
indeed was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. Particularly Reuber’s 1962 and Lipsey’s 1965
contributions are outstanding examples of such a long-run trade-oU view (Section 5.3 and Sub-
section 1.3.4). Thus, Lipsey’s piece is correctly cited by Phelps (1967: 255, n. 1) and Rothschild
(1971: 271) as providing such a Phillips curve trade-oU. Indeed, Lipsey (2016) himself explic-
itly stated that [s]ometime in the 1960s many economists came to see the Phillips curve as
providing a stable trade-oU between inWation and unemployment.” Also “Lipsey did adopt this
trade-oU version” even though “inWationary points on the Phillips curve represented disequilib-
rium points that had to be maintained by monetary policy that perpetuated the disequilibrium
by suitable increases in the rate of monetary expansion”—a point of view Lipsey also expressed
during a personal conversation.69 Hence, from the evidence presented in this Ph.D. thesis it
must be stressed that calling the usual story about the Phillips curve, which is particularly in-
Wuenced by Friedman’s contributions, a “myth” or “fake history” as Forder (2014: 2, 4) does,
goes a little bit too far,70 though in general not all of Forder’s results and those of this thesis
stand in strong contrast with each other.
This is particularly true for the second research question, which focused on the underlying
reasons why such a trade-oU was discussed and how the Phillips curve was perceived and
interpreted with respect to economic policy. Many economists regarded the Phillips curve as
representing a conWict between full employment and price stability, so that either involuntary
unemployment or a positive rate of inWation had to be accepted. Furthermore, and also stressed
by Forder (2014: 76U.), inWation was regarded as the outcome of relative price adjustments be-
tween diUerent sectors in a growing and changing economy and subject to asymmetric price
rigidities as implied by a non-linear Phillips curve. Enforcing price stability thus came at the
cost of severely choking a breathing economy. Hence, when economists of the 1950s and 1960s
discussed the possibility of making use of aggregate demand management to keep the econ-
omy at a certain rate of unemployment (Section 4.2), the motive was to remove those Wuctua-
tions which were regarded as being responsible for the inWationary bias of the economy (see,
for example, Duesenberry 1962: 139). Therefore, instead of a “natural rate of unemployment”
69Personal conversation in Vancouver on 23 June 2013.
70This point of view is shared by Laidler (2015), who remarks that “Friedman did not simply make up his ac-
count. It had a basis in reality, albeit a partial and selective one”.
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“Keynesians” were rather thinking of a “natural rate of inWation” (Hahn 1995: 51).
Money illusion in the sense of not fully adjusting inWation expectations in general, though
being discussed as one possible mechanism of a long-run trade-oU already before Friedman,
thus was not central to this explanation. However, money illusion became the cornerstone of
Friedman’s critique. From Friedman’s perspective and within his framework, no other expla-
nation of a long-run trade-oU made sense since he was convinced that full employment does
not stand in conWict with price stability for two reasons: On the one hand, price Wexibility in
his view, though not being perfect, seemed to be suXcient to assure relative price adjustments
without having to rely on a rise in the general price level. Indeed, ongoing positive inWation
could negatively aUect this price Wexibility, so that achieving price stability would also safe-
guard price Wexibility (Section 5.5). On the other hand, other “Keynesian” cost-push forces such
as strong unions were dismissed as unreasonable within his framework, since such forces can
only show up as a one time surge of the price level (if accommodated by monetary policy and if
downward price Wexibility in other sectors is insuXcient), but cannot be responsible for ongo-
ing inWation. Thus, full employment and price stability cannot be conWicting policy objectives
even in the case of strong unions. These cost-push forces, however, may inWuence the level of
real wages and hence that of the “natural rate of unemployment”.
One element of the “Keynesian” “cruel dilemma”, that is, strong unions pushing up wages
at full employment, thus was removed by incorporating union power into the “natural rate of
unemployment” and as such making it a determinant of the full employment level. Indeed, it
has to be conceded that an employment level which renders (real) wage aspirations of unions
completely out of touch with productivity necessarily must lead to inWationary pressures (if
wage growth is not restricted by incomes policies). In this sense, Friedman is completely right
that such a level of employment can only come about by surprise inWation in the short run and
hence by accelerating inWation in the long-run. The outcome of such a myopic policy, that is,
a higher positive rate of inWation, however, was also regarded by Phillips (1959: 4) as nothing
worth to strive for:
I would question whether it is really in the interests of workers that the average
level of hourly earnings should increase more rapidly than the average rate of
increase of productivity, say about 2 per cent. per year. The capitalist has control
of the prices of the main products entering into consumption. The wage earner
cannot prevent him from adjusting his prices in response to increasing costs. And
if wages and prices rise together so that we have a steady inWation, it is not the
capitalist who will lose by it.
Besides showing that Phillips was clearly aware of the dangers of a wage-price spiral, this
quote also indicates that it was well understood that a short-run trade-oU can also come about
by diUerent adjustment speeds between wages and prices and hence without relying on the
non-adjustment of expectations or on signal extraction problems (as in Lucas 1972: 116 and
1973a: 333), which emerge by adding “a certain amount of the right kind of confusion to the
system” (Lucas 1981: 562).
In sum, however, Friedman’s critique did not only emphasise the importance of inWation ex-
pectations (for which his contributions to the Phillips curve are usually remembered), but also
turned the whole issue on its head (largely unnoticed by the economics profession): Since full
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employment and price stability are not conWicting policy objectives, the whole “Keynesian”
issue disappeared. InWation since Friedman is regarded as the tool with which the economy
can be pushed away from full employment (though this policy is not advocated by Friedman),
but not as the unavoidable outcome of an economy at full employment. “Keynesians” after
Friedman thus fought an uphill battle by arguing within Friedman’s dilemma-free framework
and by emphasising the possibility of general money illusion, while more or less ignoring
previous arguments such as sectoral disequilibria and involuntary unemployment. It has been
shown that a less-than-perfect adjustment to the rate of inWation, that is, money illusion, might
be perfectly reasonable in those sectors facing excess supply if there are nominal downward
rigidities for whatever reason. This important distinction between money illusion in speciVc
sectors of the economy as a lubricant to restore market-clearing relative prices and money
illusion which will lower the real wage throughout the economy, however, was not very pro-
nounced in many contributions (for example, in Tobin’s writings as discussed in Section 5.5).
Furthermore, “Keynesian” contributions after Friedman’s critique tried to prove the existence
of a long-run trade-oU by referring to such general money illusion without clearly pointing at
the role of inWation for facilitating relative price adjustments. The focus on this kind of general
money illusion must have conVrmed the view that “Keynesians” of the 1950s and 1960s tried
to make use of inWation (see, for example, Haberler 1972: 236 with reference to Tobin 1972b) to
push the economy towards any unemployment rate within the limits as given by the Phillips
curve. However, as has been shown, this was not the case. Hahn (1982: 74f.) is thus generally
quite correct:
It is puzzling to Vnd it put forward as a discovery that a higher inWation rate will
not increase the full-employment level of employment: Keynes and Keynesians
would not have claimed otherwise. The fact is, of course, that when trade-oUs were
discussed the unemployment on the horizontal axis was thought of as involuntary.
Even so, a trade-oUmay not exist; this will have to be discussed. But the Lucasians,
by denying the possibility of involuntary unemployment – indeed, they profess not
to know what it means – have given no reason why anyone should be interested
in their trade-oU even if it existed.
In fact, the world that they describe quite plainly needs no macro-policy. Key-
nesians were concerned with the problem of pushing the economy to its natural
rate, not beyond it. If the economy is there already, we can all go home.
The crucial issue, however, is whether “Keynesians” and their critics had the same notion about
the “natural rate of unemployment”. While it has been shown in Section 5.6 that both lines of
thought essentially aimed at the same “natural rate of unemployment”, but expected diUerent
inWationary consequences, it was also emphasised that a clear deVnition of full employment
within the Phillips curve discussion and hence in modern terms of the “natural rate of unem-
ployment” did not exist (Subsection 5.1.1). The policymaker’s preferences about inWation and
unemployment essentially deVned the full employment level. In this respect, Hahn’s statement
neglects an important caveat, so that Phelps’ (1974: 31f.) rather sarcastic comment that “[w]hat
the romantics among the Keynesians believed, however, was that within wide limits the norm
of ‘full employment’ was what the nation wished to make it”, is not so wide oU the mark as
well. Indeed, Lindahl (1962: 96f.) emphasised that the post-war inWation had been also caused
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by the aim of “a stable price level and full employment” which allows too much room for
interpretation since “it may be interpreted to mean that as full employment as possible is to
be sought within the framework of a stable price level, or that the price level must be kept as
stable as is compatible with the preservation of full employment.”
Even thoughmodern macromodels usually assume a Vxed “natural rate of unemployment”, it
has been argued with respect to the third research question about today’s relevance of the orig-
inal Phillips curve discussion that some elements are still of importance for and also discussed
within current models (Section 5.8). First of all, Phillips’ approach to automatic stabilisation
policies is very close to modern stabilisation principles such as the Taylor rule or inWation tar-
geting.71 Furthermore, closely related policy issues to the “Keynesian” “cruel dilemma” of the
1950s and 1960s actually are discussed within New Keynesian models as altering the otherwise
optimal strategy of aiming at complete price stability. Moreover, modern approaches to the is-
sue of hysteresis and in some sense endogenous growth theories are very close to the discussion
about the optimal demand pressure in order to maximise the rate of growth as has been ar-
gued in Section 4.5. In this respect, the Phillips curve cannot be understood as a stable long-run
relationship, but as a short-run one which may constantly shift due to diUerent endogenous
forces as discussed in Samuelson and Solow (1960). Solow, “[a] defender of the Phillips Curve”
(Phelps 1971: 33), emphasised this view while critically remarking about the idea of a stable
“natural rate of unemployment” that “neither theory nor observation oUers support for this. If
I am right, one is driven back to something much closer to our 1960 short-run view.”72
Indeed, it has been emphasised throughout this thesis that many arguments are still of rele-
vance today. In this sense, the discipline of the history of economic thought provides important
insights also with respect to current economic thinking and contemporary issues. Of course, as
in Friedman’s quote at the beginning of this thesis, some might take the point of view that it
is not “the task of modern theoretical economics to ‘explain’ the theoretical constructs of our
predecessors, whether or not they have proved fruitful” because “a surer route to sterility could
scarcely be imagined” (Lucas 1978: 355). On the other hand, since “[e]very orthodoxy, including
my own, needs to have a kick in the pants frequently, to prevent it from getting self-indulgent,
and applying very lax standards to itself” (Solow 1978: 204), the profound and critical analysis
of diUerent lines of thought is to be regarded as an important contribution to economics.
As has been shown, the Phillips curve discussion of the 1950s and 1960s indeed would have
greatly proVted from a more rigorous theoretical analysis by clearly stating the diUerent as-
sumptions underlying each argument. This probably would have avoided many confusing de-
bates and, quite ironically, would have strengthened the “Keynesian” point of view even after
Friedman’s critique as was argued in this thesis on the basis of current mainstream models
which closely resemble the “cruel dilemma”.
Perhaps, however, the whole debate about the Phillips curve—and about the two social
“evils” inWation and unemployment—which caused so many digressions, misunderstandings,
and “revolutions”, just conVrms Samuelson’s (1955: 334) sentiment that “[t]he science of eco-
nomics does not provide simple answers to complex social problems.”
71Phillips in 1956 (cited from Young et al. 2004: 124) indeed remarked that he “concentrated on the sort of problem
that would face a central bank or other regulating authority in attempting to control the aggregates in a
system.” See also Asso and Leeson (2012).
72Letter to the author in August 2013.
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